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# Daily Report

# Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-89-206
Thursday
26 October 1989

# Daily Report
## Soviet Union

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## Chernyshev Notes U.S. 'Violation' of ABM Treaty

*LD2510161789 Moscow TASS in English 1644 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Moscow October 25 TASS—By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev:

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's statement on the Krasnoyarsk radar station was positively received in Washington.

His admission that the station was built where it should not have been in violation of the ABM Treaty was qualified in the United States as a sign of political maturity, a reflection of the new thinking, a correct step towards broader glasnost and creation of an atmosphere favouring further progress in arms control.

All construction work was stopped on the station in October 1987. The Soviet side officially announced in Wyoming that it would be completely shut down this September.

The purpose of this open and honest, though by no means easy admission is to strengthen the ABM Treaty and pave the way to the conclusion of a Soviet-American agreement on a 50-per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

There is reason to believe that the Soviet Union now has the legal and moral right to call for clarity concerning the U.S. radar stations in Greenland and Great Britain. Our country is naturally concerned about this matter.

During the 1969-1972 SALT-1 talks and when the ABM Treaty was drafted, the American side repeatedly pointed out that large radar stations with phased antenna arrays were capable of spotting and tracking strategic ballistic missiles. This means that potentially they could be used for ABM purposes.

The agreed statement, an inalienable part of the ABM Treaty, therefore stipulates strict limitations on the location of such radars. They can be built only in areas where limited ABM facilities are permitted under the treaty, on testing grounds, and on the peripheries of national territories where they should be oriented towards the outside.

Nevertheless, the United States has built in Thule, Greenland, and is now constructing in Fylingdales-Moor, Great Britain, large radars with phased antenna arrays. Neither location can be qualified as a limited ABM facilities deployment area or an American testing ground, much less as a periphery of the United States.

They have been officially announced as early missile warning stations. Therefore, they do not fall under the exceptions stipulated by ABM documents for radar stations designed to track space vehicles or discharge national technical control functions.

Hence, the Soviet Union has every right to believe that the construction of these U.S. radars is a direct violation of the ABM Treaty.

Expecting to get an honest U.S. reply in exchange for its own honesty, the Soviet Union hopes Washington will pass an adequate decision on its radar stations in Greenland and Great Britain. This will strengthen the ABM Treaty and contribute to progress towards comprehensive reductions of strategic offensive weapons.

## General Discusses Continuing SDI Threat

*PM2510140189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Oct 89 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Lieutenant General V. Starodubov under the rubric "We Answer Readers' Questions": "Too Soon To Bury SDI"—first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] In the West and often in our country, too, you can hear it said that the "Star Wars" program no longer exists in the form in which it was conceived by U.S. President R. Reagan and that SDI is not being abandoned solely because it pays enormous scientific dividends in the shape of inventions and technological discoveries which can be used in civilian sectors. Is this so? [Signed] Captain A. Melezhik

Let us start with what the U.S. Administration itself says on this score. Soon after taking office President G. Bush issued the following promise at a joint session of both houses of Congress: "I will vigorously strive for the implementation of SDI." Secretary of State J. Baker stated quite recently at a press conference: "Our view of SDI has not changed. We vigorously support this idea." U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney made it clear: "I continue to consider SDI the most promising investment in the military sphere, and I continue to believe that we are successfully moving toward the goal of creating a system that meets the demands set by the chiefs of staff. ...I visited the Livermore Laboratory in California, and I was greatly impressed by the progress we are making on the whole in this sphere."

So SDI exists. It has not been abandoned. It is still seen as a "contribution in the military sphere" and has in no way been turned into a "program for civilian needs." It is natural that some aspects of SDI have changed since it was announced in 1983. The program has gotten rid of the elements which gave it certain fantasy overtones, and has become more specific and realistic. Many exotic projects have vanished. Some have been postponed until better days. Nobody mentions the idea of an "impenetrable shield against ballistic missiles" over the United States, which would have made the United Statesa completely impregnable if it had been necessary to threaten someone with the use of nuclear weapons or even to use them. People now talk more vaguely about a system "meeting the demands set by the joint chiefs."

Some people say with a hint of disdain that the only survivor of the SDI program is "Brilliant Pebbles."

However, as official White House spokesman M. Fitzwater stated, "if this is looked at long-term—and that is precisely how we do look at it—the 'Brilliant Pebbles' program is just the first step.... The ultimate goal—the development of a space shield capable of providing protection against ICBM's—continues to be the ultimate goal." Thus, "Brilliant Pebbles" are just the first cobbles on a road leading to the ultimate goal. Moreover, they are by no means so harmless.

"Brilliant Pebbles" are antimissile missiles. Admittedly they are small in size. But this is more of an advantage than a drawback. Judging from articles, we can see that the possibility is being assessed of deploying in the future between 3,000 and 10,000 (more than 10,000, according to other figures) such "pebbles." It is planned to site them on special platforms in space and on earth—in standby mode on launch vehicles.

"Brilliant Pebbles" is not the only system under development [razrabatyvayemyy] within the SDI framework. Work on the development [sozdaniye] of the "Alpha" chemical laser, which it is planned to test in space in the mid-nineties, can be considered far advanced. Work is under way on projects based on the use of traditional ABM systems and components—for instance, antimissile missiles based on the ERIS [Exo-atmospheric Reentry Interceptor System] and the high atmosphere HEDI [High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor] systems for intercepting missile warheads. There are other versions, too. At the same time, the basis of the country's radar field, which should guarantee ICBM detection and tracking, and the guidance of antimissile missiles onto ballistic targets, is being developed [sozdayetsya].

Thus, the facts show that the U.S. program to develop [sozdaniye] a strategic ABM defense system with space-based elements continues to exist. It is simply undergoing certain changes. How it will turn out, of course, is unknown. However, the objective relationship between strategic offensive weapons and defensive weaponry is well known. This will prevent strategic offensive weapons from being reduced unless there is a certainty that strategic equilibrium at a lower level reached as the result of an agreement is not violated by the deployment by one side of a large-scale ABM system. Such certainty is provided by observance of the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972. It strictly limits SDI as regards ABM systems.

Consequently, strict observance of the ABM Treaty is a kind of insurance policy which prevents anybody's security being harmed during the implementation of the provisions of a future treaty on strategic offensive weapons. As is well known, this treaty prohibits the deployment of an ABM system by a country or the development [sozdaniye] of the basis for such a defense system. It particularly stresses that the sides are prohibited not only from deploying but also from carrying out work on the development [sozdaniye] and testing of mobile, including space-based, ABM systems or components. Such formulas ensure sufficient time for the adoption of appropriate neutralizing retaliatory measures in the event of one of the sides starting to develop [sozdavat] or test space-based ABM systems and components or to violate the ABM Treaty in some other way.

This is why E.A. Shevardnadze, talking about the Soviet proposals aimed at solving the most complex problems at the talks on nuclear and space weapons—including the problems of the Soviet side's readiness to sign and ratify a treaty on strategic offensive weapons even if an agreement on the ABM problem is not reached before such a treaty is worked out—stressed at a press conference after the recent meeting with the U.S. secretary of state in Wyoming that this readiness is expressed provided that "the sides continue to observe the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972. Needless to say, the provision on the right to withdraw from a strategic offensive weapons treaty if one side fails to observe the ABM Treaty, should be retained." In order to avoid any false impressions about its observance, the Soviet side proposed coordinating at the talks on nuclear and space weapons a single understanding of prohibited and permitted activities within the ABM Treaty framework.

I think that the adoption of this proposal also accords with the thesis oft-repeated by the U.S. participants in the talks that it is necessary to provide a certain safety margin. In this case a safety margin would be provided for both sides.

## Moiseyev Discusses Balance of Forces, Disarmament

*PM2310145689 Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French October 1989 pp 57-71*

[Text of speech by Soviet Chief of Staff General Moiseyev to French Military Academy on 5 July 1989: "The New Political Thinking and Soviet Military Doctrine"—first five paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] During Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to France, Soviet Chief of Staff General Moiseyev delivered a lecture on 5 July at the Military Academy to the Center for Higher Military Studies and the Military Academies.

Two important points should be noted from this lecture: The first relates to France's defense policy and strategic concepts, the other relates to the presentation which the Soviet authorities intend to make of their military effort, the development of their defense doctrine, and their proposals regarding the balance of forces and disarmament.

On the first point, Gen Moiseyev's remarks in reply to the questions put to him are undoubtedly important. "I gave this reply," the Soviet chief of staff said, "in my conversation with Mr Chevenement. Following the discussions I have had with General Schmitt, this reply has changed. It is that you do not regard nuclear weapons as weapons, but simply as a political means at the disposal of the political authorities. Your doctrine corresponds to the interests of your people and your country, and to their security interests. It does not make provision for an armed attack on a state or a country, but it defends the interests of your state and your country.... It is pointless to seek areas of disagreement between us.... Yours is an independent state and a sovereign country. General de Gaulle carefully defined the broad outlines of French policy, you are faithful to them and, moreover, they are in keeping with your current interests."

Whatever remarks could be made on the terminology used—it is precisely because strategic nuclear weapons have the characteristics with which we are acquainted that they can be the instrument of French strategy, which is itself linked to an independent policy—the importance of these remarks is obvious. It is not that they are entirely new: Quite the reverse, in the sixties and seventies, the Soviet leadership admitted several times that France's nuclear weapons and deterrent strategy bore witness to the independence of French policy, and they saw this as its "positive aspect." But, subsequently, and apparently in response to France's support for the deployment of the U.S. "Euromissiles" in Europe, Moscow saw French nuclear weapons as one element of the NATO member countries' nuclear forces, and there was a demand that they be taken into account, with a view to limiting and reducing them, in discussions on a U.S.-Soviet agreement on nuclear arms in Europe. By once again recognizing now that the French nuclear arsenal is in keeping with France's national interest, that it is the independent instrument defending our interests and that Soviet foreign policy should consider it as such, Gen Moiseyev is adopting a new language which must be noted.

With regard to his explanation of Soviet theories on the USSR's defense policy and on disarmament questions, it is obviously an important element of discussion and study at a time when the Vienna and Geneva negotiations are taking place on these subjects, and we thought that our readers would appreciate us putting these theories to them.

Allow me to express my gratitude to Gen Schmitt, French armed forces chief of staff, to the representatives of the Higher National Defense Studies Institute, the Center for Higher Military Studies, and the Higher Military Academies, for the opportunity they have given me to address such a high-level audience.

It goes without saying that I am addressing you as a soldier. I will discuss political and military problems; above all, I will try to explain to you the fundamental principles of Soviet military doctrine which, in the light of the "new political thinking," has undergone a radical review aimed at giving it a strictly defensive character.

Soviet Defense Minister, Army General D. Yazov and French Defense Minister Chevenement made a detailed examination of the doctrine question in Moscow last April. I would like to continue this dialogue, taking account of the changes which have occurred in our country during this period.

The Military Doctrine of Any State Has Two Aspects: One is the political aspect and the other is the technical military aspect. However, the priority is given to the political aspect. A specific policy has a corresponding specific military doctrine. All the other factors—the economy, arms, equipment—also influence doctrine, but this influence is shown through the political aspect, too.

What is the content of the political aspect of our doctrine?

It is the pledge made by the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact member countries not to take military action against a state or alliance in any circumstances unless we are exposed to an aggression. War will not come from the Soviet Union; we will never start it. We will never, in any circumstances, be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The USSR does not have any territorial claims on anybody and does not regard any state or people as an enemy. We are prepared to establish relations with all countries based on the mutual consideration of security interests and peaceful coexistence.

These are the fundamental political guidelines. They determine the content of Soviet military doctrine and all our practical actions. Some of the West's representatives are trying not to notice the influence of these guidelines on our doctrine. Failing to fully gauge the profound nature of the changes which have taken place in the Soviet military organization, they claim, in their stereotyped remarks, that our political pledges are only words.

We are sometimes told: "In the political sphere, you seem to take defense against an aggression as the objective, but you are trying to achieve that goal by an offensive strategy." The political and technical military aspects of our doctrine are therefore apparently inconsistent.

The real situation is entirely different. The political and technical military aspects of modern Soviet military doctrine are closely linked: The latter depends on the former. They both have one thrust which is defensive in nature. This is reflected in the main political and strategic objective which we have adopted: Preventing war. Removing the risk of a conflict has now become the supreme goal, the heart of the doctrine, the essential function of the Soviet state and its armed forces. This is the first time that the mission aimed at preventing war has been turned into a principle in our doctrine. Of course, the Soviet Union previously made provision to struggle against war, among other things; but this task has now come to the fore.

Why has this happened? First, because in the nuclear age, war cannot be a means of achieving political objectives. It would lead to disaster. This policy of preventing war is now seen not only in our political pledges, but also in the general thrust of our military organization, our military planning, the training of our armed forces. Unlike the NATO countries, we are not concealing the political guidelines or the technical military guidelines of our doctrine. In addition, we are trying to explain them both to public opinion and to experts. We are prepared to hold consultations to compare the Soviet and U.S. military doctrines, and the Warsaw Pact and NATO military doctrines which would make it possible to dispel the distrust and mutual suspicion which now exist and to achieve better mutual understanding.

The nature of the technical military aspect of our military doctrine includes at least four main questions: The nature of the threat, the kind of aggression which we should prepare to repel, the kind of armed forces necessary for this purpose, the means of training the latter for this mission.

**First Question: Who Is Our Potential Enemy?**

The two sides—the USSR and the United States, the Warsaw Pact and NATO—deny that threats of war come from them. At the same time, the U.S. and NATO leaders are constantly saying that they regard the Soviet Union as their enemy. When I was in the plane bringing me to France, I was looking at the U.S. army field service manual which, on page seven, clearly designates the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact member countries as the United States' enemies. Foreign Secretary G. Howe, thinks that the "Russian bear" threatens Western Europe and that it is therefore necessary, in his view, to strengthen nuclear weapons. The Western mass media are inculcating into the public the idea of the threatening, fatal nature of socialism, according to which the USSR is enemy number one and negotiations with our country can only be conducted from a position of strength. The emphasis placed on force, deterrence, and nuclear arms, is the foundation of the Brussels declaration which was accepted by the NATO leaders on 30 May, in other words, I am anxious to stress, not during the period of confrontation and "cold war," but in the context of the new positive developments in the international situation and the "new political thinking."

What remains to be done? There is clearly one thing: Taking this into account in our practical actions. The fact is that the Warsaw Pact forces and the 3 million strong NATO forces face each other in Europe. Thousands of U.S. nuclear weapons are targeted on Soviet objectives and, in the same way, an almost equal quantity of nuclear warheads carried by Soviet missiles are targeted on U.S. objectives. Such a mutual threat produces a potential risk of war breaking out by accident and in an unpremeditated way. This influences the situation in Europe, and the international situation in general.

For instance, we are now very worried, and will continue to be very worried, by the hundreds of U.S. military bases surrounding the Soviet Union in a huge circle; we have been encircled in this way for 40 years. We are well aware of the offensive operational potential of the U.S. and NATO aircraft carriers, naval air force, and naval forces, which have superiority over Soviet naval forces in many spheres. The seaborne cruise missiles, which the United States refuses to limit and which are deployed around the Soviet Union, are a major threat.

Look at the situation from our viewpoint. Our territory is exposed to a twofold aggression—that of the U.S. and NATO offensive strategic weapons, and that of the forward-based U.S. nuclear weapons. In addition to that, there is "Star Wars," the B-2 heavy bomber ("stealth bomber")—this is the instrument of a nuclear first strike—the refusal to stop nuclear tests, plans for "compensation" and the modernization of various nuclear strike scenarios.... Can we really think that this all represents peaceful aspirations?

We must take account of this and build our defense accordingly. But why should Eastern and Western Europe not try to understand each other in the military sphere? Why could we not gradually eliminate what constitutes the mutual threat? The military threat is the main source of our mutual distrust. As long as it remains, suspicion will persist, engendering instability and nervousness, increasing the desire not to lag behind, to produce a counterforce or, worse still, to acquire unilateral advantages, in the illusory hope of inflicting defeat on the enemy while remaining safe and sound, by some miracle. The only way to end this situation is a joint effort by states to promote disarmament negotiations. However, judging from the Brussels declaration, NATO is taking a cautious line in the disarmament sphere and is bravely accumulating armaments.

**Second Question: What Aggression Should We Prepare To Repel?**

We do not have a choice here either. The United States and NATO are preparing as much for nuclear war as for conventional war. Their military doctrine, despite public statements on its "defensive" nature, has hitherto presupposed the use of nuclear weapons with the aim of threatening, fighting a war, and guaranteeing a victory. All U.S. military plans are based on carrying out military operations on foreign territory and accept preventive strikes "in case of suspicion."

This is confirmed by the American concept of air and land operations, a form of battle explained in the U.S. army field service manual (FM-105). This document stipulates in black and white that the U.S. troops should act in an offensive way, and deal powerful blows from unexpected directions. After invading foreign territory and consolidating victory, they must energetically pursue offensive actions, penetrating deep into the enemy's defenses. The rate of the offensive must be rapid, to deprive the enemy of the chance of resorting to countermeasures.

These are the guidelines on the basis of which the United States and its allies are training and equipping their armed forces. In addition, the United States is openly stating that it can be the first to resort to nuclear weapons.

For instance, General Leyland, U.S. Armed Forces chief of staff in Europe, said during the Senate hearings on 14 June: "The Atlantic Alliance's armed forces are always prepared to use nuclear weapons, and even to be the first to use them, at whatever level, from the start of an armed conflict with the Warsaw Pact countries on the European theater. The Soviet Union should have no doubt about the fact that the United States and the NATO countries will use their whole nuclear arsenal." This statement was made at a time when Admiral Crowe, chairman of the committee of U.S. armed forces chiefs of staff, was making an official visit to our country at my invitation and was trying to convince us of U.S. policy's peaceful aspirations.

It is blatantly illogical for the United States to officially admit that nuclear war will lead to disaster and at the same time to continue to adapt nuclear weapons to battlefield and theater of war missions on a world scale. While stating that there can be no victor in a nuclear war, not only is it refusing to ban nuclear weapons or simply to pledge not to be first to use them, but it is seeking technical procedures and a series of methods aimed at making the use of these weapons acceptable for it in specific circumstances.

The Soviet Union cannot fail to take account of that. While taking into consideration U.S. nuclear doctrine and strategy, we are forced to train our armed forces to repel any aggression. But why should not the United States, the USSR, France, and Britain, which now face new circumstances, make a joint and reciprocal pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons? The Warsaw Pact is also in favor of a joint pledge not to be first to start a conventional war.

We are also proposing practical measures to avert the danger of the sudden outbreak of a conflict: A substantial reduction in the two alliances' armed forces in Europe, and the removal of their offensive potential; the creation of a nuclear-free corridor along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact forces and the NATO forces, and areas in Europe where there would be low concentrations of weapons; and the formation of a European center for reducing the risk of war and preventing a surprise attack.

It is difficult to understand the reasons why the NATO countries would not accept our proposals, which take account of everybody's interests and do not undermine anybody's security.

### Third Question: What Kind of Armed Forces Should the Soviet Union Have?

This question is discussed in our doctrine, on the basis of the principle of a reasonable and adequate level of defense. By this we mean that a country (or a coalition of countries) must have the minimum level of armed forces whose composition and structure guarantee a reliable defense of the state and its allies, while ruling out the possibility of conducting offensive operations.

With regard to offensive strategic arms, the principle of adequate defense, in our view, implies a balance in these weapons between the USSR and the United States. Their structures may be different, but whatever the level of reduction, their potential capabilities must be equal in terms of the efficacy of use. On the basis of these positions, we are conducting negotiations with the United States on a 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons and are proposing that they, too, should adopt this position.

With regard to conventional forces, adequate defense implies a combat structure which enables the sides concerned to repel any aggression, without authorizing them to exercise a reciprocal threat, and without having the capability of conducting large-scale offensive actions. This involves giving the armed forces a nonoffensive structure, limiting the number of offensive weapon systems, modifying the way in which the armed forces are grouped and their deployment districts in accordance with their defensive missions, and reducing military spending and the volume of military equipment manufactured.

These are not just words. We are already implementing some of the measures we can take unilaterally without undermining our defense. Without waiting for the same measures from the West, the USSR, in consultation with its allies, has taken a series of major initiatives which give our doctrine a practical defensive content. In 1989 and 1990, our armed forces will be reduced by 500,000 men (12 percent of our forces). In Europe, the reduction of Soviet troops deployed in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and in the European part of the USSR, represents a total of 240,000 men, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 820 fighter aircraft. Half of the 10,000 tanks will be destroyed, the other half will be turned into towing vehicles for the requirements of the civilian economy, or into simulators. The military budget will be reduced by more than 14 percent and the production of arms and military equipment will be reduced by almost 20 percent. You will see that we are converting 2,250 tanks into towing vehicles for fighting major fires. These are category T-55 and T-62 tanks.

These plans are now being implemented. Almost 30,000 men, more than 3,000 tanks, and a large number of other armaments and equipment have been withdrawn from the Soviet forces stationed abroad. Three of the six armored divisions due to be withdrawn already have been. The remaining three will be withdrawn next year. All the divisions being withdrawn are being dissolved. At the same time, we are withdrawing 500 nuclear warheads from forces with tactical nuclear weapons (166 warheads on aircraft, 284 warheads on missiles, and 50 artillery warheads), and we are also withdrawing air assault units, and assault bridging units with their arms and equipment.

At the same time as this large-scale reduction, we are changing the structure of the armed forces. The number of military districts and armies has been reduced and will continue to be reduced. The number of combined forces divisions has been reduced by almost half. What we call operational maneuver groups and "armored groups" have been eliminated. The divisions which for the time being remain on our allies' territory are being reorganized. A large number of tanks have been removed from their structure (40 percent in the motorized fusiliers divisions and 20 percent in the armored divisions). The divisions are being given a defensive structure. In all, the Soviet troops' surprise attack potential has been considerably reduced.

Similarly, our allies are considerably reducing their armed forces, modifying their structures, and reducing their military spending. In all the Warsaw Pact countries are reducing their forces in Europe by more than 320,000 men, more than 13,000 tanks, more than 1,000 planes, and more than 10,000 artillery systems.

Despite these radical changes in Soviet military doctrine, nothing has yet changed in the NATO countries' policy. Instead of practical measures in response to our initiatives, we are merely hearing propaganda. The West clearly has not yet drawn up a comprehensive concept which is suited to the present stage in international relations—a concept which includes all nuclear and conventional weapons, which takes account of the political changes which have occurred now that the policy of force has been discredited, and now that it has been recognized that a different approach to problems is necessary and recourse to military solutions leads to an impasse. For the time being, the West does not have such a concept.

Western propaganda about "the Soviet threat" is now no longer credible. NATO Secretary General Woerner, expressed himself very frankly on this point. This is what he said: "It is particularly important for NATO to draw up a new way of perceiving the threat, because virtually nobody now believes in the possibility of war with the USSR. However, for the time being, there is no particular idea about the content and spirit of this new approach." We cannot help Mr Woerner either.

**Fourth Question: The Means of Training Our Forces To Repel Aggression:**

We have never had any intention of being the first to launch a war. But, based on World War II experience, we have until recently planned to repel an aggression by both offensive and defensive actions.

Taking into consideration the Western countries' concern, we have just reviewed our strategy, and we are busy reshaping the thinking of our generals and officers. In case of aggression, the Soviet armed forces' main forms of action will consist of defensive operations at the start of a conflict. In training our army, defense is now placed in the forefront. We are consequently revising the rules of engagement for our land, air, and naval troops, and the fundamental documents and rules of combat to which our armed forces refer. We have considerably reduced the number of large-scale maneuvers, we are showing moderation in our defense programs, in which qualitative parameters now have a major place, both in the technical sphere and in the composition of our armed forces.

However, we have a number of subjects of concern which the United States and NATO should take into consideration. During the "Global Shield" maneuvers, the United States has, since 1979, implemented an air surveillance system by its strategic bombers, involving the participation of around 30 percent of the B-52 and B-1B bombers. In this surveillance operation, the air routes are identical to those in the real situation. Starting from U.S. territory and passing over the North Pole, Alaska, and the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, their planes approach to within 1,300 or 1,500 km from the Soviet borders, and sometimes less. Such exercises are dangerous and cannot always be correctly identified.

NATO's annual maneuvers in Europe of the "Autumn Forge" type involve between 300,000 and 400,000 men; they have taken on such proportions that one would think we were on the threshold of war. We have to work hard to establish the difference between these maneuvers and a real deployment of NATO's armed forces in case of war. Why not take account of our concerns, in the same way that we would take into consideration those of the West on the subject of other activities by the Soviet armed forces?

There is another question which defines the nature of our doctrine. I am thinking of the plans to modernize NATO's tactical nuclear weapons. What is the root of the problem?

In view of the constructive developments in the Vienna negotiations and to create a stable situation and reduce the danger of war in Europe, it is vital to start separate negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons, with a view to reducing and completely liquidating them. This is the proposal which the Warsaw Pact organizations made to the NATO countries. What was the reply?

It was made during the meeting of NATO country leaders in Brussels. It largely corresponds with U.S. intentions. The NATO countries affirmed:

The importance they attach to the concept of nuclear deterrence and their rejection of the idea of the "triple zero" option in Europe, thus perpetuating the nuclear threat.

The postponement until 1992 of the decision to bring into service and deploy new missiles. But what will happen after that date? It is not difficult to see, because the United States has received the support of its allies in financing its Lance-2 missile program.

Their determination to link the start of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons with reaching an agreement in Vienna on conventional forces. This method of linking things is, in my view, an error of principle. The United States is trying to surround itself with a "Wall of China," with regard to negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. I must say that Mr Gorbachev's visit to Beijing has shown that the Wall of China has now become a meeting place, a favorable ground for diplomatic negotiations.

Thus, to reveal the root of the problem, the Brussels meeting virtually excluded tactical nuclear weapons from the general disarmament process. The NATO leaders rejected the proposal by the Warsaw Pact countries and gave the United States the opportunity to "quietly" implement its modernization plans.

This is not a flexible position and it does not solve the problems. This issue has been avoided to some extent, thus clearly running the risk of hampering the Vienna negotiations, and hampering Europe's progress toward a secure and stable world.

What is the point of modernization if we can, during these 2 or 3 years, secure a substantial reduction in conventional weapons? Why does the United States want to deploy the Lance 2 missile in Europe, if we are destroying our SS-23 missiles, which have a similar range? This is clearly a way of circumventing the INF agreement.

Modernization is not in harmony with the positive changes which have occurred in the international sphere and will not increase security in Europe. The latter is seen solely as security "for oneself" and not as comprehensive and equal for all. It is impossible to agree with this position, which contains the risk of confrontation and could prompt a retaliatory response.

Disarmament must be applied to all types of weapons. NATO is not justified in fearing negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons and in indefinitely postponing them. Nor has it any reason to regard nuclear weapons as something "sacrosanct."

In short, there are many problems on which we must work together to remove our respective anxieties. I must say that the talks I have had on this subject with Army General Schmitt and Defense Minister Chevenement have produced areas of agreement. Over the past 3 years, Eastern and Western Europe have made constructive progress in all directions, notably in disarmament. We must safeguard these achievements to avoid any regression which would take us back to gloomier times. In this sphere, all the European countries, and especially the USSR and France could clearly make a positive contribution through their joint efforts.

## Restructuring of Warsaw Pact Activities Suggested

*90UI0068A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian No 40, 3-9 Oct 89 pp 9- 11*

[Article by Mikhail Bezrukov and Andrey Kortunov: "What Kind of Alliance Do We Need? Prospects for the Development of the Warsaw Pact"]

[Text] Inspection of foreign political baggage and inventories of the interests and goals of the USSR in the world arena have so far touched only to an insignificant degree on our country's most important alliances and commitments. Which alliances are becoming the most important and which are losing their significance? Which ones are aiding our progress and which are impeding us? From which commitments may we be released and from which may we not?

These questions should be asked about the international military-political alliance of the socialist countries in which the USSR participates—the Warsaw Pact. For a long time the problems of the Warsaw Pact remained outside social discussion, and political science unwaveringly stated that the cooperation of the socialist countries had reached a "qualitatively new level." Today much more is being said and written about Soviet-American relations or about our common European home than about the problems of this group of countries which has traditionally been called the "socialist community." At the same time one hears the opinion that the Warsaw Pact (at least from the standpoint of the interests of the USSR) has outlived its usefulness.

### Is the Skepticism Justified?

Certain political forces proceed from the idea that the Warsaw Pact limits the sovereignty of its Eastern European members and impedes democratization, economic reform, and full-fledged inclusion in the world community. It is presented—sometimes quite categorically—as a "lever of pressure in Moscow's hands."

In our view, there are common interests which justify the existence and development of the Warsaw Pact. These include, above all, the common socioeconomic problems of its member countries. All of them (including the Soviet Union] have lagged too far behind in their development to be included under equal conditions with the West in the process of world economic and political integration. While previously, acting separately, the countries of Eastern Europe were able to achieve for themselves certain peripheral conditions for economic cooperation with the West (simply by demonstrating some degree of "independence" and "autonomy" from the Soviet Union), now, from all appearances, as the West abandons views that are typical of the "cold war," the political cost of this "autonomy" will increasingly drop. G. Bush's visits to Poland and Hungary and also the results of the meeting of the "seven" in Paris last summer showed this.

Moreover, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact would inevitably raise the questions: What system of relations will come to replace it? What mechanisms will provide for stability in Eastern Europe? For centuries this region has been a source of contradictions and military conflicts, a hotbed of large and small wars. This is where both the world wars of our century started. The creation of the Warsaw Pact, although it did not eliminate the traditional contradictions in relations among the Eastern European countries, did not enable them to move beyond the framework of being controlled either. It would be at least irresponsible to assume that, outside the framework of the Warsaw Pact, it will be easy to retain the current level of stability in the region. (Especially taking into account the internal problems in certain Eastern European countries which can be reflected in their foreign policies.)

Nor can one fail to take into account that today three-fourths of the trade of socialist countries comes from trade ties within the community; the same high level of reciprocal ties is typical of scientific, cultural, and humanitarian contacts as well. Although recently the "traditionalists" have been trying somehow to isolate their population from the phenomena taking place in the neighboring "reformist" states (limiting certain contacts or the dissemination of periodicals), these attempts are not even relatively effective.

All these problems do not only objectively unite Eastern Europe into a unified whole; just as objectively they counterpose Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to the western part of the continent. Western Europe (and also the United States and Canada) are today encountering qualitatively different problems of development and completely different horizons are opening up before it.

Let us stipulate at the outset: We are by no means in favor of perpetuating the split of Europe into two opposing blocs. We are in favor of a common European home but are against illusions that it can be created in 1 or 2 decades, simply "skipping over" all the problems and difficulties that exist in Eastern Europe. The general European process can and will develop, general European institutions and structures have great potential, and one must welcome the "breakthrough" of any socialist country into these institutions and structures. But if the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union do not wish to remain the stepchildren of the rich and flourishing Europe of the 21st century, they must act together.

### From "Monolithic Unity"—to Harmonious Diversity

What transformations are we talking about? We are speaking about a mature political alliance, about consistently overcoming the Stalinist legacy in our relations with Eastern Europe.

A mature political alliance is an alliance based on actual and not formal equality of the participants. The USSR must resolutely distance itself from those actions of the past which placed these countries in the position of satellites and not allies.

A mature political alliance is an alliance based on diversity. Diversity of the social structures of the countries included in it, diversity of political institutions and social life, in a word—diversity of models of development.

A mature political alliance is an alliance which includes, along with unity concerning the basic issues, serious disagreements and sometimes contradictions. The USSR and Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia simply cannot have "complete unity of views" on all questions, just as even two of the very best of friends cannot have complete unity of views.

At the same time the Soviet Union should not be especially nervous about the possible growth of Western influence in Eastern Europe. At the present time the prestige and authority of the USSR and its leadership among the population of Eastern European countries have increased significantly. Many offenses of the past if they have not been forgotten, have at least become less acute. It is also very important that in recent years we have managed to "de-internationalize" the internal problems of the Eastern European countries—today few of them can be linked to the possibility of Soviet intervention or direct instructions from Moscow.

Recent years have produced much evidence for the Eastern Europeans that the previous "principles" of USSR policy in Eastern Europe are a part of the past. From all appearances this will facilitate the improvement of relations among the allies.

One of the paths in this direction could be the development of political mechanisms of the alliance which so far are essentially in the embryonic stage. This subject has already been raised at a high level in the allied socialist countries, including the USSR. The question of politicization of the activity of the Warsaw Pact is becoming especially crucial now. Steps directed toward weakening the military standoff in Europe, in addition to being a contribution to the cause of maintaining peace, in our opinion, have another side—they inevitably weaken the military basis of the partnership of the Warsaw Pact allies. We can and should rejoice in these "losses." But are ties in other spheres sufficiently developed and strong? Have the necessary prerequisites been created for shifting the focus to the activity of the alliance?

Today it is more difficult to make a turn in the direction of politicizing the Warsaw Pact than it was in the earlier stages of its existence. If the process of strengthening the political structures of the socialist military and political bloc had been started under conditions of stability and indisputability of the leadership of the USSR, the corresponding suggestions would be a manifestation of confidence in our allies, a sign of readiness to involve them more in the decisionmaking process.

The difficulty of the formation of a mature political alliance in Eastern Europe is determined also by the fact that the growing economic and political difficulties in Eastern Europe are sometimes reflected in the growth of nationalist attitudes. This factor operates not only at the level of mass public awareness, but also at the state level.

Another difficulty consists in the fact that the alliance will have to be restructured under conditions of the existence of "reformers" and "traditionalists" in socialist countries. The differences between them are growing, making it more difficult to coordinate their actions.

While defending the expediency of strengthening the political structures of the alliance, one should emphasize at the outset that the steps we propose are not directed against anyone in the world. Improvement of the political mechanism of the Warsaw Pact will inevitably meet with mistrust from many in the West and it is necessary to do everything possible to dispel fears which might arise.

### The Warsaw Pact Staff Headquarters

In our view, the reform of the Warsaw Pact should lead to the creation of a permanent political staff headquarters for the bloc. It could be located in the capital of one of the member countries; say, Warsaw, Budapest, or Prague. It would be expedient to stipulate three levels for the structure of this organization. One of them would be an international collective of the secretariat working under the leadership of the general secretary of the Warsaw Pact. The second level would be permanent representations of the member countries, whose heads would meet regularly at a session of the Warsaw Pact. The third level would be permanent and temporary committees and subcommittees engaged in the consideration of a broad spectrum of problems. The proposed organizational measures, of course, would in no way call into question the need for or the usefulness of the existing higher political organs of the Warsaw Pact—the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Political Consultation Committee, or their working organs—the special commission for disarmament, the work group for reciprocal current information, and various groups of experts. We cannot but see, however, that the activity of these organs—both the high political organs and the working ones—is concentrated mainly around problems of security and disarmament in the context of East-West relations. Considerably less attention is devoted to the system of East-East relations which, in our view, should also become one of the priority tasks in the activity of the Warsaw Pact in the future.

Today for quite understandable reasons one can only guess about the form the Warsaw Pact staff headquarters might take. The main thing is to create a working organ that is capable of effectively searching for and finding political solutions that are acceptable to the allied countries.

But will the new structures duplicate the work of existing channels of communication among members of the bloc?

Is it not possible to avoid additional expenditures on such a costly project as the creation of the Warsaw Pact staff headquarters?

One should single out two circumstances that are of primary importance. First, the creation of a permanent Warsaw Pact staff headquarters will make it possible to bring into the system and regulate various and diverse contacts within the bloc which will inevitably have a positive effect on their effectiveness. Second, the task of creating new political institutions in the Warsaw Pact becomes especially important under the conditions of the changes in the socialist countries, which are placing new demands on the organization of dialogue within the bloc.

It seems that the last point is in need of further clarification. As we know, within the framework of the Warsaw Pact there has developed a tradition of solving many problems along party rather than state lines. This practice has been possible particularly because of the fact that the ruling parties in the socialist countries are all of the same type and they are similar in terms of their positions in social life and the level of development of times that exist among them. But now the situation is rapidly changing: Forces that compete with communism are coming into the political arena and Poland has already formed a coalition government where communists do not play a leading role at all. We are faced with a need to create purely state structures for interaction within the bloc which will be more resistant to change in the political situation within individual Warsaw Pact countries.

As future tasks which could be set for the new political institutions of the Warsaw Pact for purposes of forming mature allied relations within the framework of this organization, it seems possible and expedient to discuss and consider the following questions:

Conducting regular consultations pertaining to global, political, and humanitarian problems of modernity.

Participating along with the corresponding CEMA organs in preparing for actually being included in the system of international economic interdependency.

Contributing to more active utilization of the mechanisms of international diplomacy, above all the UN system, in order to strengthen international security, resolve regional conflicts, and expand cooperation.

Exchanging opinions on international conflict and crisis situations; coordinating the activity of the Warsaw Pact members in the sphere if international trade in arms and military aid to developing countries.

Examining the foundations for the creation of a mechanism for regulating bilateral and multilateral conflict situations among Warsaw Pact members themselves, including those that arise from existing territorial disputes, political disagreements, and ideological contradictions.

Developing a general political line for the Warsaw Pact regarding all areas of activity for limiting and reducing arms; holding regular consultations pertaining to Soviet-U.S. negotiations on reducing strategic offensive weapons, nuclear testing, and so forth.

Analyzing the current activity (in the political-diplomatic and military-political spheres) of NATO, the West European alliance, and the European Economic Community; determining the medium-range and long-range prospects for the development of these organizations, drawing up the Warsaw Pact policy with respect to these organizations.

Promoting contacts and cooperation between budget and foreign political commissions of higher legislative organs of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Determining the maximum amount of time for classification of Warsaw Pact documents and publishing materials that go beyond this time period.

Creating an effective and authoritative press service for the Warsaw Pact and organizing in the staff headquarters regular briefings and press conferences for journalists and providing the corresponding press releases and also Warsaw Pact periodicals and reports.

Constantly analyzing the moods of the public in the Warsaw Pact countries concerning questions of international security, disarmament, and relations among the allies.

The proposed list, of course, is open to augmentation and refinements. The permanent political structures of the Warsaw Pact should be capable of satisfactorily analyzing any question that arises and developing an acceptable solution to it. Taking this goal into account, we should also create the most flexible possible system of organs for the bloc's political mechanism.

We are not speaking about creating another bureaucratic monster in a short period of time. The development of political structures is a process that requires a good deal of time and special caution in the question of allotting additional funds and expanding the number of institutions.

### The Advantages of "Politicization"

"Politicization" of the Warsaw Pact will significantly increase this organization's stability and set a qualitatively new tone for its work, and the main thing is that it will make it more receptive to the qualitatively new requirements of modernity. On the one hand the preconditions will appear for cooperation of the socialist allied countries in areas that are critically important to their interests. On the other, the permanent political organs of the bloc, by playing the role of a kind of "buffer," will reduce the probability of the situation getting out of control, with all the negative consequences for the world that would ensue from this.

Restructuring the activity of the Warsaw Pact would also be a convincing confirmation of the peaceful intentions of the USSR and its allies and evidence that they are actually ready to make changes in international relations on the European continent in the spirit of the "new thinking." The proposed innovations would deal a real blow to references to the "exclusively military direction of the alliance of the socialist countries" and the "indifference of the USSR to the viewpoints of its partners." The appearance of new political institutions of the Warsaw Pact could also essentially facilitate interbloc dialogue with NATO.

The development of the political mechanism for the Warsaw Pact is of great value not only in the context of the opposition between East and West, which is only a part of the extremely complicated mosaic of problems facing the socialist countries. The changeover to a more mature political partnership could, in particular, render invaluable assistance in the matter of having its members "grow into" the existing world system of interconnections and be included in the world market in a limited way.

The desire to radically restructure relations with the outside world, above all economic ones, and also reforms that create conditions for movement in this direction—these are all important prerequisites for success. But the latter is by no means guaranteed. The international market does not like inexperienced and awkward "neophytes." It is difficult for them to make their way into the main areas of the international division of labor.

It takes time to adapt to the world "rules of the game." At first the socialist countries will inevitably encounter attempts to push them into secondary roles and to infringe on their interests in various areas. Under these conditions the close interaction of Warsaw Pact members, including along political lines, can be a significant plus in their struggle for their "place in the sun." It seems that the advantages of moving closer together in the interests of development are shown, on the one hand, by the experience in this kind of cooperation that has already been accumulated and, on the other, the similarity of the problems the Warsaw Pact allies will have to encounter.

In publishing these reflections as a discussion, the editors invite both Soviet and foreign specialists, as well as just interested readers, to express their opinions.

## Warsaw Pact Ministers To Meet 26-27 Oct

*LD1810183889 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1803 GMT 18 Oct 89*

[Text] Moscow, 18 Oct (TASS)—A report was circulated here today saying that, under an accord reached, the next meeting of the foreign ministers' committee of the Warsaw Pact member states will take place in Warsaw on 26-27 October, 1989.

## Medgyessy Arrives for CEMA Meeting

*LD2510192889 Budapest MTI in English 1708 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Moscow, October 25 (MTI)—Dr Peter Medgyessy arrived in Moscow from Tokyo on Wednesday. The deputy prime minister, permanent CEMA representative of the Republic of Hungary, will be heading the Hungarian delegation to take part in the 132nd session of the CEMA Executive Committee, which will begin on Thursday. The session is to conclude on Saturday, with the signing of documents.

## TASS Reports Gremitskikh Press Briefing 25 Oct

### Baker Speech

*LD2510162989 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1442 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Moscow, 25 October (TASS)—Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy head of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaking at a briefing today described as important and substantive the speech of James Baker, U.S. secretary of state, which he had given on 23 October in San Francisco before members of the "Commonwealth" Club. The Soviet diplomat drew the journalists's attention to the pronouncement of the U.S. secretary of state to the effect that the construction of "new strategic mutual relations with the USSR" based on "a healthy political foundation" is the final goal of U.S. policy in the sphere of security. "We welcome and share such appraisals and intentions," the Soviet diplomat said.

The four founding principles of stable and predictable strategic relations with the Soviet Union that James Baker proclaimed, the diplomat continued, coincide in general with the USSR's view on the strengthening of strategic stability in the process of disarmament. The thesis on favorable opportunities in world policy which provide an opportunity "to go further beyond deterrence based on the unstable technical balance of fear" also was an important new point of the statement of the secretary of state.

"At the same time," the representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, "we cannot accept all the statements made by the secretary of state without reservations. Thus, we cannot agree that the latest american programs for deploying cruise missiles and strategic bombers are almost stabilizing means only because they have low speed." The thesis alleging that the implementations of the SDI program will promote stability causes serious doubts, too, the Soviet diplomat noted.

"On the whole, James Baker's speech definitely shows the United States' new approach to relations with the Soviet Union, and this creates favorable opportunities for further approximation of the sides' approach to issues of security and progress towards new concrete accords," Yuriy Gremitskikh stressed.

### U.N. Resolution on Central America

*LD2510163289 Moscow TASS in English 1616 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Moscow October 25 TASS—The resolution on the situation in Central America, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on October 23, is graphic evidence of the United Nations' growing role and of efforts by its secretary-general to defuse conflicts, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here today.

He said that the Soviet Union fully shares the resolution's positive assessment of the efforts by the Contadora Group and all Central American countries to reach a political settlement in the region on the basis of principles of self-determination, non- interference and respect for the legitimate interests of all nations.

Of principled importance, Gremitskikh said, is the General Assembly's appeal to countries situated outside the region but maintaining connections and interests in it. These countries are called upon to facilitate the implemention of agreements reached by the Central American presidents and to refrain from any actions directed against them.

Gremitskikh expressed hope that the call will be heeded by all nations and stated that "the Soviet Union has always adhered and will adhere to these principles in its approach to the solution of problems in Central America."

### U.S. Citizen's Arrest

*LD2510170789 Moscow TASS in English 1655 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Moscow October 25 TASS—A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, addressing a regular briefing here today, drew attention to American press reports of October 14 about the arrest of U.S. citizen Frank Arnold Nesbitt on charges of attempting to pass information to Soviet authorities.

Spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh said that THE WASHINGTON POST later carried an article claiming that the Soviet State Security Committee (KBG) was trying to recruit Nesbitt during his stay in Moscow.

In September this year, Nesbitt requested the Soviet parliament in writing to give him Soviet citizenship, Gremitskikh said. Attached to the application were required documents, including an autobiography.

Nesbitt visited the Soviet Union as a tourist late in September to familiarise himself with the country and stayed in Moscow for about one week.

Gremitskikh said that a check of the curriculum vitae provided by Nesbitt led to suspicion of his possible connections with the criminal underworld, due to which his application will not be considered.

### 'Genocide' of Turkish Conscripts

*LD2510174889 Moscow TASS in English 1710 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Moscow October 25 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh has denied allegations that appeared in the Turkish mass media a few days ago about the "killing" of young Soviet Turks serving in the Soviet Army.

"the newspaper TUERKIYE went so far as to claim that manifestations of genocide against conscripts of the

Turkish nationality occurred in the Soviet Army," Gremitskikh told a briefing here today.

Referring to corresponding services of the Soviet Defence Ministry, Gremitskikh said that "among conscript soldiers who died since January of this year, there was not a single citizen of the Turkish nationality."

### Lebanese Approval of Peace Plan

*LD2510175289 Moscow TASS in English 1732 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Moscow October 25 TASS—The Soviet Union welcomes the Lebanese Parliament's approval of a Lebanese settlement plan proposed by the Arab League Tri-party Committee, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh said at a briefing today.

For the sake of saving their homeland, representatives of different Lebanese political forces and confessions managed to overcome the contradictions that had caused the current crisis.

"The peace efforts of the tri-party committee, the good will of other Arab countries and the active assistance of the world community played an important role in this process," Gremitskikh said.

The agreements reached by Lebanese parliamentarians, Gremitskikh went on to say, created favorable prospects for Lebanon's renewal and the establishment of a peaceful life.

At the same time, Gremitskikh pointed to difficulties that hindered the restoration of the national consent: the Lebanese have accumulated a lot of differences and mistrust over 15 years of armed confrontation.

"Therefore, it is necessary to protect and promote the reconciliation process. It is necessary that the Lebanese and other parties involved in the Lebanese affairs display reason and good sense in their actions and statements," Gremitskikh said.

"The Soviet Union wants to see Lebanon a united and prospering country that will fully participate in international life. For its part, the Soviet Union will continue contributing to a political settlement of the Lebanese crisis on the basis of a balance of interests, maintaining permanent contacts with the Lebanese and other parties concerned," Gremitskikh said.

### West's Perception of Bloc Changes Discussed

*PM2410130189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Oct 89 Second Edition p 4*

[Own political observer Vitaliy Korionov article: "Stick and Carrot"]

[Text] "The West must go on the ideological offensive. We must make full use of the change in the political current. In order to determine the nature of the new current forming east of the Elbe we need both a stick and a carrot."

These words could be read the other day in a DAILY TELEGRAPH article devoted to the events currently taking place in certain east European countries. The British newspaper cannot be accused of a failure to be frank. It expressed feelings currently prevalent in certain Western circles.

The processes currently taking place in the countries "east of the Elbe" indeed cannot fail to attract the attention of both the adherents and the enemies of socialism. Some people hope that the peoples, political parties, and social movements will find effective ways and means of overcoming the difficulties which a number of these countries have encountered at this new stage in their development. Others, on the contrary, hope that such a fundamental breakdown of the political and economic system is under way here that the so-called "postsocialist" stage has arrived.

Of course, the current processes in Poland, Hungary, and certain other countries are the domestic concern of their peoples. But it is also indisputable that in today's interdependent world major political events taking place in certain countries have repercussions in other parts of the world, too. This is particularly true of the long-suffering continent of Europe, where the stability of certain states often becomes a sensitive indicator of the state of the international situation.

The next century will make even greater demands of Europeans and other peoples. To a very great extent an effective response to this challenge depends on the unity and purposefulness of the united efforts of peoples and states. A peaceful and democratic Europe has all the more reason to successfully carry out its role, because it was on European soil that the process opening up a new and promising page in international relations—perestroyka in the Soviet Union and the profound reforms in the other community countries—began. Many statements by politicians, including politicians who by no means share our ideology, could be cited on this score. We will restrict ourselves to just two. Former FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt said if the West, wastes the opportunity provided by Soviet perestroyka, "it will not get another chance this century." Austrian Federal Chancellor F. Vranitzky noted: "Nobody could have predicted today that the profound transformations in the socialist countries would go smoothly and without problems. However, we have a historic opportunity, and we must seize it without fail...."

Needless to say, there are also many politicians in the Western countries who would like to use this "historic opportunity" in the exact opposite sense. They see the processes taking place in, say, Poland and Hungary as an opportunity to "change the face of Europe." "The chance of moving forward in achieving the Western alliance's main strategic aim of the past 45 years," the

FINANCIAL TIMES wrote, for instance, "is not a time to be counting small change."

Such people who long to turn whole countries into a convertible currency lose so much of a sense of reality through their unscrupulous games that they are now freely discussing how to "reward" Poland for appointing a "Solidarity" representative as prime minister, or how to urge Hungary to "show its individuality." Only these circles forget about the most "unimportant" point: Will the peoples of these sovereign countries agree to the fate which the traders of other people's sovereignty have prepared for them?

Of course, we would be avoiding reality if we failed to notice the fact that in both Poland and Hungary there are forces which link the emergence of their countries from their economic and other difficulties with a reorientation of their policies toward the West. These difficulties are obvious, they are indeed great—hence the emergence among certain people of calculations that the main and decisive means of overcoming them is economic, financial, and other aid from the West. It is well known, however, that such attempts have been made before as well. What did they lead to? Poland's foreign debt currently stands at around $40 billion. In paying off the interest Poland is already repaying more than it originally received.

Today "Solidarity" circles are making appeals to the West: "You yourselves encouraged us to act. Now you have to help us to achieve results." Just how are those to whom these appeals are addressed responding? For instance, White House Chief of Staff J. Sununu, speaking on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation," stated that the policy hitherto adopted by the administration has been consistent, has produced results, and has helped Poland to arrive at the present situation. It has been a policy of gradual steps which takes a step forward as Poland takes a step forward.

Does this mean that the West is indefinitely postponing giving economic aid to Poland or Hungary? No, it does not. The plans for providing such aid are currently being discussed in both the United States and West Europe.

Characteristic admissions are made. In early October a White House statement was published which declared: "There are no differences of opinion on the fact that Poland and Hungary need resolute support from the United States and will get it. There are no differences of opinion on the fact that the United States must play a leading role in working out a coordinated Western approach to Poland's economic resurgence." Clarifying this, the President stated at a press conference: "However, I believe that while we are giving aid, we should insist on the reforms that are needed. Otherwise we will simply be throwing money into a bottomless pit." A. Cranston, deputy majority leader in the Senate, was even more candid. He stated that U.S. aid to Poland and Hungary should "encourage these two countries to turn away from communism."

The House of Representatives voted by 345 to 47 the other day to approve the bill granting aid to Poland and Hungary. According to this document, now submitted for Senate examination, $837.5 million will be allocated to these countries in fiscal 1990-1992. The EEC countries also promise to allocate several hundred million dollars.

There is no doubt that Poland is currently going through a very difficult time. The main task now is to get the country out of its protracted socioeconomic crisis. We cannot fail to agree with those people in Poland who emphasize that this is a nationwide task which can only be resolved through the joint efforts of all Poles who value their country's supreme interests. The formation of a Polish coalition government shows that the main social forces, guided by a sense of common responsibility and cooperation in partnership, have managed to rise above their differences and grievances by expressing their readiness to jointly tackle Polish renewal. Speaking at a joint session of the Polish Sejm and Senate in connection with G. Bush's visit to Warsaw, W. Jaruzelski stressed that only those changes which correspond to society's real aspirations, improve its life, strengthen civil liberties, and reinforce Poland's stability, security, and positions in the international arena will stand the test of time.

At the end of the 20th century there is an increasing tendency in the world toward the internationalization of economic and social life. The importance of the division of labor, production sharing, and exchanges of material and spiritual cultural assets is growing. Do the ideas of socialism run counter to these objective processes? Not at all. On the contrary, they are in line with them.

T. Mazowiecki, chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers, recently noted that for Poland cooperation with other socialist countries is an important matter, since we are neighbors; it is a question of geography, and no miracle is going to transport Poland to the moon, say. Indeed, the foundations of Soviet-Polish relations cannot be undermined by fluctuations in the political outlook. Our countries' geostrategic interests coincide. Collaboration between the USSR and Poland within the Warsaw Pact is one of the props of peace and stability in Europe.

As is well known, President Bush noted in his Warsaw and Budapest speeches that the United States has no intention of destabilizing the situation in these countries, of driving a wedge between members of the Warsaw Pact, or of complicating relations between them and the Soviet Union, recalling that the Soviet head of state's visits to the FRG and France had shown that the USSR has no intention of decoupling these countries from the United States. The President also noted that the improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations is having a favorable influence on the two powers' allies too.

We cannot fail to note the good sense of this position. Of course, it would be shortsighted not to realize that those forces in the United States which think that they are now closer to the implementation of their antisocialist schemes than before have not laid down their arms. However, there are realities which do not depend on their wishes. Reality lies, above all, in the fact that any attempts to remove the cornerstone from the edifice of European security will rebound on those trying to pursue such wild notions. Those trying to rock the socialist boat risk at one and the same time rocking, if not completely capsizing, the common European and common world boat.

### Gerasimov on UN Abstention, Policy on Israel

*PM2310115589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 3*

[G. Charodeyev report: "Explanation of Position; From Our Correspondent in the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Text] The routine briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists was addressed by G.I. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, who particularly recalled that a few days ago the Soviet UN delegation had abstained in the vote on a Danish motion to make no decision on amending the draft resolution to ratify the Credentials Committee report. The amendment proposed not recognizing the Israeli delegation's credentials.

"We are getting requests," he said, "to comment on the Soviet representative's UN vote on this question. I can say the following: The contemporary stage of development in international relations, characterized by a deepening of international problems, requires the world community to broaden the base for dialogue, involve all interested parties, and search for a balance of their interests in each specific case. The broad political discussion being conducted within the UN framework presents the best opportunities in this respect. Our position also reflects the desire to lend universality to the discussion and secure broader participation by states in UN activity.

"Our attitude toward Israel's policy is quite another matter. Its policy on Near East settlement questions still does not give us sufficient grounds to submit it to serious reexamination. The Soviet Union's policy as regards Israel remains unchanged," the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed.

tric Association Viewed

*PM2310092989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 5*

[A. Nikolayev dispatch: "Greece. Stock of Trust"]

[Text] Athens—As IZVESTIYA (No. 292) has already reported, the All-Union Scientific Society of Psychiatrists was readmitted to the World Psychiatric Association [WPA] by decision of the General Assembly of this international organization, held in Athens. In addition, the Independent Association of Psychiatrists recently created in the USSR received the status of a temporary member of the WPA (pending the next general assembly, to be held in 3 years' time).

In order to evaluate this event, I think we have to go back to 1983. That was when the organization of Soviet psychiatrists withdrew from the world association. The reason was the former WPA leadership's politicization of the association's activity to the detriment of professional dialogue. For the sake of justice, it must be added that at that time there was a real possibility of expulsion from the world association on charges of abuse of psychiatry in the USSR for political ends.

It is clear that the decision adopted in Athens is a positive reaction by the world psychiatric community to the changes taking place in the USSR, which have also affected psychiatry. G.V. Morozov, chairman of the Soviet delegation, noted this in particular when journalists clustered around him, impatiently awaiting the results of the secret ballot, which dragged on into the night. It was a sensation: 291 votes "for" and only 45 "against" (19 abstained). (The Independent Association of Psychiatrists was admitted temporarily without counting votes.) Even the night before in the lobbies at the World Congress of Psychiatrists the chances had been estimated only as 50-50!

A positive role was obviously played by the visit to the USSR in spring of this year by an American delegation of psychiatrists, which was allowed to examine patients as it chose. Naturally the question arises: Why was such cooperation limited to Soviet-American contacts? Is it possible that Western Europe does not find such contacts interesting? Collaboration on a multilateral basis within the framework of the WPA can only benefit both our society and world psychiatry.

Incidentally, a few words about the paradoxes of glasnost. At the congress in Athens and around it certain organizations vigorously lobbied against the readmission of the All-Union Scientific Society of Psychiatrists to the WPA. The main argument bolstering these demands was the critical publications in the Soviet press about the unsatisfactory state of psychiatry in our country and cases of violations of human rights in psychiatry. But, obviously, this kind of glasnost gave the participants in the forum an additional argument "for" rather than "against."

The obvious readiness shown by the delegation of the All-Union Scientific Society of Psychiatrists to collaborate with all other alternative professional organizations of psychiatrists in our country was also probably to its benefit.

Of course, there were some hitches. For instance, in a memorandum that was circulated the All-Union Scientific Society of Psychiatrists hastened to report the creation of a special commission for examining cases of the abuse of psychiatry in the USSR. But it could not give the names of the members of this commission or its address....

## China

### Rogachev, Qian Qichen Discuss Border Issues

### Progress in Beijing Talks Noted

*LD2410183989 Moscow TASS in English 1740 GMT 24 Oct 89*

[Text] Beijing October 24 TASS—Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen today received Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev, head of the visiting Soviet Government delegation at the fourth round of the Soviet-Chinese talks on border issues.

The talks passed in a businesslike and friendly atmosphere. The sides pointed out that certain progress had been achieved during the three previous rounds.

The Soviet-Chinese summit in May 1989 gave an important impetus to cooperation in different spheres, including the border settlement.

The sides discussed some issues concerning those sections of the Soviet-Chinese border on which an agreement has not yet been reached.

The talks were attended by Soviet Ambassador to China Oleg Troyanovskiy, as well as the head of the Chinese Government delegation and Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei.

### Accord Implementation Urged

*OW2510105889 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev on Tuesday [24 Oct]. Rogachev is in Beijing as head of the Soviet delegation to the fourth round of Soviet-Chinese border talks. Qian Qichen pointed out at the meeting that progress has been made in the Soviet-Chinese border talks. He added that the two sides should seriously deal with the border issue and strictly implement the agreement on this issue reached at the summit last May.

### Better Cooperation With PRC Friendship Societies

*OW2510092889 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1409 GMT 14 Oct 89*

[Speech by (Milov), member of the Central Council of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, at the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries in Moscow; date not given—recorded in Russian fading into Mandarin translation—from the "On the Path to Friendship and Cooperation" program]

[Text] The two countries' friendship societies recently signed a new agreement outlining the foundation for their continued cooperation over the next 2 years. The content and scope of the new accord is more extensive than past cooperative programs. The future focus will be placed on promoting exchanges of specialized personnel. For example, the Soviet Union will send a 10-member delegation of leading figures from industrial enterprises and agroindustrial joint entities [nong gong zong he ti] to China every year. These figures will learn not only about the Chinese experience in managing enterprises, but also will establish direct contacts with relevant enterprises. The two countries will exchange young creative personnel and establish contacts among various youth federations of the two countries in 1990. Roundtable meetings will become a new forum for cooperation between the two friendship societies.

The new cooperation plan calls for, among other things, the convening of a roundtable in Beijing in 1991 under the slogan "Understanding Neighbors." This meeting will be attended by representatives of the two countries' mass media, who will discuss the role of journalists in fostering mutual understanding between the people of the two countries and in strengthening their traditional friendship. Exchanges of mass media study groups is another new form by which cooperation will be promoted and mutual understanding will be enhanced. Study groups will be exchanged next year and discuss the Soviet reform and China's economic reform. In addition, the Soviet Union will invite Chinese medical experts to lecture and perform acupuncture therapy in 1991. Folklore festivals, new in the 1990-1991 plan, will be held in Alma-Ata and Urumqi. The Soviet central Asian republic of Kazakhstan and Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in China each will send 40 artists to the festivals.

The border branches of the two countries' friendship societies will expand their contacts to a notable degree. The new plan provides for the establishment of ties between cities and villages; for example, (Zongherostov) and Tianjin, Nakhodka and Dalian, the two Oblasts of Chita and Amur and the cities in China's northeastern provinces will establish relations. In addition, the new cooperation plan calls for exchange visits by leading figures and activists of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries and the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society on the one hand, and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries and the China-USSR Friendship Association on the other hand. It also calls for exchanging periodicals, documents, and documentary films. We believe that the new plan will advance and enhance further the friendship and cooperation existing between the peoples of the Soviet Union and China.

## Northeast Asia

### S. Korean President's Washington Talks Examined

*PM2510142789 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Oct 89 Second Edition p 3*

[M. Melnik article: "United States-South Korea: Yesterday's Arguments"]

[Text] South Korean President No Tae-u ended his trip to the United States the other day. What was behind his Washington trip? After all, George Bush visited Seoul quite recently (in February this year). Yet just over 7 months later there is a new summit meeting. It seemed as if the two sides had reached agreement on the main issue in Seoul: George Bush gave assurances that he does not intend to withdraw American troops from South Korea. Certain progress had apparently been made in trade relations, too—the South Koreans promised to open up their market more to American goods. However, these problems have continued to trouble public and political circles in the United States and South Korea.

In the United States increasingly loud and insistent demands are being made that the military presence in the southern part of the Korean peninsula be reduced. The American Armed Forces grouping there is quite large, after all—43,000 officers and men, around 130 military installations, plus tactical nuclear weapons.

The main argument for the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea remains as before—the continuing or even growing "threat from the North." This is the pretext used for the major military program of modernizing the South Korean Army and intensifying bilateral cooperation.

It is with regret that it has to be noted that much was also said about the "military threat" from the DPRK this time around. George Bush assured No Tae-u that U.S. troops will stay in South Korea. For his part the South Korean president stated that any discussion about cutting the U.S. troops in the South is "foolish and illogical," because of "North Korea's intransigence and the change in the overall balance of forces in Southeast Asia."

What can you say here? It's the former logic and the same old stereotypes, albeit spiced with talk of Seoul's readiness for inter-Korean dialogue.

The problem of the trade imbalance was one of the topics of No Tae-u's talks in Washington. Last year commodity turnover was R31 billion (South Korea is America's seventh largest trading partner), and the balance in Seoul's favor was almost R10 billion. South Korean electronics and automobiles have really caught the eye of consumers in the American market. Two hours before Bush and No Tae-u met in the Oval Office the U.S. Department of Commerce issued its monthly bulletin, which shows that the trade deficit with South Korea this August went up to $700 million.

The United States is demanding that South Korea open up its market to U.S. goods, especially expensive agricultural products, threatening to apply sanctions otherwise.

The U.S. threats have provoked a sharply negative reaction in South Korea. Many South Koreans think that such conduct ill becomes an ally, particularly as Washington has declared its desire that Seoul be an "equal partner."

## Japan's Military Dialogue of 'Great Significance'

*OW2210052989 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 20 Oct 89*

[Text] At a press conference on 17 October, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Watanabe stated that Japan is willing to hold a military dialogue with the Soviet Union. Moscow Radio commentator Dmitriyev comments as follows.

Spokesman Watanabe's statement drew attention as an indication of Japan's new stance. The Japanese Government has avoided holding any dialogue with the Soviet Union to discuss the direction of disarmament in the Asian and Pacific region despite the changed situation in the region. When the Japanese foreign minister recently visited Moscow, the Soviet side proposed holding a dialogue between the two countries to discuss the direction of reducing the military confrontational level in the Far East. General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union made several proposals for lowering the military confrontational level in his speeches in Vladisvostok in 1986 and in Krasnoyarsk in 1988. However, Japan has thus far made no response to these proposals. It also refused to send observers to a naval maneuver conducted by the Soviet Pacific Fleet this summer.

In light of all this, however, the way Japan deals with issues seems to have changed. Japan's agreement on the military dialogue with the Soviet Union is something to be welcomed as a new positive factor in Soviet-Japanese relations. This attitude of Japan represents a willingness of the Japanese Government to expand dialogue with the Soviet Union in various areas. Foreign Minister Nakayama explicitly stated this attitude in his speech after he assumed the post of the foreign minister. Needless to say, the Soviet Union welcomes the trend of expanding the dialogue between the two countries. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze called for the expansion of dialogue between the two countries at talks with Foreign Minister Nakayama in September. During these talks, various issues concerning the military situation in the Far East were brought up.

At the press conference, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Watanabe also stated that Japan is willing to continue dialogue with the Soviet Union, but at the same time he contended that such a dialogue will not be effective without the participation of the United States. He contended this because the United States is the leading military giant in the Asian and Pacific region. Even if dialogue between the Soviet Union and Japan fails to promote the disarmament, it will be of great significance to bilateral relations between the two countries. Among other things, it will deepen their mutual trust. At present, the two countries lack mutual understanding, and this is evident in Japanese high-ranking official's remarks concerning the so-called Soviet threat. Any negotiations on disarmament in the Far East will reduce concerns and allay groundless unrest in the two countries. To this end, the Soviet Union should positively explain its plans for a unilateral cut in troop strength. The military dialogue between the Soviet Union and Japan will also be of great significance to the world.

Recently, it has frequently been said that the United States and Japan have entered into an equal partnership concerning relations. If this is true, then we hope that the United States will reconsider its attitude toward thwarting the Soviet-Japanese dialogue on disarmament in the Asian and Pacific region. We also hope that the United States itself will participate in this dialogue. At any rate, the fact that Japan has agreed to hold a military dialogue with the Soviet Union is the first step in easing tensions in the Asian and Pacific region.

## Southeast Asia & Pacific

### Singapore Acceptance of U.S. Bases Deplored

*PM2510123389 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Oct 89 First Edition p 3*

[V. Vinogradov "Observer's Opinion": "They Have Agreed..."]

[Text] A Singapore Foreign Ministry statement issued in that country reports that the United States and Singapore have reached agreement on expanding the use by the U.S. Navy and Air Force of military installations located on Singaporean territory. In particular, it is planned to make more extensive use of Singapore's potential as regards servicing and refitting U.S. warships, to site U.S. warplanes for short periods on rotation at the Paya Lebar Airbase, and to increase U.S. Armed Forces service personnel in Singapore to almost 200,000. It is clear from the statement that the United States intends to embark on the implementation of these plans as of early 1990.

Thus, the U.S.-Singapore talks on the U.S. military presence in the Asian island republic have finally been made definite. Of course, things could have been worse for Singapore's neighbors and for the countries which, together with it, form part of ASEAN. I recall that, back in August, when it all started, it became known that Singapore had proposed that Washington site U.S. military installations on its territory. It explained this step by a desire to maintain some kind of "strategic balance" of forces in the region, which, in Singapore's opinion, could be upset were the U.S. military bases in the Philippines to be closed.

The "Singapore initiative" prompted a sharply negative reaction from a number of its ASEAN partners, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia. Thus, S. Suroguritio [name as published], a member of the leadership of the Indonesian Democratic Party parliamentary faction, directly stated that the siting of U.S. military installations on Singaporean territory will undoubtedly lead to a violation of stability in Southeast Asia and impede its transformation into a zone free from nuclear weapons and foreign military presences. According to a report in the newspaper MERDEKA, he called on the country's government to oppose the U.S. military presence in Singapore, since it will pose a major threat to peace in Southeast Asia.

Washington's reaction to Singapore's proposal was different. There it received a high assessment and was seen as "generous." Admiral H. Hardisty, U.S. Armed Forces commander in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, immediately left on a familiarization visit to Singapore. Following this trip the press even featured a statement by him, which boiled down to saying that by obtaining the Singapore bases, the United States would allegedly be able to depart "almost painlessly" from its Philippine installations.

This fueled the flames of criticism of Singapore still further. As a result the Singaporean leadership started backpedaling. First Singapore's ambassador to Malaysia told Malaysian Defense Minister A. Rithauddeen that Singapore "is unlikely to permit U.S. military installations on its territory." Then Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew himself stated during a brief visit to Indonesia: "We do not intend to site U.S. military bases in our country."

But nonetheless, as we can now see, neither Singapore nor the United States has abandoned the actual idea. Yes, the Pentagon has not (for the time being, at any rate) taken up the military bases on Singaporean soil. However, on the basis of the accord now reached it has obtained an opportunity to substantially expand the U.S. military presence in that part of the continent. It is quite obvious that this development of events is not in line with the interests of the peoples living in Southeast Asia, who are striving to turn their region into a zone of peace, good-neighborliness, and neutrality.

### Curbs on Detained Burmese Leaders Noted

*BK2210072689 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1430 GMT 22 Oct 89*

[Text] According to the rules announced by the Myanmar [Burmese] military government, many well-known opposition leaders will not be permitted to compete in the elections scheduled for May 1990. A REUTER report from Yangon says that a spokesman for the State Law and Order Restoration Council revealed at a press conference held on Friday [20 October] that political leaders under detention, regardless of who she or he may be, will not be permitted to participate in the elections.

The move by the military government is mainly targeted at the most popular opposition leaders of the National League for Democracy, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin U. Both of them have been placed under house arrest for a year since last July.

### CPSU Delegation in Vietnam to Study Economy

*PM2510144189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Oct 89 Second Edition p 4*

[TASS report: "Interparty Ties"]

[Text] In accordance with the plan for interparty ties a delegation of CPSU party workers headed by O.K. Rybakov, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, was in Vietnam 14 through 23 October to study the experience of the Communist Party of Vietnam in implementing the reform of the national economy.

The delegation was received by Tran Xuan Bach, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee.

## Sub-Saharan Africa

### Vorontsov Arrives in Ethiopia With Message

*LD2510115789 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1104GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Addis Ababa, 25 October (TASS)—Y.M. Vorontsov, M.S. Gorbachev's personal representative, member of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR first deputy foreign minister, arrived in Addis Ababa today to deliver a message from the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to Mengistu Haile Mariam, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia Central Committee and president of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

### Prospects of ANC Talks Seen as 'Quite Real'

*MB2310190689 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 21 Oct 89*

[Vladimir Valentinov commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] The South African minister of constitutional development and national education, Gerrit Viljoen, has expressed readiness to discuss preliminary conditions for talks with representatives of the country's black majority, including leaders of the African National Congress [ANC]. Vladimir Valentinov comments on the situation:

(?It would seem) the South African Government seems to be more and more inclined to begin a dialogue with its people.

Until recently, Minister Viljoen was making a condition which, if not ruling out talks, largely put them off. That condition was for the ANC to renounce armed struggle if a ban on it was to be lifted and talks with it are to be started.

That condition would be fair in any other case but not in the case of the ANC, for peace talks are certainly better and more (?advantageous) than armed struggle, as practice has shown, particularly while settling the situation in South-West Africa [words indistinct] but not in the case of the ANC, for that organization followed the principle of nonviolence from its inception in 1912 till the early 60s. ANC tried all peaceful means to end discrimination in the country and to convince the government of the need for democratization. But, with all that, it [words indistinct] for peaceful methods, ANC was outlawed and has been underground ever since. That forced the patriots to take up arms.

Granted, South Africa today is not the same as 30 years back, for political thinking [words indistinct] has been [words indistinct] the best evidence of that is, as I said, the current settlement in South-West Africa. This process cannot but influence the situation in South Africa proper. I dare say that the release of eight political prisoners, the first ever talks of the president with the black Africans' religious leaders, and a call for dialogue on the future of the country can hardly be seen as mere political maneuvering.

It is true that the government is pursuing political gains, (?easing) racial confrontation, seeking a positive response of the Commonwealth, which was discussing sanctions against South Africa. But those (?first) steps also reflect objective reality and historical imperatives: national liberation movement and international effort to end apartheid.

We should also remember that President de Klerk included in the 5-year plan of national development a pledge to start dismantling the apartheid regime, and he has to take certain measures to keep up face and [word indistinct] prestige. But he also has to win favor with the extreme right wing, which is still rather strong and firmly opposed to any talks with the liberation movement. That explains why the emergency law is still on and that freedom fighters are still being arrested and executed.

If the ANC decides to open talks, what are the guarantees it won't be victimized by the government? Therefore, with all its preference of peace (?talks) the ANC has no intention of laying down arms. That principled and firm stand has probably led Gerrit Viljoen to say in a recent interview that the ANC need not formally renounce armed struggle for the government to begin talks with it.

If that is a genuine constructive position and not a propaganda ploy, prospects of talks are quite real.

## East Europe

### Shevardnadze Continues Visit to Poland

#### Meets With Jaruzelski, Rakowski

*PM2610085789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 26 Oct 89 Second Edition p 4*

[TASS report on Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's 25 October Warsaw meetings with Polish President Jaruzelski and PZPR First Secretary Rakowski: "Priority Relations"]

[Text] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was received today by President Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland.

The Soviet official conveyed cordial comradely greetings from Mikhail Gorbachev to the Polish head of state. Jaruzelski expressed his sincere wishes of success to the Soviet leader.

The Polish president stressed the significance and timeliness of Shevardnadze's visit to Poland. Both parties highly assessed the tonality and content of the conversations and talks held by the Soviet minister with Poland's prime minister and foreign minister.

The main message expressed at the meetings was the idea that it is necessary not only to preserve, but also to develop relations between the USSR and Poland and strive to enhance their efficiency.

Both in these discussions and at the presidential level there was an unambiguous reaffirmation of Poland's loyalty to its allied commitments under the Warsaw Treaty which is playing an important role from the viewpoint of Poland's national interests and of the international situation.

The meeting in Warsaw showed that Soviet-Polish friendship is not subjected to short-time oscillations but rests on the firm foundation of the two states' and peoples' objective interests.

The expansion of the social basis of this friendship in Poland and the completion of the process of clarifying "blank spaces" in the history of Soviet-Polish relations can and should facilitate the development of friendship.

The known declaration signed by Gorbachev and Jaruzelski gave an impetus to this process.

The parties had a conceptual discussion about changes carried out in the USSR and Poland. The path chosen is not easy, but there is no alternative to it, they said.

The sides expressed confidence that the policies reflecting society's objective requirements will make it possible to overcome the current difficulties and lead the two countries to a new level of development.

Shevardnadze, who is also a member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee, met with Mieczyslaw Rakowski, first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party's Central Committee. Shevardnadze conveyed to him warm greetings from the Soviet Communist Party chief.

It was noted during the conversation that the results of Shevardnadze's visit to Warsaw point to the broad understanding in Poland of the abiding value for it of close ties with the Soviet Union, that rest on a solid basis created over the past decades.

Rakowski expressed full understanding and approval of the Soviet leadership's policy towards establishing and developing business contacts with the new Polish government which enjoys the PZPR's support on specific measures directed at overcoming the crisis.

The interlocutors exchanged information about the activity of the CPSU and the PZPR and the tasks facing each of them at the current crucial stage in social development in the two countries.

They expressed satisfaction with the two parties' contribution to making positive, increasingly tangible changes in the world arena. Tireless efforts by states, parties and peoples are required to promote the positive trends.

The formation of a modern image of socialism and its renewal in keeping with the challenges of the time is to play a fundamental part in this process.

### Meetings Summarized

*LD2510214489 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1900 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] At the invitation of the government of the Polish People's Republic [PPR], on 24-25 October 1989, E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, was in Poland on a visit.

E.A. Shevardnadze was received by President W. Jaruzelski of the PPR. He conveyed to him from M.S. Gorbachev cordial greetings and best wishes. During a warm and comradely conversation there was an exchange of opinions on the situation in both countries, and profound conviction was expressed of the vital importance of developing relations of friendship and all-around cooperation between the USSR and PPR, the Soviet and Polish peoples.

E.A. Shevardnadze also met with T. Mazowiecki, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PPR. In a friendly conversation the principal attention was given to questions of bilateral, including economic relations, their further improvement and deepening. The common opinion was expressed of the need to raise the effectiveness of Soviet-Polish cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit and taking all-around account of the interests of each side, the development of co-production, and radical improvement of the machinery of economic interaction.

Between E.A. Shevardnadze and K. Skubiszewski, minister of foreign affairs of the PPR, there were thorough talks on a broad spectrum of questions of Soviet-Polish relations and international problems.

Having analyzed the present state of and prospects for Soviet-Polish relations, the sides were unanimous in the view that the further development and strengthening of goodneighborly cooperation and mutual commitment to obligations between allies fully meet the vital interests of both countries and peoples and the tasks of ensuring security and stability on the European continent. Efforts will continue to be made for the fruitful development of bilateral relations in all fields in accordance with the principles of freedom of choice, respect for sovereignty and equality of rights, and noninterference in internal affairs. The ministers emphasized the importance of protecting and multiplying everything of value that has been achieved in relations between the Soviet Union and Poland and of the further broadening in both countries of the social base of traditional Soviet-Polish friendship.

They expressed readiness to promote in every way the development of ties between the parliaments and governments of both states through public, scientific, and cultural organizations. Particular attention was focussed on widening contacts between people and creating more favorable conditions for border cooperation.

Both sides showed a desire to clear up certain issues relating to the history of Soviet-Polish relations. An acceleration of this work would meet both sides' interests. The unanimous opinion was expressed that joint efforts in this field should serve to establish the historical truth and to strengthen friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Poland.

E.A. Shevardnadze provided information about the present stage of perestroyka in the USSR, the revolutionary changes taking place in the country, and the progress of the reforms in the political, economic, and other fields, and the development of the processes of democratization and glasnost.

K. Skubiszewski spoke about the new trends in the country's public and socioeconomic life, and about the measures taken by the government to stabilize the economy and create preconditions for its dynamic development.

It was noted that perestroyka in the USSR and the processes of renewal in Poland and other socialist countries are inseparably linked with the reaffirmation in international relations of the new political thinking and the priority of values common to all mankind and with the strengthening of law and order.

The sides were of the unanimous view that of late, thanks to a constructive East-West dialogue, the possibility has become apparent for a radical move toward an easing of confrontation and preconditions are being created for a qualitatively new, peaceful stage of international development. The implementation of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and the progress which has been noted in the matter of strategic offensive arms reduction within the conditions of the ABM treaty reaffirm the reality of the nuclear disarmament program.

A thorough exchange of opinions was held on the progress at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, during the course of which the sides stated their desire to work toward speeding them up and toward concluding a corresponding agreement in 1990.

The ministers stated a similarity of views of the sides on key questions of world politics and expressed interest in the close coordination of the foreign-policy steps of the USSR and the PPR aimed at strengthening European and universal security, arms reduction, and disarmament and the development of cooperation and strengthening trust between all countries. It was emphasized that the initiatives of the Warsaw Pact member-states go a long way toward assisting this. The particular significance which both sides attach to the development of the process of the CSCE in all fields and the efforts aimed at building a "common European home" was noted.

Other questions of mutual interest were also touched upon.

The talks were held in a sincere, friendly, and constructive atmosphere.

E.A. Shevardnadze invited K. Skubiszewski to make an official visit to the USSR.

The invitation was accepted with gratitude.

### Interviewed on Warsaw TV

*LD2510203889 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1900 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Interview with USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze by Grazyna Bukowska, not further identified; date, place not given—live or recorded; Shevardnadze speaks in Russian with superimposed Polish translation]

[Text] [Bukowska] Minister, to what extent—in your opinion—does the further development of friendly contacts between Poland and the Soviet Union depend on clearing up the difficult issues linked with the history of our relations, and how much on the changes taking place now in the Soviet Union and Poland?

[Shevardnadze] I think that resolving the problems linked with the past, with all—even the most difficult—period in the history of our relations requires greater responsibility and serious treatment. There has been a great deal of discussion about this both in Polish society and the Soviet Union. These problems were tackled in 1987, at the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and General Wojciech Jaruzelski. They also were discussed yesterday, during my meeting with Premier Mazowiecki and Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. It also was one of the subjects of my conversation with Mieczyslaw Rakowski. Work is in progress on clarifying and solving the problems concerning the history of our relations. A joint Soviet-Polish commission has been set up, composed of academics and historians. Some of the work has been completed already. Yesterday, however, we came to the conclusion that progress here is too slow, that these activities are not dynamic enough. One does not have to recall, probably, how very sensitive this problem is, and its solution requires great efforts of scientific precision, complete objectivity, and justice. it is now possible to speed up this process. I also would like to add that society and the Soviet authorities, and also the citizens in Poland and the Polish authorities, are immensely interested in getting to the heart of the matter.

When necessary, justice has to be established, but the work on resolving the problems concerning the history of our relations must be based on scientific foundations if we are to say the whole truth to the current and future generations. The truth cannot be established without science. I stress: Such work is in progress, but not as intensively as demanded by the needs of the moment. During my meetings yesterday, there was talk about finding ways of accelerating this process.

[Bukowska] What do you think about opinions, expressed particularly in the West, that the nationalities and economic problems of the Soviet Union are a great danger to perestroyka and Mikhail Gorbachev's policies.

[Shevardnadze] I do not think that such opinions are expressed only in the West. I think that our society also very actively and critically assesses what is happening in the Soviet Union, electors watch with greatest attention the activities of the Supreme Soviet and assess what happens at Congress of the People's Deputies. Elements of polarization of views appear at various levels. I think, however, that this is natural and useful. At a time so historic for the nation and the state, not everything can happen politely and smoothly. The full agreement of all citizens is impossible, the revolution is the revolution.

[Bukowska] With regard to the nationalities issue, what do you think, Minister, about what has been happening in Lithuania recently? About the attempts to limit the arrivals from Poland?

[Shevardnadze] I would like to say something about the nationalities issue in general and about the progress of the precesses you have mentioned. If one were to ask the majority of our society, not to mention our authorities, then no one would have any doubt that the work of the revolutionary renewal of our society and socialism must be continued to its logical conclusion. That was the first point. Secondly, as a result of profound thinking, research, and serious and creative teamwork, we have worked out a new platform for resolving the nationalities problem. A new nationalities policy is working within the party and the state. I think that this joint stance will allow us to resolve all the problems, all of which is connected with the existence of the Russian federation, and will allow us to define the place of every nation, every community that is part of the federation.

Many misunderstandings concerning nationality issues and also connected with our mutual relations arise from the lack of sufficient information on the subject.

[Bukowska] We are talking on the eve of a meeting of the foreign ministers of the states belonging to the Warsaw Pact. What do you think about changes that certainly will occur in the structure of the treaty?

[Shevardnadze] In my opinion, a change of the entire structure is not necessary. It is mainly organizational matters that are involved. Here, no doubt, transformations and some corrections are needed. Generally speaking, the Warsaw Pact up to now has been a military and political agreement. It is not only the name, but also the particular placing of emphases. I think that the Pact gradually should change into a political and military entity, and into a political and defensive entity, for issues related to security in the world will be resolved through political means thanks to increased credibility and trust between states of various orientations. Political issues thus will become the priority in our treaty, as well, although one cannot forget its military function. As long as military blocks exist in the world, we also must concern ourselves with matters related to defense.

In principle, we come out in favor of dissolving military treaties, but as long as they exist, we also must think about the common security of Warsaw Pact member-states.

[Bukowska] If in the future you think about writing memoirs and describing the time of perestroyka, what would the title of such a book be? Have you ever thought about writing your memoirs?

[Shevardnadze] So far, I have no time to think about memoirs. [laughter]

[Bukowska] You are always travelling. How do your wife and family take it?

[Shevardnadze] We (?often) go to New York, and so far my wife has not submitted a complaint about me to the United Nations, although she has had an opportunity to do so. [laughter]

### Views Poland's Role in Europe

*LD2510212789 Moscow TASS in English 2110 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Warsaw October 25 TASS—The Soviet Union regards Poland as a most important and solid partner in the solution of the tasks that European peoples and entire humanity encounter now, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, on a working visit here, said in an interview to the Polish news agency PAP.

The minister believes that the new aspects of Soviet-Polish relations confirm the validity of the project of a common European home, the principles of new thinking and its main tenet of complete freedom of choice.

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic can and must mean active interaction of two major European states, participants of the Warsaw treaty organisation in the construction of a common European home, in the struggle to get rid of the burden of the arms race, prevent the further deterioration of the environment and ensure human rights.

Summing up the results of his visit to Poland, Shevardnadze said that it was a very useful visit.

He said that there exists a community of views with the Polish leaders, that Soviet-Polish relations are of fundamental importance both for the Soviet and Polish peoples and for stability and peace in Europe.

"We have mutual understanding also as regards allegiance to fundamental agreements that have been concluded by our two states. We are true to allied agreements, to the principles on the basis of which the Warsaw treaty organisation was formed," Shevardnadze said.

### Interviewed by PAP

*PM2610083789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 89 Second Edition pp 4-5*

[TASS report on an interview between Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Poland's PAP news agency: "E.A. Shevardnadze Interviewed by PAP"; date not given]

[Text] E.A. Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, who is here on a working visit, gave an interview today to the Polish press agency, (PAP).

Question: The new political thinking and the idea "of a common European home" presuppose a radical restructuring of relations between the states on our continent. How do you assess the changes in the relations between Poland the USSR?

Answer: One probably needs to state more precisely what "perestroyka" we are dealing with in this case. Neither the new political thinking nor the idea "of the common European home" presuppose any destruction of something already in existence.

They must simply become more opened, oriented to a greater degree toward mutually advantageous cooperation, toward the development of a free exchange of people, ideas, and cultural values.

Scientific and technical progress, the exchange of advanced technology, care for the environment, the creation of a European legal, economic, and information space—this is what should increasingly be the object of collective efforts.

It is understood that in the sphere of security, all European states will follow the concept of sufficiency for the needs of defense, will reduce their military potentials to the minimum necessary, and will have a nonoffensive structure of armed forces. A sufficient transparency of military activities must be ensured and large-scale confidence-building measures must operate on a mutual basis.

The European home can be erected and stand firmly only on the foundation of the territorial-political realities which have come about on the continent. This means: on the foundation of the inviolability of borders, which were established as a result of the post-war peace settlement and enshrined in a number of later agreements in the Moscow treaty between the USSR and the FRG, in agreements between the FRG and other countries of Eastern Europe, and the Helsinki Final act.

Today's political realities also include two military and political alliances: the Warsaw Pact and NATO. They have not always existed, and no one treats them as permanent factors of the future. We are in favor of disbanding these groupings on a mutual basis. It is clear that in its finished appearance "the common European home" will render many present European structures unnecessary.

As long as the two alliances exist, one must work toward their gradual transformation into political-military organizations through the preferential development of civilian areas of their activities, while cutting back all military elements. This will have a beneficial effect both on intra-alliance relations and on the common European process.

In such a case, the Warsaw Pact would continue playing the role of stabilizer and guarantor of territorial-political realities and could, at the same time, make a more substantial contribution to building the new Europe.

In other words, one must follow the road which Europe has already taken, complete with building of what has already been started and is being done, above all, within the framework of the Helsinki process in various areas.

I think that the new factors in Soviet-Polish relations confirm in practice that the project "of the common European home" and the principles of the new thinking and of its main provision regarding complete freedom of choice are well-founded.

Question: Profound political reforms and an unusually complex and difficult economic situation are the dominant tendency of the development of the situation in Poland and in the USSR. How do you assess the possibility of economic cooperation between our countries in this connection?

Answer: It is possibly more agreeable to cooperate when there are no major problems in the economy, when everything is in order. In our case, it is simply essential to cooperate, since the economy of the Soviet Union and the economy of Poland mutually overlap in very large sectors.

Your country accounts for around 10 percent of USSR foreign trade turnover and our share in Poland's foreign trade is around one third. Let us imagine for a moment what will happen if one day Polish coal, and that is over 11 million tonnes annually, rolled ferrous metal products (700,000 tonnes), sulphur (800,000 tonnes), ships, wagons, machine tools, knitwear, ready-made garments, footwear, cosmetics, and medicines, were to suddenly disappear from Soviet trade turnover.

And that would mean for Poland a loss of 15 million tonnes of oil, 7,900 million cubic meters of gas, 11.5 million tonnes of iron ore, 6,300 million kilowatt hours of electric power, 105,000 tonnes of cotton, 0.3 million tonnes of manganese ore, machine tools, machinery, and equipment.

Different attitudes may be taken on Soviet-Polish economic cooperation. There really has been and still is a whole host of shortcomings, a great deal of which has to be changed and improved.

However, our cooperation has also given quite a lot to our countries. Major joint projects have been carried out and industrial enterprises have been built. Thirty percent of Poland's industrial production is produced at them. In the USSR there are plants and factories working which have been built with Polish technical assistance.

We have both experienced cooperation with the West. We both know that bank and trade credits carry a high cost. In 1971-87, Poland, for example, received credits of $47,000 million, paid $50,000 million as repayments and interest, and still owes $39,000 million.

One could, perhaps, criticize previous Polish governments. But Poland is not an exception here. The same things have happened to a dozen other states, primarily non-socialist countries. And they had most varied types of governments. Could it be that all of them were short-sighted or sluggish?

The answer, in my view, is that the Western crediting system is geared, first of all, to gaining a guaranteed high profit. The banks are guided by the rule: money must work, and their money works.

I am saying this not as some kind of accusation, but to stress the obvious fact that all forms of economic cooperation have their particular features and entail various consequences.

You certainly know that the issue of foreign credits and loans is being debated now in the USSR. The view that we cannot opt for increasing our foreign debt which is already high enough, is gaining the upper hand, however.

Just like the majority of countries, the USSR is both a debtor and a creditor. But the Soviet-Polish mechanism of crediting has not been geared to making profit, we have been guided by other principles. Let us say that in credits, Poland has a negative balance of R6,000 million and $1,500 million. But in this case the interest is considerably lower and we have not had big problems when one had to find a flexible approach to the repayment of this or that credit.

Today the system of mutual accounting, prices, and the exchange rate for the national currencies are getting priority in our trade and economic cooperation. The urgent need for elaborating a new stystem and new principles is obvious. It must not be done in a high-handed manner.

Let us say the question of prices is raised. We are in favor of examining it. After all, there was a time when we lost around $2 billion each year on supplies of raw materials because mutual trade was not conducted according to world market prices. In recent years, admittedly, the trend has gone in the opposite direction, but the situation has not yet been restored.

The ships we buy in Poland cost us more than world prices, but we purchase them in spite of the fact that we have favorable offers from the FRG, Great Britain, and other Western countries. There have also been cases when Polish producers could have found more profitable markets, but they had to fulfill contractual obligations with the Soviet Union.

Deviations have occurred in both directions. Some things balanced; some did not. We have not always aimed for profit in our ties. Perhaps not everything ought to be subordinated to commerce in the future either, but the principle of mutual advantage definitely has to be made paramount.

One thing is clear: It is no longer possible to solve this problem within the confines of the old structures of cooperation.

I want to stress most definitely that the Soviet side is approaching the difficulties being experienced by the Polish economy with great understanding, although we ourselves have our own difficulties.

The USSR is very interested in your country surmounting these difficulties as quickly as possible. We would like to see neighboring Poland a strong, flourishing state, living in peace and harmony with itself, its neighbors, and other countries and peoples. This is our firm desire for today and the future.

We shall proceed from the basis of this principled position in tackling issues of improving cooperation between our countries. These matters will be a subject for discussion during the visit by T. Mazowiecki, the head of the Polish Government, to the Soviet Union, which is coming up soon.

Question: What new things, in your opinion, will the policies of the new Polish Government, presented by Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki in his speech on its program in the parliament and in Foreign Minister K. Skubiszewski's speech at the United Nations, contribute to bilateral relations?

Answer: Each government sees the priorities, the routes for resolving some or other tasks facing the country in its own way.

In the past few days I have had a very profound and substantive conversation with Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki. Detailed and constructive talks have taken place with Minister Skubiszewski, my colleague, as well.

I was glad for the opportunity to meet President W. Jaruzelski again and to renew an exchange of opinions with M. Rakowski, first secretary of the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee. I discussed with them, also on a wide scale, issues of Soviet-Polish relations.

Incidentally, both President W. Jaruzelski and M. Rakowski came out in favor of the intensive development by the Soviet Union of contacts with the new Polish Government.

In light of these conversations, it is already possible to come to more well-based conclusions on the line of Poland's new government. I have the distinct impression that it attaches great significance to the development of relations with the Soviet Union and is ready to continue moving forward, where positive experience and real results have been accumulated by us. The prospects for cooperation and interaction look hopeful. We will be able to do much by building our relations on full equality, reciprocity, and mutual advantage.

There are difficult problems in our relations, above all dealing with the past. All these issues are now not only named openly, but are also being discussed openly within the framework of our bilateral relations.

As far as I know, many Poles are interested by the issue of the situation of individuals of Polish nationality residing in the Soviet Union. There are more than 1 million of them.

You know that major changes are now occurring in our country, in the nationalities policy and in humanitarian issues in general. The conditions for the sociopolitical activeness of all citizens, independent of their nationality, are being broadened. Much is being done for the creation of the necessary conditions for the preservation of national distinctiveness and native cultures and languages.

During the last 18 months and 2 years, Polish cultural and educational societies have been founded in the Ukraine, in Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Irkutsk. Their task is the development of national traditions, helping with the study of the Polish language and the history and culture of Poland and work on the preservation of historical and cultural monuments. The opening in Moscow of a Polish information and cultural center was an event.

All Soviet citizens of Polish origin who prefer to live in the homeland of their ancestors may freely leave for Poland within the framework of our legislation, which is now being brought in line with international standards. It must be said that there are no special obstacles here in any case. Since the beginning of 1988, 521 Soviet Poles have expressed the wish to move to the Polish People's Republic. And only in one case did any problems arise. Permission was received by 520 people.

Soviet and Polish historians are called upon to conduct exhaustive research into the pre-war period, which was tragic for the fates of our peoples, to eliminate, in our common interests, all vagueness and half-truths in the facts and appraisals.

The first USSR People's Deputies Congress set up a special commission to undertake a political and legal evaluation of the Soviet-German treaties of 1939. It is due to present a conclusion on the subject of its investigations to the second USSR People's Deputies Congress.

There must remain no "blank spots" in the history of our relations, which could serve as a cause to stir up unhealthy passions. This is a difficult but necessary process. These "spots" include the question of the mutual return of cultural treasures and an objective, scientific investigation into the Katyn tragedy.

We have no reason to conceal genuine facts when they are known to us. At the same time, however, we adhere strictly to the principle that, before drawing definitive conclusions, it is necessary to conduct the most thorough and most meticulous study and to dig down to the last detail, to genuine documents. Historical truth is too delicate a thing on which to act intuitively, on the basis of suppositions or partial knowledge; because otherwise, instead of remedying old misfortunes, it is easy to inflict a new evil.

I can state with complete frankness that it is our firm intention to conduct a serious, authoritative, and responsible investigation and to cleanse the history of Soviet-Polish relations of all encrustations—whatever period they come from—which might prevent the two peoples from coming together. Means of accelerating this work were exactly what we talked about with Minister Skubiszewski.

The process of returning cultural treasures is in progress, and it must be carried through to the end. If these matters are approached objectively, taking account of legal norms and being guided by justice, it is always possible to find a joint solution.

There is something else which I cannot fail to mention. Our common history is not a black canvas with blank spots. For the most part, it is painted in the colors of good, nobility, disinterest, courage, and heroism.

Take our own period. How many Polish patriots gave their lives in the struggle against fascism on Soviet soil! And surely the 600,000 Soviet servicemen who perished in the fighting for the liberation of Poland cannot be forgotten? This page—which is in other ways tragic but also bright—cannot simply be turned over just like that. We have to bequeath to future generations the task of eternally preserving the memory of the Polish and Soviet heroes. It is our common duty to restore the names of all those who perished and to bestow honor upon them.

How do we see the prospects for relations with Poland?

I am confident that we will overcome the difficulties, reach a level road, develop cooperation, and live as good, close neighbors and allies.

Question: How do you evaluate the new elements which have appeared in our bilateral relations, the broad contacts among citizens of our countries, and the mutual exchange among people? Is such an expansion of the "grass roots" of international relations an element which stabilizes the new situation on both sides of our border?

Answer: "Soviet-Polish cooperation must be a matter for the millions." I believe that those words from the well-known declaration on Soviet-Polish cooperation in the spiritual sphere are more topical today than ever before. Such an approach does not only correspond to the internal processes going on in our two countries, but also accords with the logic of pan-European and, indeed, worldwide development. This was spoken about convincingly and graphically at M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with Polish intellectuals in the course of his visit to your country.

In our age, relations between states simply cannot be confined to contacts along "traditional" official channels. The "living soul" of interstate contacts is provided by links between peoples. The closer they are, the stronger and "more quake-proof" are interstate structures. This is particularly true with regard to relations between neighboring states, united equally by history, politics, and geography. I do not doubt that the potential for cooperation between the Soviet and Polish peoples is truly vast.

Question: The declaration on Polish-Soviet cooperation in the sphere of ideology, science, and culture, signed by W. Jaruzleski and M.S. Gorbachev, has played a very important role in changing approaches to our common past and present. Can this document, in your view, continue to regulate the spheres of cooperation contained in its name, or do the qualitative changes that have occurred in our relations also demand that new interstate accords be drafted?

Answer: This is an important document in Soviet-Polish relations. It was precisely in connection with it that the issue of "blank spots" in our common history was posed, and subsequently, joint commissions were formed to establish the facts and draw up assessments. A start was made at the time on the entire work in this area. I believe that the declaration will continue to serve the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Poland. That does not, of course, rule out the possibility of drawing up any new or additional accords, should the sides regard them as desirable.

Question: How can or must cooperation between our countries on the international arena look in the altered circumstances?

Answer: This cooperation can and must, in my view, be the energetic interaction of two of the largest European participant- states in the Warsaw Pact in the construction of the all-European home and in the struggle for liberation from the burden of the arms race, for averting the further deterioration of the environment, and for securing human rights. In a word, we regard Poland as a most important and prestigious partner in the tackling of the tasks that have today come to face the peoples of our continent and all mankind.

Question: How would you briefly sum up the results of your visit?

Answer: I can say now that it was a very necessary visit. You know that traditionally we have good, businesslike contacts with the Polish leadership. A new coalition government has appeared in the country in recent years and naturally there is a desire to meet and talk about the destiny and prospects of our relations, to give an assessment of that stage of cooperation in which we now find ourselves and to think seriously about tomorrow. I think that on the whole we have been successful in doing this. We have specific tasks. We do not disagree that Soviet-Polish relations are of fundamental significance to the Soviet and Polish peoples, and for stability and peace in Europe.

Secondly, we agree that it is necessary to keep everything positive and favorable that has been achieved in our relations. Thirdly, we have agreed to ensure that our economic cooperation is highly dynamic and to make better still its effectiveness, mutual advantage, and equality of rights.

And one more very important circumstance: We have a common language, a common mutual understanding that we are true to those basic agreements that were concluded between our countries. We are true to those alliance obligations; we are true to those principles on the basis of which the Warsaw Pact was formed. These, in general terms, were the main results of the talks.

## Briefs Press on Rakowski Meeting

*LD2510151289 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1325 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Warsaw, 25 Oct (TASS)—Answering questions from Polish and foreign journalists following his meeting in the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Central Committee with M. Rakowski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, E.A. Shevardnadze stressed that the conversation had been held in the traditional spirit of mutual understanding and friendship characteristic of relations between the two fraternal parties. Recalling the recent visit to Moscow by M. Rakowski, and his meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, E.A. Shevardnadze said that although only a short time had passed since this visit, taking into account the dynamic process of change in the modern world, there was something to discuss at his meeting. Particular attention was paid to Soviet-Polish relations at the current stage.

During his conversation with M. Rakowski, there was a broad review of the state of affairs in the new stage in Soviet-Polish relations, including economic, scientific and technical, and other matters. The so-called "blank spots" in history also came up: This question is not new;

it was touched upon in the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and M. Rakowski, and during the conversation held yesterday with T. Mazowiecki, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic [PPR] and K. Skubiszewski, PPR foreign minister. Agreement was reached to continue research in this area more energetically and calmly in order to establish the historic truth. We want only the truth: This is in the interests of our countries and peoples, E.A. Shevardnadze noted.

International questions were also discussed at the meeting, in particular issues of European cooperation, the construction of a European home, overcoming military confrontation in the world, and the contribution that both parties might make to that process.

Answering a question on the opinion that Soviet-Polish relations are now better than ever before, E.A. Shevardnadze stressed that obviously one should not compare different stages in Soviet-Polish relations.

One should recall the joint struggle against fascism, the solidarity of the war years, and those Poles who died during this struggle on Soviet territory and the 600,000 Soviet soldiers and officers who fell in the struggle for freedom on Polish territory. One cannot fail to remember the bright pages of cooperation and mutual assistance during the restoration of our countries' national economies in the postwar years. Not everything was smooth in this history, but both sides sincerely wished to build a new life together.

The current stage is a very interesting one in Poland's history. The situation requires certain corrections to be introduced. First of all, one should find ways to restructure the mechanism of economic cooperation and to enhance its effectiveness. The peoples of the two countries are interested in this. Relations between the two countries are as good as they should be between neighbors. They are based on a healthy and strong foundation. One should develop them in every possible way on the principles of equality, goodneighborliness, adherence to obligations, and friendship.

Our economic cooperation is different from those principles on which Western countries have given assistance to Poland. The principles of mutual profitability should be preserved and developed in this sphere.

Touching upon relations between the CPSU and the PZPR, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo member mentioned that they are traditionally fraternal and are based on good traditions and a firm foundation. During conversation with M. Rakowski, the USSR's and PPR's allegiance to joint obligations and agreements and allegiance to Warsaw Pact obligations were confirmed. The sides came out for the consolidation and development of Soviet-Polish links and the relations between the two parties.

One should continue unswervingly to seek new forms of cooperation in these traditionally special relations, M. Rakowski added.

### Rakowski, Shevardnadze Assess Talks

*LD2510152689 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1305 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] [Announcer] As announced, we will now broadcast the statements made by Eduard Shevardnadze and Mieczyslaw Rakowski after today's meeting.

[Correspondent] Here is what Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told journalists after his meeting with PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party] Central Committee First Secretary Mieczyslaw Rakowski:

[Begin Shevardnadze recording in Russian, fading into Polish translation] The meeting proceeded in the spirit of traditional, mutual understanding. Only recently, Comrade Rakowski paid a visit to Moscow. He met Comrade Gorbachev. Not much time has passed, but the contemporary world is so dynamic, that there are nonetheless many matters to be discussed, particularly concerning the issue of Soviet-Polish relations. Under present contemporary conditions Comrade Rakowski and I agreed between ourselves that we would review at what stage Soviet-Polish relations presently stand; [and that we would] cover the widest circle of issues in this review: economic, scientific-technical relations, as well as other issues.

We talked about the so-called "blank spots." This is not a new question, by the way. It was tackled earlier at the meeting between Comrades Jaruzelski and Gorbachev. We discussed this subject yesterday with the Council of Ministers chairman and the foreign minister and we agreed that we would examine all these events in a more dynamic way, in order to contribute to establishing the truth and restoring historical truth. The Polish side has no other wish; the Soviet side has no other wish—nor is it striving towards anything else. We only want the truth. It is very necessary to us, to our peoples; and it lies in the interests of our friendship.

Besides bilateral relations, we tackled certain issues of European cooperation, of the common European home, of the prospects for overcoming military confrontation on the European continent; and we discussed conditionally the contribution our parties, our peoples, can make to this historic cause. [end recording]

[Correspondent] when asked about CPSU-PZPR relations, Mieczyslaw Rakowski said:

[Begin Rakowski recording] Relations in every sphere of social or economic life are not static. Life brings new problems all the time and confronts us with the necessity of looking for new forms of cooperation. For example, now that a coalition government headed by a Catholic premier is operating, the question has arisen for the parties: in what way are we to develop our relations with the CPSU, while allowing for an effect on inter-state relations? The Minister has already made note of this. It's hard for (?me) to say today what the new forms of cooperation will be like tomorrow, but it"s certain that new situations create new necessities. In my opinion, one thing is sure—that this is the great Slav wall against which one must lean, I'm quoting Cardinal Wyszynzki this time, because, in so doing, we strengthen the sense of national security. I am immensely glad about what the Minister said about his talks with the Premier. I am immensely glad that a date has been fixed for Mr Mazowiecki's trip [to Moscow], because Poland needs the trip to affirm this very sense of security and the certainty that we are not changing allies, nor are we playing any kind of double game. So, in my opinion, the state of relations today is highly satisfactory, but can always be better and we also talked about that today as well. [end recording]

### Shevardnadze Evaluates Visit

*LD2610091289 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Video report and interview with USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze by Yu. Ulyanov on 25 October at the Belvedere Palace in Warsaw—recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Video shows Shevardnadze, Rakowski during talks] The Soviet guest was received today by Mieczyslaw Rakowski, first secretary of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party—FBIS] Central Committee. Interest in the visit of the USSR minister of foreign affairs is not small in Poland. Improvised press conferences spring up after every official meeting and after every round of talks.

[Video shows Shevardnadze surrounded by reporters speaking through interpreter] Do you think that Soviet-Polish relations are now as better than ever, asks a correspondent of SOLIDARNOSC newspaper. Obviously different stages in Soviet-Polish relations should not be compared, replies Eduard Amvrosiyevich. They have been and continue to be based on the firm foundation of equal cooperation and mutual respect, on the community of objectives, and on the international arena.

And this is the Belvedere Palace. A meeting took place here between Comrade Shevardnadze and Wojciech Jaruzelski, president of the Polish People's Republic. [Video shows the Palace and then Jaruzelski and Shevardnadze and their entourage during the meeting.] The program of the working visit is approaching its end.

[Video shows Ulyanov and Shevardnadze seated in easy chairs] [Ulyanov] Tell me, were the talks difficult? After all, you met a different Poland and different people; as the Americans say—with a completely different team.

[Shevardnadze] I would not say that I encountered a different Poland. Only the government is different—it is a coalition government, alternative forces have undoubtedly entered the arena, other leaders and managers have appeared, whom I met yesterday. Today I was also in touch with them.

You are interested in the atmosphere, as you told me. I would say that the atmosphere was most amicable, the discussions were constructive and substantive. I felt the interest of the leaders—I have in mind the new leaders in the government—the interest in developing relations and in deepening and extending Soviet-Polish cooperation.

And it is very important that a dialogue with the new leaders has been initiated and that the dialogue will be continued. I would especially like to single out the today's discussion with Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski and with Comrade Rakowski. But these are not the first meetings and discussions, these are, so to speak, our traditional contacts. But yesterday, there were indeed relatively fresh elements and factors. I think that Soviet-Polish cooperation will be developing on an upward trend. The Polish people are interested in it and the Soviet people are interested in it, too. I would say that all of Europe is interested in it.

### Ends Official Talks, Stays for Meeting

*LD2510200989 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1900 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Excerpts] Eduard Shevardnadze, the head of the Soviet diplomacy, has ended an official visit in Poland. Eduard Shevardnadze will remain in Warsaw. He will take part in the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of Warsaw Treaty states starting tomorrow.

### Soviet Deputy Interviewed on Poland, Gorbachev

*AU2510204889 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 23 Oct 89 p 6*

[Interview with Leonid Batkin, USSR people's deputy and member of the Interregional Group of Deputies, by Irena Lewandowska: "The Authorities Need To Have Someone To Talk to"—date and place not given]

[Text] [Lewandowska] What similarities and what differences do you see between what is going on in the USSR and what is going on in Poland? I am not just thinking of the present, but also of the years 1980-81.

[Batkin] The first and fundamental difference is that we do not have to keep an eye on a superpower neighbor. We can only be threatened by Russian tanks and never by Polish ones, and that makes things much easier. The reasons for the catastrophe in Poland are the same as the reasons behind what occurred in Hungary in 1956 and in Germany and Czechoslovakia at other times. Democratic movements in the socialist camp started up in a single country and then faced opposition from the rest of the camp. Now, for the first time in history, this syndrome no longer exists, and this is due, among other things, to the fact that the situation in the USSR has finally changed. In my opinion, the stagnation in Czechoslovakia and the GDR is temporary, and [passage removed by censor] (Law of 31 July, 1981, on the Control of Publications and Spectacles, Article 2, Item 3—OFFICIAL GAZETTE No 20, item 99, amended 1983, and No 44, item 204) the regimes are condemned to step down.

In our country there are none of the factors that hindered the revolution in Poland, but we also lack what made it easier for you to carry out your revolution. We do not have private ownership in the countryside. We do not have private trade, and we do not have your church. And perhaps the most important thing is that we have not seen the emergence of that fortunate situation that became the fountainhead of Polish freedom: What I am thinking of is the alliance between the intelligentsia and the workers. In our country it is still an everyday occurrence to have the workers effectively ranged against the intelligentsia.

[Lewandowska] It would appear that there is a gulf separating the intelligentsia from the rest of Soviet society, a gulf that is particularly noticeable in Russia.

[Batkin] It is true to say that the "Moscow Tribune" Club has not restricted its activities to words. For example, it organized a rally at the stadium in Luzhniki to protest over the massacre in Tbilisi. However, for a wide range of reasons, both personal and psychological, we have not even established contacts with Moscow's workers, who remain rather a "terra incognita" for us, and we lack popular political leaders such as Lech Walesa. In addition, I somehow do not see there being any serious people among the intelligentsia who think like politicians.

When the Workers Defense Committee was established in Poland, it formulated its own work methods and sought to explain them to the workers; it tried to seek out common ground. It became possible to conduct a dialogue and to establish joint structures.

[Lewandowska] It seems to me that it is a good thing for the authorities to have a partner they can negotiate with. In your country, however, the authorities do not really seem to have someone that they can talk to.

[Batkin] I agree. I have already written on this subject, saying that Gorbachev should be particularly interested in the emergence of an organized opposition, because it is always better to have dealings with an organization than a mob. The first steps in this direction have already been taken. For example, representatives of workers committees in the Kuznetsk Basin have already had meetings with Moscow economists and leaders of the Interregional Group of Deputies. However, at the moment all of this is in the form of talks and private meetings, but what is necessary is the setting up of a permanent structure.

[Lewandowska] Do you not think that people are simply afraid? The word "opposition" has very frightening associations; the fate of those who were members of an opposition in the past immediately springs to mind....

[Batkin] Fear really does exist, but it is not the main reason. What there is is a kind of inability to act. We do not know how to operate in the European way. People are afraid of the reaction of the authorities and they have doubts of an ideological kind. And, apart from that, there is fear of crossing a line that will mean the start of a harsh dispute with Gorbachev. Of course, the time will come when we have to argue with Gorbachev. That is becoming absolutely certain now, but it is, of course, obvious that we will not be arguing about every point.

[Lewandowska] Perhaps the situation is forcing Gorbachev to retreat?

[Batkin] My reply is that I do not really care, and the point will be irrelevant in the historical sense. Either Gorbachev radicalizes his policy, or the whole matter is destined for the scrap heap. The matter of the legislation on ownership is a case in point. I have received a draft of this legislation and the whole thing is a complete mess and will solve absolutely nothing. I do not know whether the inter-regional group of deputies will be able to present any alternative to it, and even if we do, I am convinced that the draft proposed by Ryzhkov's government will be accepted. There may be certain corrections which will create the impression of democratic procedure, but in reality it will not change it in any material way. What the authorities put forward is what will be accepted. Regrettably, we lack politicians. Poland has not only Walesa, but all his magnificent advisers as well, and—I will stick my neck out—politicians of the caliber of Wojciech Jaruzelski.

[Lewandowska] Jaruzelski?

[Batkin] Yes, Jaruzelski. Despite everything and the catastrophic situation, Jaruzelski found the personal strength and the courage not only to completely change his personal politics, but to go against the majority in his own Central Committee. This is the very thing that I wish for Gorbachev. Jaruzelski's position, as I see it, is the position of a president who is above all parties.

[Lewandowska] That is to say General Jaruzelski wishes this to be so.

[Batkin] Yes, and although it does not always work out like this, the intention behind it is always important. Should Gorbachev ever try to do the same I would say that it would be a step in the right direction. From the moment that a government under Mazowiecki came into being, Jaruzelski ceased to be the absolute ruler in Poland. Our problem stems from the fact that we do not have our own "Solidarity," or Walesa. There is no one with whom authority can be shared. We must first create an alternative political force. The most pressing problem for all democratic forces, peoples' fronts, and informal organizations is the creation of such a structure to span the whole country.

## Homesick Family Returns to GDR From FRG

*PM2610150189 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Oct 89 First Edition p 5*

[I. Osinskiy report: "Hospitality in Words. Refugees Want To Return Home From the FRG"]

[Text] Berlin—Growing numbers of refugees from the GDR would like to return home from the FRG. ADN has reported that more than 100 applications to this effect were received by the GDR permanent mission in Bonn last weekend alone.

It is well known, the TASS correspondent in Berlin reported to the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA editorial office, that 100,000 people have left the country in the last few months. They were convinced that what lay in store for them in the West was, if not paradise, then at least exceptional scope for initiative and an opportunity to make their fortunes. Therefore, despite the state's repeated advice not to act hastily and to think everything through, they "voted with their feet" for capitalism. It did not take too long before the sobering up...

The newspaper DER MORGEN described the fate of one such family without naming it.

Their life was successful in every respect. They built a comfortable and cozy home in a smallish town on the shore of a picturesque lake. The head of the family worked as a lecturer. His salary was quite sufficient to enable them to live without worry, and therefore the wife decided to devote herself to raising the children. The older daughter was studying technical drawing, the younger one was still at school. An expensive car, the money for which had been saved over 17 years, was the object of shared pride. They decided to inaugurate the newly purchased car by taking a vacation on Lake Balaton.

They encountered a veritable Babel of refugees there, with a fair number of suspicious individuals milling around them in search of easy pickings. Obviously someone took a fancy to the luxury vehicle. All attempts to trace the vanished car were fruitless. In their despondency at the loss, the family set out to seek consolation in the West. The FRG welcomed them hospitably in words, but cruelly in deed. They suffered a few days in a migrants' camp—spending hours on end waiting in line for food, living without any domestic comforts. They finally made their way to relatives...

They seemed to have found peace and quiet there: They had a roof above their heads, and the problems of employment and the children's education were being solved. Nonetheless, they felt worse with each passing day. They constantly saw people giving them sidelong glances and even heard insults and threats.

All the material problems would probably have resolved themselves with the passage of time. But, the family members admit, we would never have enjoyed the meaningful spiritual life to which we were accustomed in the GDR. We are happy to be back home.

This happiness has a bitter aftertaste. Many acquaintances consider them "renegades," and some have even stopped exchanging greetings. It is not easy to regain the lost trust.

We will probably sell our home and move to some other city. We will start over, the former refugees say.

They have nobody to blame but themselves. Yes, they often expressed irritation with the bureaucracy, the shortages in supplies, and the other aspects of disorganization still existing in the GDR. But who is to impose order in his own home if not the master himself?

## West Europe

## Gorbachev Continues Official Visit to Finland

### Meeting With President Koivisto

*PM2610094589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 89 Second Edition p 1*

[TASS report: "M.S. Gorbachev's Meeting with M. Koivisto"]

[Text] The Soviet-Finnish summit meeting began in Helsinki today.

M.S. Gorbachev and President Mauno Koivisto expressed satisfaction at the fact that it is taking place at this precise moment and makes it possible to focus attention on those questions where Soviet-Finnish relations with their high degree of mutual trust play a particularly important role.

M.S. Gorbachev expressed thanks for the hospitality and cordial [radushnyy] reception. He began by inviting M. Koivisto to the Soviet Union, thereby stressing that this meeting is a component of their constant friendly dialogue. Our attitude toward Finland, he said, has independent and great value for us not only on the bilateral plane but also within the framework of the all-European process—as an example of equal rights, good will, and mutually advantageous cooperation over the course of decades. This relationship has profound roots and our two peoples have lived alongside each other for centuries. As a result, despite all the upheavals of the past, sympathy for the Finns as a very close people has taken firm root in Soviet people.

But simply noting that fact is not enough. We must constantly feed these relations with new content. This meeting is also important to look at what can and must be done to develop Soviet-Finnish collaboration with a consideration for the changes in the two countries and in the European and world economy and politics.

A small country but a big people who, relying on their national values, have been able to make and are continuing to make a considerable contribution to civilization. That attests to their growing potential, generates respect, and is particularly important in our time when the perestroyka of international relations is beginning on new democratic and humane foundations.

We greatly prize the role which the Finnish leadership and President Mauno Koivisto personally are playing in the consolidation of good-neighborliness and mutual understanding, whose foundations were once laid under President Paasikivi, M.S. Gorbachev noted. For its part the Soviet leadership firmly adheres to precisely this course and will pursue it devotedly.

M.S. Gorbachev gave the President frank and detailed information about the specific features of the moment through which the Soviet Union is now passing. In discussing specific problems of the Soviet economy attention was paid to the new type of foreign economic relations, the role of joint ventures, and the formation of intensive cooperation zones, primarily in the Leningrad region, the Baltic republics, and the Kola Peninsula where, M.S. Gorbachev noted, we can only welcome the activeness of Finnish firms and business circles.

M.S. Gorbachev imparted his thoughts regarding the prospects for resolving interethnic problems in the USSR on the basis of the renewal and improvement of the Soviet federation. The president expressed full understanding for the Soviet leadership's policy on this question and confirmed his principled position correspondingly to build Finland's relations with the USSR and its republics.

In M. Koivisto's opinion, not a single serious Western statesman with whom he has met recently underestimates the international importance of perestroyka and none of them is inclined to behave provocatively with regard to the Soviet Union or East Europe. For his part he stressed the importance of the inclusion of the Soviet economy in the world economic system and of the USSR's association to the activity of international economic organizations.

Citing the Soviet Union's principled position, which rules out any interference whatsoever in the affairs of other states, M.S. Gorbachev noted the especially crucial nature of the present moment, when any attempt to destroy the natural development which the people themselves want is fraught with the danger of very serious consequences for the world situation as a whole.

The interlocutors exchanged opinions on the present state and importance of Soviet-U.S. relations. On the whole, M.S. Gorbachev gave a positive assessment of the talks on strategic arms, conventional weapons, and armed forces in Europe, although serious problems still remain awaiting a mutually acceptable solution.

The one-on-one talks will be continued.

## Conversation With Public, Museum Tour

*LD2510225989 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by correspondent Tikhomirov from Helsinki on the visit by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 25 October]

[Excerpts] [Tikhomirov] Here we have the first meetings on the streets of Helsinki, the first questions and answers, the first handshakes:

[Begin Gorbachev recording] We know that the Finns know how to manage things. We have seen that in our own country, in the homeland, and we know. We know the good feelings of the citizens of Finland toward the Soviet Union. You should know that every Soviet person has had a kindly attitude toward the Finns resting deep in his heart for a long time. What you have done here and are continuing to do is a good human example. Nevertheless, a person is elevated by his deed and actions, not by fine-sounding words. I know you do not like to talk much. [Video shows people in crowd beginning to speak to Gorbachev]

True, that is so. [Gorbachev laughs] True, I see that you have sufficient emotions today. [Video shows Gorbachev chatting to people, shaking a hand, moving off to waiting limousine] [end recording]

[Tikhomirov] This is the moment of the visit to the Lenin museum in Helsinki, in the working-class district of Hakaniemi. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Gorbachev] It is interesting what historical ups and downs there are! [passage omitted]

[Tikhomirov] In a short interview with a Finnish journalist, the general secretary turned his attention, in particular, to Lenin's work: "State and Revolution," which Lenin wrote in Finland.

[Gorbachev] The main thing with Lenin was his devotion to the socialist idea; that was the main thing. The main thing is service to the people and their interests. This—and high morality—is what one has to learn from Lenin. This is always necessary for everyone who links himself with socialism and the struggle for the implementation of socialist ideals. That will be the most correct thing. Lenin's "State and Revolution" was one of his (?most) difficult works, written on the eve, when it was already visible in what direction events were developing [words indistinct]. Much is expressed. And yet, experience afterward of the construction of socialism showed that not everything that was said (?there) was correct, and Lenin rejected it. That is Lenin's approach; that is what it is necessary [word indistinct]. The point is not to quote Lenin, but to be true to Leninism. That is the most [word indistinct].

[Unidentified speaker]...to seek the truth all the time.

[Gorbachev] Always in the specific context of the events; the historical context, and always remembering the interests of the working people.

[Speaker] Lenin...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] Then you will not go wrong. I have mentioned this work, "State and Revolution," and here in front of us we have a facsimile copy to, in my opinion—but already, in general, just a few such copies remain. This facsimile was made in 1977.

[Raisa] A manuscript...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] A manuscript.

[Raisa, continuing]...of Lenin's work.

[Gorbachev] That is what was written by Lenin.

[Raisa] It is a facsimile edition of the manuscript of Lenin's "State and Revolution."

[Gorbachev] This is a very rare and valuable edition, and I...[changes thought] Incidentally, the finishing touches were put to it in Razliv, for...[passage omitted]

[Gorbachev]...from Razliv to here...[passage omitted]

[Gorbachev] So, this is precisely what actually happened here within these walls. I would like to hand it over to the museum here so that it will lie somewhere here alongside.

[Unidentified official] Thank you very much.

[Gorbachev] Fine. Thank you again for the memory, for what you are doing here within the framework of this museum. I want to assure you that our perestroyka is also a tribute to Ilyich and a continuation of the great cause he commenced with the bolsheviks and led the workers' movement in October 1917. Thank you.

[Two unidentified officials] Thank you very much. [end recording]

[Tikhomirov] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev left his signature in the museum's book for honored visitors.

## More Chats With Public

*LD2510232489 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Video report from Helsinki on CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's activities on 25 October; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Video shows Gorbachev on street proceeding toward his limousine. He stops to talk to an enthusiastic crowd waving small Finnish flags] [Gorbachev] We wish to continue through our perestroyka the realization of the Leninist concept of socialism. [Video shows gorbachev listening to someone who is translating to the crowd for him] In the current conditions, taking account of the experience that has been acquired by the country-...and the achievements of all world civilization, regardless of social system. It is necessary to adopt the best that civilization gives and to apply it under socialism, for renewal of it.

[Unidentified man] Mikhail Sergeyevich, for you, is Finland a model for the development of Eastern Europe, too?

[Gorbachev] For me Finland is...or rather, our Soviet-Finnish relations are a model for relations between a large country and a small country. It is a model for relations between states belonging to different systems. For me, it is a model for relations between neighboring states. [Video shows Gorbachev and wife getting into limousine again. A group of young people cry out: "Misha. Misha". Gorbachev shakes some hands and stops again] Wait a moment. Are these Finnish people (words indistinct)? How so? They are said to be very equable people! [Video shows Gorbachev shaking more hands. The crowd waves and shouts goodbye. Gorbachev and wife wave and get into limousine]

## Summary of 25 Oct Activities

*LD2610090689 Moscow TASS in English 0856 GMT 26 Oct 89*

[Text] Helsinki October 26 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev continues his official visit to Finland today. He began talks with Finnish President Mauno Koivisto on Wednesday.

The sides are expected to sign several bilateral agreements in the political, economic and other spheres.

Today, the Soviet president will visit an exhibition of Finnish industry, meet Finnish businessmen, continue his talks and deliver a speech at the Finlandia Palace.

Spokesmen for the Soviet and Finnish delegations told a news conference on Wednesday that the first head-to-head meeting between Gorbachev and Koivisto passed in a friendly and cordial atmosphere. The two presidents discussed bilateral relations and international problems, including the situation in Europe and the development of the disarmament process.

On Wednesday, Gorbachev and other Soviet officials visited the Hietaniemi Cemetery in Helsinki where two outstanding Finnish presidents—Juho Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen—are buried. Gorbachev laid a wreath at their graves.

The Soviet delegation then visited the apartment-museum of Vladimir Lenin. The Soviet president laid flowers at the memorial plaque on the building, walked through the museum and signed a book of honorary visitors.

Mauno Koivisto and his wife hosted a dinner in honour of Mikhail and Raisa Gorbachev in the Presidential Palace on Wednesday night.

### Koivisto-Hosted Dinner

*LD2510185589 Moscow TASS in English 1849 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Helsinki October 25 TASS—A dinner in honour of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and his wife Raisa was given at the Presidential Palace tonight on behalf of President Mauno Koivisto and his wife.

The banquet was attended from the Soviet side by Aleksandr Yakovlev, other officials and a group of Soviet public representatives currently in Helsinki.

Koivisto and Gorbachev exchanged speeches.

### Gorbachev Banquet Toast

*PM2610092589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 89 Second Edition p 2*

[TASS report on Gorbachev's speech at a 25 October state banquet in Helsinki, under the general heading "Strengthening the Foundations of the Common European Home" and the headline "Speech by M.S. Gorbachev"]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. President,
Esteemed Mr Tellervo Koivisto,
Ladies and Gentlemen, Comrades,

I am sure, Mr. President, that your friendly words will be gratefully received by Soviet people who have the best of feelings and profound respect for their northern neighbour, the Land of Suomi.

I wish to greet a people who has preserved the poetic beauty and original look of its land and ennobled rigorous nature by persistent work. I wish to welcome a nation that has enriched European and world culture by the Epos Kalevala, the music of Jean Sibelius, and by the remarkable works of writers, artists, designers, and architects. We invite Finnish masters to help us restore architectural monuments in our country.

What Russian artist and philosopher Nicholas Roerich described as "Finland's enchantment" was an inspiration to Repin, Glinka, Rimskiy-Korsakov. Many Russian poets dedicated their verse to Finland's nature and its people.

Lenin and Finland, this theme is forever a source of sympathy between our two peoples. We are grateful to Finns who treasure the memory of the founder of the Soviet state, the leader of our great revolution.

Our destinies have been closely interwoven by history, and both of our countries have not been ungrateful. We have contributed a unique example of equal relations, mutual respect, and confidence to the treasure trove of history. And this has been done despite the fact that the past has not always been smooth and that there was even fierce strife at times.

I wish to greet neutral Finland and its effective and benevolent policy that has been serving peace in Nordic Europe and the whole of Europe for many years. Finland earned high prestige among European peoples and the international community by its international activity, inclination towards a dialogue, attention to partners, and at the same time firmness in asserting its stand and the right to its stand under any circumstances.

This made Helsinki the starting point of the European process. The Soviet Union highly appreciates Finland's contribution to the shaping of positive, sound tendencies during the post-war period and its persistent striving to put an end to the cold war.

We appreciate the stable, many-faceted, and productive cooperation between our two states, the public of our countries, and personal contacts between Soviet and Finnish citizens.

These are fruits of a far-sighted choice made 45 years ago, a result of efforts by statesmen from Paasikivi to Koivisto. It is particularly important that the youth of our two countries has learned to treasure everything that has been achieved in this respect by the previous generation and that they wish to replenish this. The policy of Soviet-Finnish good-neighbourliness has a European scope and is an asset in world politics.

Much of what is now used in international communication was manifested for the first time in relations between the Soviet Union and Finland. They developed a "technique" for the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. I do not want to sound excessively affected, but I cannot avoid mentioning the fact that relations between the USSR and Finland are exemplary relations in many respects.

Their vitality is shown also by the fact that the international importance of Soviet-Finnish interaction has not lessened even now that dozens of countries have joined in the European process. It assumes fresh importance and resonance. Our experience confirms the possibility of creating in relations between by no means identical states a long-term foundation that is unaffected by either domestic or foreign circumstantial political considerations.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Staying in your country we have become directly aware of the close interest with which the Finnish people are following the process taking place in the Soviet Union. It is particularly pleasant that they understand the universal importance of the things with which we are occupied at home. The president of Finland and I have already discussed today specific features of the present stage of perestroyka.

Each subsequent stage in the renewal of Soviet society—this work has been widely launched—has hitherto turned out to be more difficult than the previous one. This is natural, for what we have is a "revolution within a revolution." It is more than likely that we are now living through the most crucial moment.

The special complexity of the situation is determined by its transitional character. The correction of past deformations and the radical revision of views on socialism have released a huge amount of public energy and swiftly involved millions of people in political affairs. Profound transformations in the economic basis and an atmosphere of unfettered hearts and minds has given rise to or aggravated problems which quite often are felt acutely and evoke discontent.

The current priority task is to consolidate the released energy into practical work and direct it so as to achieve tangible results in daily living.

We rely on our new parliament which is promptly increasing its working and learning to perform its role as required by the times. Fundamental laws currently under discussion by the Supreme Soviet, some of which have already been passed, will alter the entire economic and political structure of society. Our socialist federation will be filed with new contents. The forthcoming elections to republican and local soviets is a second stage in the political reform, a stage of great importance. The 28th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party will be a historic milestone in the development of perestroyka.

The democratization of society is the core of the entire process. With all the pluralism of opinions and passions which are characteristic of our life today, the socialist choice of the people remains unshakeable.

Our perestroyka has already had an international impact. Tapping the energy of our vast country to assert the primacy of common human values in the world development can substantially help streamline human progress. We are solving our tasks now in the context of the interests of the world community. This has already influenced the atmosphere in the world and promoted the improvement of the international situation.

Our countries are vastly dissimilar. But remaining different, preserving all our originality, we respect each other's choice. Moreover, we regard distinctions and dissimilarity as a source of mutual enrichment and of supplementing each other economically and culturally. Here is a fresh example from the latter area. Before departure I was presented with two voluminous books in Russian and Finnish. This is the first volume of the joint publication, the Bibliography of Uralic Studies, prepared by scholars of our two countries.

Unique work has been done. It comprises research into archaeology, ethnography, folklore, linguistics, and literary studies of all peoples of the Finno-Ugric group in 70 years since 1917, a jubilee year for both our states. Isn't this an example of Soviet-Finnish contribution to world humanities!

The Soviet Union is firmly determined to continue along the road of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with Finland. As you see, I used the formula of the 1948 treaty. Much has changed since then, but the fundamental idea—to be friends, to cooperate, to help each other—that was adopted then has not become dated. It is capable of taking on new contents, adapting to the present and remaining ever necessary and relevant.

I hope, Mr. President, and I will permit myself to say this on behalf of us both that we shall do our utmost so that Soviet-Finnish relations remain at the highest level of confidence and goodneighbourliness. And when needed, our two countries will be as ever trailblazers in international affairs. This requires constant attention and sustained effort.

But we have become accustomed to this. We have rich experience and firm support of our peoples. I believe that we shall cope with the task. And the summit meeting that we have started so successfully today confirms my belief.

I have one more mission, which is very important and pleasant, to invite you, Mr. President, to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union.

To the health of Mr. Mauno Koivisto and Mrs. Tellervo Koivisto,
To the flourishing of friendly Finland and its people,
To further cooperation and friendship!

### Koivisto Banquet Address

*PM2610112189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 89 Second Edition pp 1-2*

[TASS report on speech delivered by Finnish President M. Koivisto at 25 October Helsinki banquet in honor of M.S. Gorbachev under general heading: "Strengthening Foundation of All-European Home"]

[Text] Mr General Secretary and chairman of the Supreme Soviet,
esteemed Mrs Gorbachev,
esteemed Soviet guests,
ladies and gentlemen!

Allow me once again to welcome you on your arrival in Finland on an official visit which I am sure will prove historic.

By nature the Finns are a reserved people. Nonetheless I am sure that in the course of these 3 days you will be able to sense the atmosphere of friendship and respect for you which prevails here.

We first met in Moscow a little more than 4 years ago. I retain pleasant memories of our substantive talks and the hospitality shown to us both then and during my official visit to the Soviet Union in 1987.

Over these years the world has changed greatly, not least as a result of your bold efforts.

The foundation of our countries' mutual relations has not changed. That is not an expression of stagnation but of the fact that the breakthrough we are now witnessing in the broad European context took place in our relations more than 4 decades ago.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is becoming clear that relations between Finland, which had just acquired its independence, and the young Soviet state could have developed better from the outset than they did. After all, the government headed by Lenin recognized Finland's independence. It was clear to the Finnish state leadership that of Russia's political parties only the Bolsheviks were ready for this recognition.

In the twenties and thirties relations between Finland and the Soviet Union lacked positive development for the creation of mutual trust and the establishment of mutual relations of a kind which would have kept Finland away from wars.

The fact that Finland made no more effort to develop relations between the two countries should be explained not by the fact that the Finnish Government had hostile intentions with regard to the Soviet Union but by the fact that Finland was lulled by the idea that there would be no big war or that if there were the country would be able to remain outside it.

Harsh wars taught the Finnish people that it is precisely a small nation which should consider the interests of the security of its big neighbor and guard against building its future by relying on aid and sympathy from overseas.

After the war the fact that the country had emerged from its wartime ordeals not only wiser but retaining its representative system of the people's power and its economic viability created a favorable basis for a new orientation in Finland's foreign policy. It embarked very energetically on the solution of the tasks presented by the conscientious fulfillment of the peace treaty.

The key question of the new foreign policy was the building of confident relations with the Soviet Union.

When the treaty on friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid was concluded in 1948 and when it had been filled with content entirely to the Finns' satisfaction, the new line was reinforced.

The treaties concluded between our countries remain the basis of our mutual relations. We shall observe them. There is no need to change their formulation, although decades have passed and the international situation has also changed with them.

The most important thing was mutual understanding with regard to the spirit of the treaties and also mutual trust which was built on the basis of this mutual understanding by my esteemed predecessors J.K. Paasakivi and U.K. Kekkonen together with Soviet leaders. Analyzing the development of our relations over 4 decades we can note that the capital of mutual trust has grown abundantly.

The profound renewal of Soviet society implemented under your leadership, Mr General Secretary, perestroyka, and the new open atmosphere of debate have helped us understand the Soviet man in a new and more detailed way. The natural disasters and other difficulties which have affected our neighbor have generated sympathy, even a feeling of shock in us.

The Soviet Union is an enormous multinational community whose different parts complement each other and depend on each other. Although the very direct decisions made previously have left a certain concealed tension which is now being discharged, there are every grounds for believing in the ability of this community of peoples to resolve its problems in such a way that the individuality of the parts which comprise it is strengthened while at the same time consolidating its integrity.

The new way of thinking in the Soviet Union's foreign policy gives new impetus, even to the development of relations between our countries.

Trade and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union has had and will continue to have very important significance for Finland's economy. In our opinion the basis of our mutual trade and economic relations can most successfully be assured by conducting bilateral trade. In the present situation this system may be developed so that it also promotes wide-scale economic collaboration under the changing conditions.

A subject of Finland's special attention is the international cooperation for which you, Mr General Secretary, outlined the main milestones in your speech in Murmansk 2 years ago.

At the time you had just returned from the historic summit meeting in Reykjavik which opened up before mankind the prospect of a nuclear-free future, although specific decisions had not yet been made at the time.

Today practical measures have already been gradually implemented—for the first time the elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons has begun. The Finns are giving this development their full support. After all we ourselves are a nuclear-free country and have put forward initiatives for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in North Europe.

The situation was still blocked 2 years ago. Tension in relations remained and the world's northern regions remained under the threat of the growing arms race. We were particularly perturbed by the adoption of cruise missiles and the buildup of naval activity in the Northern sea regions.

From the viewpoint of Finland's security it is very important that it be possible to break this vicious circle of armament and turn development in a positive direction. We should totally renounce long-range cruise missiles, restrict arms in sea regions, and extend confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans.

Past development is also positive in this respect. We pin great hopes on the growing mutual understanding reflected in the recent meeting of Soviet and U.S. foreign ministers in the United States.

We consider it possible to expect further steps forward in the disarmament field and in general in the improvement of East-West relations. This as a whole has paramount importance from the viewpoint not only of security but also of ensuring economic development.

I agree with you that we should embark jointly on the rational development of the northern regions rich in natural resources, as you suggested in Murmansk. Here it is essential to protect the vulnerable nature of the north and to substantially reduce the burden it bears today as a result of pollution.

Concern for the danger threatening northern nature has prompted the Finnish Government to convene in early fall in Rovaniemi City an international meeting of specialists on arctic environmental conservation. We hope that this will lead to growing cooperation between all states adjacent to arctic regions.

In recent years Europe has advanced considerably in creating a system of mutual trust. This has happened primarily in the military and humanitarian fields. At the same time the economic cooperation embracing the entire continent has advanced slowly.

The aggravation of economic problems in many countries means instability for all Europe. As for environmental problems, no reasons should place obstacles on the path of their solution with the aid of available scientific and technical achievements on the scale of the entire continent.

The fourth meeting of countries which took part in the all-European conference will begin in Helsinki in 2 and ½ years. We are prepared to accept participants in the meeting at the highest level if, as we hope, talks in individual fields make successful headway.

We are convinced that Finland together with other neutral countries will be able to make a constructive contribution to the development of a unified Europe, the Europe which you, Mr General Secretary, call the common European home.

I want once again to emphasize the great credit you take for the fact that the mounting tension in the world has been turned into mounting mutual understanding, that the enormous resources necessary for arms can now be directed toward projects of vital importance from the viewpoint of man's future, and that the lives of individual people have been able to be enriched with a reduction in fear and an increase in hope.

In conclusion Mauno Koivisto proposed a toast to the successes of good-neighborliness between Finland and the Soviet Union.

## Gorbachev 26 Oct Activities

*LD2610105889 Moscow TASS in English 1045 GMT 26 Oct 89*

[Text] Helsinki October 26 TASS—The second day of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Finland began with a meeting with Prime Minister Harri Holkeri. The Soviet president then visited a Finnish industrial exhibition.

He was accompanied by President Mauno Koivisto and Harri Holkeri. The exhibition features leading firms and companies producing and processing agricultural goods, operating in the timber and metal- working industries, and manufacturing computing technology, which enjoy good reputation throughout the world.

Gorbachev met Finnish businessmen at the conference hall of the Kalastajatorppa Hotel. Kazimir Ernrut, Central Union of Industry chairman, greeted the Soviet president.

The meeting was addressed by Gorbachev.

## Gorbachev, Koivisto Continue Talks

*LD2610134189 Moscow TASS in English 1334 GMT 26 Oct 89*

[Text] Helsinki October 26 TASS—Visiting Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Finnish President Mauno Koivisto continued the Soviet-Finnish talks in the afternoon today.

They discussed bilateral relations and international issues.

Also present were Soviet and Finnish officials.

## Kovalev Holds Talks at Finnish Foreign Ministry

*LD2510164989 Moscow TASS in English 1633 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Helsinki October 25 TASS—Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Kovalev, Finnish Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio, and State Secretary of the Finnish Foreign Ministry Ake Wihtol had conversations and consultations here today in connection with Mikhail Gorbachev's official visit to this country.

They had a substantive discussion about specific issues related to European and world politics, disarmament, and bilateral Soviet-Finnish relations.

Both parties stressed the need for Foreign Ministries and their units to implement vigorously agreements of the current Soviet-Finnish Summit in Helsinki.

Special attention was given to the further perfection of the mechanism of consultations between the Foreign Ministries in the two countries. Subjects for such consultations were outlined.

The conversations were held in a businesslike and friendly atmosphere.

### Yakovlev Meets Parties' Delegations in Finland

*LD2610084789 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, member of the Soviet delegation, met today with the delegations of the leading political parties of the country. Naturally, the CPSU has the longest fraternal ties with the Finnish Communists. Comrade Yakovlev conversed with a delegation of the Finnish Communist Party, headed by Party Chairman Jarmo Wahlstroem. [Video shows meeting]

There was also a meeting with the delegation of the SKP-Y [Finnish Communist Party-Unity] headed by Party Chairman Esko-Juhani Tennilae. [Video shows meeting]

The delegation of the Social Democratic Party was headed by Pertti Paasio, chairman of the party and foreign minister of the country. Kalevi Sorsa, eminent figure of the Social Democratic movement and chairman of parliament, was present at the meeting. [Video shows meeting]

Comrade Yakovlev also met with a delegation of the leading bourgeois party, the National Coalition Party, headed by Party Chairman Ilkka Suominen, minister of industry of the country. [Video shows meeting]

## Supreme Soviet Session

### Deputies Call for Election Law Clarifications

*PM2610074789 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Oct 89 First Edition p 1*

[Report by parliamentary correspondents Captain 1st Rank V. Lukashevich and Captain 3d Rank V. Urban: "Urgent Task for Deputies"]

[Excerpts] The Kremlin—[Passage omitted] One fundamental draft law and, as it transpired, one which brooks no delay is the draft Law on Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution on Questions of the Electoral System, was discussed on Monday [23 October]. The pointed discussion which blew up after the report by A.I. Lukyanov has underlined the immediacy and significance of this draft law. The speaker was asked a mass of questions and the chairman, M.S. Gorbachev, twice had to extend the time for answering these questions. [passage omitted]

Many parliamentarians appeared to share the concern of Deputy S.M. Ryabchenko, who observed that the document under consideration at the session must establish a certain benchmark for the observance of human rights in all the union republics. Deputy B.N. Nikolskiy submitted the proposal to nominate candidates from social organizations but to vote for them only in the okrugs. Deputy V.A. Shapovalenko expressed the opinion that this question must be put to a referendum: Let the people decide whether to hold elections from social organizations or not.

In the opinion of Deputy A.M. Yemelyanov, more work must be done on the provisions of the draft which concern the number of candidates, the election of the head of state, and some others. Deputy V.I. Samarin noted a number of shortcomings in the draft law and suggested that it be submitted for discussion in the committees and commissions and a decision made only after that.

Some of the speakers expressed doubts about provision 100 of the article, which says that any number of candidates may be included on the ballot papers. Does it mean that there could be just one contender? Will the elections not then simply be turned into the kind of voting we practiced for decades?

Lieutenant Colonel B.F. Pylin, a deputy from Volgograd, proposed that the chairmen of village and settlement soviets be elected by direct ballot. This, in his opinion, would be the first confirmation of direct elections for leaders of authorities.

It is a pity that the discriminatory measures applied to military servicemen voting in the Baltic and some other regions of the country in the form of the residential qualification and the restriction of other electoral rights were not given publicity at the session during the discussion of amendments to the Constitution. As is well known, these questions are causing bewilderment among many servicemen.

Summing up the exchange of opinions, M.S. Gorbachev supported deputies' proposal that work on the draft law must be continued in the committees and commissions. The session agreed that this work must be regarded as the "urgent task" of the committees and commissions. It was decided to start it immediately after lunch in order to be able to present it to parliament by 1400 hours on Tuesday for further discussion and approval.

The same day, deputies heard a report by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevarnadze on the work of the Foreign Ministry to implement the main directions of Soviet foreign policy.

### PRAVDA Reports Debates on Constitution

*PM2510125589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Oct 89 First Edition p 1*

[Report by PRAVDA parliamentary group: "Guidelines of the People's Power"]

[Text] The events connected with the election of the USSR people's deputies are still fresh in people's memories yet a new election campaign is not far off. Now the voters have to specify who will represent their interests in the supreme soviets of the union and autonomous republics and in the local soviets.

As has already been reported, last Monday [23 October] the joint sitting of our parliament's two chambers ended during the daytime. And after the intermission the work shifted to the standing committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet where the deputies "went over" in detail the articles of the Constitution concerning the functioning of the electoral system.

What conclusions did the deputies reach?

"We worked attentively on the deputies' proposals heard from the session rostrum or submitted in writing and prepared our conclusion," we were told by Yu. Kalmykov, deputy chairman of the Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order. "In particular we calculated the expediency of enshrining in the USSR Constitution the principle of multiple candidate elections. In this connection we suggest altering the third part of article 100 to read: 'The number of candidates included on the ballot slip should be greater than the number of available deputies' seats.'"

The committee members disagreed with the opinion of A. Yemelyanov, S. Ryabchenko, V. Shapovalenko, and other deputies who suggested establishing direct elections of soviet chairmen by the population. The adoption of this proposal would entail fundamental changes to the structure of power in the country. As for the election of people's deputies from public organizations, this problem, the committee believes, should be discussed during the preparation of the new USSR Constitution. The introduction of any changes right now will cast doubt on the legality of the powers of the present USSR people's deputies.

Deputy V. Chelyshev and others raised the question of the possibility of enlisting funds from enterprises and organizations for holding the elections. Considering the lack of a control mechanism for the expenditure of these funds and considering that the candidate deputies should take part in the election campaign on an equal basis, the committee proposed retaining the existing Constitution's provision that expenditure connected with preparing and holding elections of people's deputies should be borne by the state.

Virtually all committees and commissions also discussed the following controversial element: Can one and the same person be a deputy of two soviets simultaneously? The parliamentarians' opinions differed. But our poll showed that the majority are inclined to think that this possibility should be kept. Ultimately it all depends on the individual qualities of deputies and their work capacity and activeness.

We found unexpected confirmation of this thesis in a talk with G. Burbulis, a people's deputy from Sverdlovsk. It turned out that he and other deputies from the Urals region have in fact already taken part in the preparation of draft laws which will be submitted for examination by the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet session which began today.

"The participation of one deputy in two soviets," Gennadiy Eduardovich said, "is natural. I see in this a guarantee of the continuity of power, of its vertical interaction, and of the possibility of the joint, prompt solution of problems concerning both an individual rayon and an oblast or republic or the country as a whole."

A USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium session led by A. Lukyanov was held yesterday morning. It summed up the proposals from the standing committees and commissions. The reworked draft law "on changes and additions to the USSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) on questions of the electoral system was submitted to the evening plenary sitting of the Supreme Soviet.

It discussed the draft law article by article. Keen polemics flared up over who should elect the soviet chairmen. The majority adopted a formulation enabling the union republics to decide independently whether or not there should be direct elections of chairmen of the local organs of soviet power. After the debates the deputies decided to approve the draft law and submit it for examination by the second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. With a view to accelerating the implementation of the electoral reform the Supreme Soviet has deemed it possible to effect a change to republican legislations on the election of people's deputies on the basis of the draft of this law, providing for the republican documents on the elections to be put into operation after the adoption of the all-union law by the second Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

### Further on Debates

*PM2510133589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Oct 89 Second Edition p 1*

[Report by PRAVDA parliamentary group: "Guidelines of People's Power"]

[Text] The events connected with the election of the USSR people's deputies are still fresh in people's memories yet a new election campaign is not far off. Now the voters have to specify who will represent their interests in the supreme soviets of the union and autonomous republics and in the local soviets.

As has already been reported, last Monday the joint session of our parliament's two chambers ended during the daytime. And after the intermission the work shifted to the standing committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet where the deputies "went over" in detail the articles of the Constitution concerning the functioning of the electoral system.

"We worked attentively on the deputies' proposals heard from the session rostrum or submitted in writing and prepared our conclusion," we were told by Yu. Kalmykov, deputy chairman of the Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order. "In particular we calculated the expediency of enshrining in the USSR Constitution the principle of multiple candidate elections."

On Monday and Tuesday the members of the Commission on Consumer Goods, Trade, and Municipal, Consumer, and Other Services to the Population spent about 6 hours discussing the proposed changes to the electoral system. The principles of the formation of the power of the people locally and in the republics have the most direct bearing on this subdivision of the USSR Supreme Soviet. After all, the reform of the economy places responsibility for providing people with everything essential—from goods in the store to a water pipeline in good repair—on the local and republican soviets.

Is it expedient to elect them on condition that at least two candidates run for each seat? V. Levakin, deputy chairman of the commission, told us that heated disputes developed around this proposal. Deputy A. Obolenskiy insisted on unconditional multiple candidate elections: In his opinion only in this way is it possible to maintain the level of democracy. Deputy G. Magomedov objected: In small hamlets, for instance, it is hard to find several candidates for one seat.

Virtually all committees and commissions also discussed the following controversial element: Can one and the same person be a deputy of two soviets simultaneously? The parliamentarians' opinions differed. But our poll showed that the majority are inclined to think that this possibility should be kept.

We found unexpected confirmation of this thesis in a talk with G. Burbulis, a people's deputy from Sverdlovsk. It turned out that he and other deputies from the Urals region have in fact already taken part in the preparation of draft laws which will be submitted for examination by the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet session which began today.

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It discussed the draft law article by article. Keen polemics flared up over who should elect the soviet chairmen. The majority adopted a formulation enabling the union republics to decide independently whether or not there should be direct elections of chairmen of the local organs of soviet power. Then the clause on the election of people's deputies from public organizations was completely excluded from the draft law by individual voting. After the debates the deputies decided to approve the draft law and submit it for examination by the second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. With a view to accelerating the implementation of the electoral reform the Supreme Soviet has deemed it possible to effect a change to republican legislations on the election of people's deputies on the basis of the draft of this law, providing for the republican documents on the elections to be put into operation after the adoption of the all-union law by the second Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

At the end of the sitting the Supreme Soviet approved S. Sitaryan as deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. He will head the Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission. For the remaining 2 weeks the deputies will work in parliamentary committees and commissions. The next plenary session will be held Monday 30 October.

## International Affairs Committee Meets 25 Oct

*LD2510204989 Moscow TASS in English 2029 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Moscow October 25 TASS— By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs today suggested to the USSR Supreme Soviet that the Soviet join the 1980 U.N. convention on treaties regarding international purchases and sales.

Vladimir Burmistrov, USSR deputy minister of foreign economic relations, told the meeting that the United Nations convention offers unified standards of mutual responsibility of parties to a foreign trade deal. This is particularly important in conditions when the number of participants in foreign economic relations sharply increased in the USSR.

Aleksandr Dzasokhov, acting chairman of the committee, said that as many as 6,700 firms and enterprises having a right to do business in the foreign market have already been registered in the USSR.

He said that many of them do not have enough experience and make blunders that result in considerable economic damage to the state. Unification of the standards for purchases and sales will help improve the situation.

The debate went beyond the framework of the matter discussed. Deputies made many critical remarks regarding the efficiency of foreign economic activity of the Soviet state.

It was noted that Soviet businessmen now make many trips abroad, not always for sufficient reason, and that considerable amounts of currency are spent.

As many as 20,000 specialists worked in the area of foreign economic ties prior to 1986. Over 100 thousand specialists work in the area now, but this has not been accompanied by corresponding growth of trade turnover.

In view of the importance of these problems, it has been decided to discuss them at another meeting.

The committee also discussed the question of endorsing the status and changing the procedure of awarding the international Lenin peace prizes.

Speakers noted that the prestige of the prize has fallen, specifically for the reason that out of ideological considerations the prize had been awarded mostly to leaders of the international communist and national liberation movements.

Deputies declared in favour of selecting candidates on the basis of new political thinking, proceeding from common human values. The committee set up a group of deputies to draft a decision on this matter.

## Committees and Commissions Meet 26 Oct

*LD2610095389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 26 Oct 89*

[Text] At the USSR Supreme Soviet session. The country's people's deputies are today continuing examination of a number of draft laws on the session's agenda. For example, the draft law on the status of USSR people's deputies is to be discussed by members of the Commission on Labor, Prices, and Social Policy. The Committee on Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order plans to examine the draft law on a unified taxation system. Problems of land legislation are on the agenda of a session of the Committee on Agrarian Issues and Food.

### Sitaryan Reportedly Elected Deputy Premier

*LD2610122589 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1030 GMT 26 Oct 89*

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet has elected Stepan Sitaryan as the country's new deputy premier and chairman of the State Commission on Foreign Economic Relations. According to informed Soviet sources, Armenian-born Sitaryan will also be appointed as the new Soviet chairman of the Finnish-Soviet Intergovernmental Economic Commission.

## Political & Social

### RSFSR Supreme Soviet Opens 25 Oct

#### Vorotnikov, Ryzhkov Take Part

*LD2510172489 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] A session of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet opened in the Kremlin today. The main question on the agenda is the changes to the republican constitution, and the law on elections, which are designed to continue in the localities the reform of the bodies of state power that was started at the end of last year.

Taking part in the session are Comrades Vorotnikov, Ryzhkov, Slyunkov, Biryukova, Vlasov, Lukyanov, Pugo, Razumovskiy, Girenko, Manayenkov, Stroyev, and Usmanov.

#### Agenda 'Unanimously Approved'

*PM2610092989 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Oct 89 Second Edition p 1*

[Unattributed "Information Report on the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Sittings"]

[Text] The 11th sitting of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, opened in the Great Kremlin Palace at 1000 hours on 25 October 1989.

Comrades V.I. Vorotnikov, N.N. Slyunkov, A.P. Biryukova, A.V. Vlasov, A.I. Lukyanov, B.K. Pugo, G.P. Razumovskiy, A.N. Girenko, Yu.A. Manayenkov, Ye.S. Stroyev, and G.I. Usmanov took part in the work of the session's morning sitting.

Deputy N.M. Gribachev, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, was in the chair.

Before examining questions on the agenda of the session's work, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet examined a proposal to constitute a group of deputies as tellers.

The session's agenda and standing orders were unanimously approved.

The agenda of the session's work includes the following questions:

1. On the draft RSFSR Laws On Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) and On Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies and RSFSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies.

2. On the elections of RSFSR people's deputies and RSFSR local soviets of people's deputies.

3. On progress in the work to transfer autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, and the RSFSR to the principles of self-management and self-financing.

The deputies then moved on to examine the questions on the session's agenda.

A report on the first item on the session's agenda—on the draft RSFSR Laws On Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) and On Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies and RSFSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies—was delivered by Deputy V.I. Vorotnikov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The second sitting of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet opened in the Great Kremlin Palace at 1600 hours.

Comrades V.I. Vorotnikov, N.I. Ryzhkov, N.N. Slyunkov, A.P. Biryukova, A.V. Vlasov, A.I. Lukyanov, B.K. Pugo, G.P. Razumovskiy, Yu.A. Manayenkov, Ye.S. Stroyev, and G.I. Usmanov took part in the work of the session's evening sitting.

Deputy Ye.A. Norka, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, was in the chair.

The sitting began its discussion of the question on the draft RSFSR laws On Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) and On Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies and RSFSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies.

The following deputies spoke during the debate on the report on the draft laws: Kh.Kh. Bokov (Gudermesskiy Electoral Okrug, Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR]); B.I. Fomin (Elektrosilovskiy Electoral Okrug, Leningrad City); I.N. Yudakova (Sosnovskiy Electoral Okrug, Tambov Oblast); M.M. Kaufman (Obluchenskiy Electoral Okrug, Khabarovsk Kray); USSR People's Deputy P.A. Yunyayev, director of "Kamenskiy" State Farm in Volgograd Oblast's Gorodishchenskiy Rayon; L.I. Matveyev (Kuzminskiy Electoral Okrug, Moscow City); A.D. Bogdanov (Chukotskiy Electoral Okrug, Magadan Oblast); R.A. Kudryashova (Leninskiy Electoral Okrug, Yaroslavl Oblast); USSR

People's Deputy M.P. Mirgazyamov, chairman of the Bashkir ASSR Council of Ministers; G.S. Kostenko (Tyndinskiy Electoral Okrug, Amur Oblast); A.I. Toropov (Kovrovskiy Electoral Okrug, Vladimir Oblast); V.N. Shtygashev (Abakanskiy Electoral Okrug, Krasnoyarsk Kray); USSR People's Deputy N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

### Electoral System Revamp

*LD2610085189 Moscow TASS in English 0828 GMT 26 Oct 89*

[Text] Moscow October 26 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation continues to discuss bills aimed at revamping the electoral system on democratic principles and renewing the structure of government organs in this largest of the USSR's 15 union republics.

Submitting bills on amendments to the constitution and on elections in the Russian Federation at the opening session on Wednesday, Vitaliy Vorotnikov, chairman of the Presidium of the Federation's Supreme Soviet, stressed that they would promote greater competence of republican bodies of power and increase the independence of local soviets of people's deputies (councils).

### 25 Oct Session Summary

*LD2510191989 Moscow TASS in English 1825 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Moscow October 25 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

Ethnic problems dominated the debate held at the current session of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet today.

The Russian Federation is the Soviet Union's biggest constituent republic comprising 31 autonomous entities.

The deputies discussed bills on amendments to the Republican Constitution and elections in the Russian Federation.

The drafts, presented at the morning sitting by Vitaliy Vorotnikov, president of the Presidium of the Republican Supreme Soviet, are directed at the democratic restructuring of the election system and a substantial renewal of the republican bodies of power.

The majority of speakers today backed the key provisions of the bills related to general principles of shaping republican and local bodies of state authority.

Some deputies favoured the expansion of the rights of the Russian Federation's autonomous units. Deputy Aleksandr Bogdanov, from the multi-ethnic Magadan region in the country's extreme northwest, favoured the establishment of a two-house parliament in the Republic and suggested forming bicameral local Soviets, or councils, in regions inhabited by various ethnic groups.

It was also proposed to increase the number of people's deputies in the republic by 300-400, chiefly by adding deputies from the autonomous units (the initial draft envisages the election of 1,068 deputies).

Marat Mirgazyamov, chairman of Bashkiriya's Council of Ministers and people's deputy of the USSR, favoured a legislative endorsement of the autonomous entities' economic independence.

Another deputy, Petr Yunyayev, speaking on behalf of the Workers' Conference of Peoples's Deputies of the USSR, suggested holding direct elections of the president and the first vice-president of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet.

At the demand of the Russian deputies who assessed his proposal as an attempt to exert pressure on the republican parliament, his statement was broken off.

The debate on the bills will continue tomorrow.

## RSFSR Supreme Soviet 25 Oct Speeches

### Vorotnikov Address

*LD2510122589 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[From the "Soyuz" program]

[Excerpt] The 11th session of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet opened today in Moscow in the Great Kremlin Palace. Issues concerning the RSFSR draft law on amendments and additions to the RSFSR Constitution, the draft law on the election of RSFSR people's deputies and local soviets of people's deputies, and the progress of work to transfer autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, and the whole federation to principles of self-government and self-financing have been submitted for its discussion. Vitaliy Ivanovich Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, read a report on the first issue. Describing in detail the drafts of the new legislative acts, he said in part:

[Begin Vorotnikov recording] Comrades, our session is to take an important step in the development of the state system of the Russian federation—it is to approve a new structure for the republic's organs of authority and the procedure for their formation. The Supreme Soviet Presidium thinks it expedient that a new supreme organ of state authority—the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies—should be formed in our republic in accordance with the USSR Constitution. This proposal has received wide support from citizens, labor collectives, and public organizations which took part in discussion of the draft law on amendments to the RSFSR Constitution.

What is the point of creating a new supreme organ of state authority? First, it will reflect the whole spectrum of the Russian peoples' interests, being made up of representatives of all strata and social groups of our republic's nationalities, almost 150 million people. Second, as a concentration of great political and intellectual strength, it will be able to tackle the most important issues of state life under the jurisdiction of the RSFSR in an authoritative manner. Finally, the formation of the congress creates real preconditions for fruitful work by the numerically more compact and constantly functioning RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

The basic provisions concerning the formation and activity of the Congress of People's Deputies are set out in detail in the draft laws. With the aim of fuller representation for individual territories, it is proposed that 1,068 deputies be elected to the congress. It is borne in mind here that there will be 900 territorial constituencies and that, at the same time, 168 national territorial constituencies will be formed, half of which will be in autonomous territories. If we decline to hold a congress, then the representation of people's deputies in the supreme organ of state authority will be reduced by a factor of two and a half or three in comparison with the present Supreme Soviet, which would seem to be unacceptable for the Russian federation.

The draft of our law contains the desire of the autonomous republics for Congresses of People's Deputies not to be set up there, but for Supreme Soviets to operate as the supreme organs of state power, as is the case now. Their role, however, will be considerably enhanced, and they will operate in a different way.

The creation in the Supreme Soviet of two chambers with equal rights—a Soviet of the Republic and a Soviet of Nationalities—will be fundamentally important for the further development of Russian and Soviet statehood. The formation of a second chamber will indisputably lead to a deepening of national and internationalist principles in the Supreme Soviet's activity and to active development of ties among the peoples of the RSFSR, and will help to implement the legitimate rights and interests of the autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs. A two-chamber supreme representative organ of power will be an effective means of confirming the federative nature of the Russian federation.

During discussion of the draft laws, the opinion was expressed that it is necessary to specify clearly the correlation of functions of the Congress of People's Deputies and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The grassroots proposal, which has been approved by the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Commission of Legislative Proposals, should, we think, be supported namely, that in Article 107 of the draft law, the status of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet should be more precisely defined, to read that it is an organ of the congress, since it is elected by the congress and reports back to the congress.

Further, in connection with the enhanced role of the representative organs of state power, it is proposed that the procedure for formation of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium should be changed, to endow it with other functions. It will now no longer be a legislative organ, will not issue decrees of a normative nature, but will primarily deal with organizing the work of the Supreme Soviet. [end recording] [passage omitted]

### Ryzhkov Closing Remarks

*LD2510205589 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1805 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Closing remarks by Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of USSR Council of Ministers, at 25 October session of RSFSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow—recorded]

[Text] Comrades, if the comrades insist that Comrade Voronin or Comrade Nikitin speak to you about material resources and other questions concerning development of the agroindustrial complex, that can be done. But, I think, nevertheless, we should act in the following way: On Monday, the USSR Supreme Soviet will examine the draft plan for 1990, in which a major section is the development of our country's agroindustrial complex. These questions will, of course, be given very serious discussion at the session, and I think there will be definite decisions.

In addition, tomorrow, in the Council of Ministers, we meet heads of the Committee for Agrarian Issues of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Twelve people will come to the Council of Ministers to examine these questions there. I am extending an invitation: Please let comrades from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] also come and, there, we will examine these questions in business-like fashion. If it suits you, I will propose this option: tomorrow at 1200. No objections, comrades? No.

Comrades, our working time has run out. The session is declared closed. Next session: tomorrow at 1000 in the morning.

### Ryzhkov Speaks on Medical Cooperative Violations

*PM2510193189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 89 First Edition p 3*

[TASS report: "Strengthening Law and Order in Cooperative Sphere"]

[Text] A scheduled conference of the leaders of a number of ministries and departments was held in the USSR Council of Ministers on 24 October under the chairmanship of N.I. Ryzhkov to discuss questions of intensifying the struggle against economic crimes and transgressions.

The activity of medical cooperatives was subjected to detailed analysis at the conference. As the report by USSR Health Minister Ye.I. Chazov noted, the development of these cooperatives is intended to fill serious gaps in the organization of medical aid for the population. In the first 6 months of 1989, the network of medical cooperatives across the country, including recuperation cooperatives, grew from 1,900 to 2,800. Some 48,000 people work in them. The appearance of these cooperatives has made it possible to slightly ease the pressure on preventive treatment establishments in a number of regions and more extensively involve highly specialized doctors in providing services for the population, particularly in places with an inadequately developed clinic network. Some cooperatives provide charity services, practice nontraditional treatment methods, and use regenerative occupational therapy for invalids.

But, in addition to this, negative trends have appeared in the activity of medical cooperatives which conflict with moral and ethical norms and with the law.

A check carried out by the USSR Health Ministry showed that in a number of cases the formation of medical cooperatives is taking place without the knowledge of public health care organs and hygiene supervision bodies. Unfavorable sanitary conditions have been found in many cooperatives.

People are rightly indignant over inordinately high prices for services, which are sometimes many times in excess of the state rates. At the same time, under their contracts with state institutions, cooperatives pay them a fixed price for leasing premises, equipment, materials, and medicines. Cases are not infrequent where unique equipment and instruments are leased out to cooperatives to the detriment of the main tasks of the health service connected with providing free medical assistance. Medicines in short supply are being bought up from pharmacies.

The fact that local authorities turn a blind eye to all this and that the USSR Health Ministry has dissociated itself from solving a number of problems in this sphere has meant that in a number of areas economically accountable state medical institutions are essentially being squeezed out by cooperatives. Shortcomings in legislation designed to combat these phenomena are making it possible for mercenary dealers to derive unearned income in these cooperatives, and this is giving rise to social tension among medical workers and the population.

In the opinion of the conference participants, a particular danger is posed by the fact that cooperative structures are becoming intertwined with state structures. There are instances where leaders are directly involved in cooperative activity.

The practice of setting up medical cooperatives on the premises of state preventive treatment establishments—frequently to the detriment of their main activity—was strongly criticized. There are cases where a number of cooperatives have unlawfully provided surgical assistance and conducted operations to terminate pregnancy and also special research.

Contrary to the Law on Cooperatives, medical cooperatives are not devoting attention to developing their own production base. The majority of them pay as much as 70 percent of their income to wage funds, which makes it possible to set excessively high salaries for people who work in cooperatives. Skilled cadres are being seen to leave state medical establishments for this reason.

The conference voiced justified criticism of the USSR Health Ministry for its passive stand regarding negative phenomena in cooperative activity. There is still no effective mechanism to monitor the quality of diagnostic and medical assistance provided by cooperatives. The legal responsibility of cooperatives and the leaders of preventive treatment establishments on whose premises cooperatives are functioning for late diagnosis or wrong diagnosis and for other incorrect actions has also yet to be defined. The procedure of giving notification of infectious and oncological diseases does not extend to medical cooperatives.

Summing up the discussion of this question at the conference, N.I. Ryzhkov stressed that the pluses and minuses in the activity of medical cooperatives reflect the general contradictions that have arisen in the country's cooperative movement at the present stage of its development. It would be wrong to raise the question of curtailing the activity of medical cooperatives. They must be developed—but on a healthy basis, in strict accordance with current laws and principles of social justice. The shortcomings of medical cooperatives have highlighted the weak sides of the state health care system, the improvement of which is still the main way to improve the medical service for the country.

The attention of union republic councils of ministers and health ministries was drawn to the fact that the work of medical cooperatives must strictly conform with the provisions of the Law on Cooperatives in the USSR and the USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 29 December 1988. Their activity, which is directly linked to people's health, must be carried out in an atmosphere of greater glasnost and monitoring. A great deal can be done in this respect by the medical community and the mass media. The conditions must also be created whereby economically accountable state medical establishments cannot be forced out by cooperatives.

The intolerability of cooperatives being joined by leading workers from organs of state administration and also from state, social, and cooperative enterprises, organizations, and institutions whose functions include the monitoring of cooperative activity was specially indicated.

The need to take practical measures to improve the work of state medical institutions, strengthen financial monitoring services, and improve legislation in the sphere of the economy and health care was emphasized. Specific instructions in this connection were given to union republic councils of ministers, the executive committees of local soviets, and the leaders of the USSR Health

Ministry and corresponding republic ministries, the USSR Ministry of Finance, law enforcement bodies, and other organizations.

The following took part in the conference work: V.A. Kryuchkov; A.P. Biryukova; B.K. Pugo; S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; A.Ya. Sukharev, USSR general prosecutor; M.S. Shkabardnya, USSR Council of Ministers administrator of affairs; USSR ministers V.V. Bakatin, V.A. Durasov, V.S. Pavlov, and K.Z. Terekh; and the leaders of a number of economic departments.

## Ukrainian, Belorussian Supreme Soviets Open

*LD2510123489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] The Supreme Soviets of Belorussia and the Ukraine are in session today in Minsk and Kiev. In Kiev, the law on changes and amendments to the Constitution of the Ukraine, the law on providing legal foundations for the reform of representative bodies—its state authorities—are being examined. A number of laws are to be passed.

At the Minsk session, deputies are also discussing important questions of the life of the republic. In particular, a state program for eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident in Belorussia is to be examined and passed.

## Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Convenes 25 Oct

*LD2610101189 Kiev in English to Europe 1900 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Next is a report from the session of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet:

[Correspondent] The 10th session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th Convocation started its work in Kiev today. The session was opened by the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, Deputy Platon Kostyuk. The current session will examine the following issues: first, legal guarantees of the representative bodies of state authority in the Ukrainian SSR; second, election of people's deputies of the Ukrainian SSR and deputies of local soviets; third, the draft law of the Ukrainian SSR on languages in the Ukraine; and fourth, the adoption of the decrees of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

The participants of the session approved the agenda of the session by voting.

A report on legal guarantees of the reform of the representative bodies of state authority in the Ukrainian SSR was made by chairperson of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, people's deputy of the USSR Valentyna Shevchenko.

[Begin Shevchenko recording in Ukrainian fading into English translation] The current session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine can be rightly regarded as an extraordinary event in the social and political life of our Republic. The thing is that the adoption of the law on changes and amendments to the Ukraine's Constitution and the law on elections, will affirm the major principles of people's representation at the bodies of power at all levels, and the democratic character of the socialist democracy as a whole.

Two working groups were elaborating the draft laws back in August last year. They worked out several variants which became the basis of the drafts that were published in the press for nationwide discussion. Taking part in the discussion which lasted about 3 months were 15,000,000 people, or practically every second elector. Over 235,000 comments, proposals, and remarks have come from work collectives, public organizations, party and soviet bodies, and individuals. Nine more variants of the draft laws were forwarded to the commission on legislative proposals. Many, in our opinion, just proposals, were taken into account. Therefore we can rightly say that the draft laws to be discussed are the result of collective work of many people. I will start with the draft law on amendments to the Constitution, fundamental law of the Ukrainian SSR. It should be pointed out that the suggested amendments deal with the creation of conditions for renewal of the structure of the soviets, with determining the order of formation and activities of the highest bodies of state power, and for improvement of the electoral system.

First of all we should define what the highest body of power in our Republic should be like. The publicized draft envisages that in the Ukrainian SSR, like in the Soviet Union as a whole, there will be the Congress of People's Deputies. However, in the course of discussion, it was proposed to renounce the Congress and define in the Constitution that the highest body of state power in the Republic should be the Supreme Soviet. After lengthy exchange of opinions, the commission on legislative proposals and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet arrived at a conclusion that this proposal can be agreed upon.

The Supreme Soviet, having the status of the highest body of power, and acting permanently, will be able to resolve the issues in a much quicker and flexible manner. That will be a qualitatively new Supreme Soviet, having broad powers. It will be able to put the questions before the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the abolition of the Union laws if they infringe on the rights of a Union republic. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR will enjoy the right to suspend the action on the territory of the Republic of decrees and statements of the Soviet Union government as well as of the Union ministries and departments, if they do not correspond to the Constitution and laws of the Ukrainian SSR.

The Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine has also the right to solve the questions which deal with the usage of the territory and natural resources of our Republic. The powers of the Supreme Soviet in the sphere of providing constitutional human rights and freedoms are becoming more concrete. Through its legislative functions the Supreme Soviet will have a possibility to actively influence the renewal of all spheres of life, establishment of legal norms which will promote development of the economy of the Republic, strengthening its sovereignty. In its turn the fact of turning the Supreme Soviet into a permanently-working body of state power demands defining the status and functions of the Presidium.

According to the draft, the Presidium is not provided with the right to issue the decrees which will introduce changes in the acting legislature. The Presidium will organize the work of the Supreme Soviet, will confer awards, pardons, citizenship, and so on. A new order of forming the Presidium will be established. It will not be elected, but will be composed of those officials who will be working there in accordance with their occupation. Those are: chairman of the Supreme Soviet; his or her deputies; head of the people's control committee; heads of permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

New functions will also be performed by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. According to the law, he will be the highest official in the Republic and will represent the Ukraine in the Soviet Union and in the international relations. It is suggested to elect the chairman of the Supreme soviet at the session out of the number of people's deputies of the Republic by secret ballot, for five years. He is subordinated to the Supreme Soviet and may be recalled at any period.

In the system of the state bodies of the Ukrainian SSR it is envisaged to form a committee for Constitutional compliance which has to become, so to say, an unbiased guard of the fundamental law of the Republic, an obstacle on the road of law violation in the acts of the state bodies. In the course of the discussion of the draft law, sharply debated was the provision on electing people's deputies from public organizations. Taking into account the negative attitude of the broad strata of the population to this aspect, it was decided to renounce it. [end recording]

[Correspondent] That was a summary of the speech made by the chairperson of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR Valentyna Shevchenko at the session of the highest body of state power of our Republic. We continue our report from the session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. Taking part in the work of the current session with the right of a deliberative vote are people's deputies of the Soviet Union from the Ukrainian SSR. Today they came out with a proposal to consider them full right participants with a decisive vote. Miner from Dnepropetrovsk region deputy (Vasyl Bubnov) resolutely protested against giving the floor at this session to the people's deputies of the USSR from our Republic. The polemics around the proposal of the people's deputies put the session's agenda under threat. Next to take the floor was people's deputy of the USSR, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine Volodymyr Ivashko, who said in part:

[Begin Ivashko recording in Ukrainian, fading into English translation] Is it necessary to step on the road of confrontation with anybody when we have the only one outcome, and that is consolidation of the entire Ukrainian people for the benefit and happiness of the Ukrainian people? I suggest that all interesting disputes which emerge at the session be stopped, as well as the discussion of this issue. I suggest that we should immediately start examining the draft laws and never return to this. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Taking part in the debate was (Volodymyr Zheliba), the chairman of the executive council of the Kirovograd regional soviet of people's deputies. In his speech at the session he said in part:

[Begin Zheliba recording in Ukrainian, fading into English translation] Now a few words about the proposals advanced by a group of deputies of the USSR from our Republic. Their projects are called alternative, but if one approach is (?banned) from the legal and juridical point of view, there is no alternative in them whatsoever. The official draft laws were discussed by more than 15,000,000 voters, and they include the best from everything proposed by the people of our Republic. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Next to speak was Stanislav Martyniuk, second secretary of the Kiev City Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, who objected to what was said by the previous speaker:

[Begin Martyniuk recording in Ukrainian, fading into English translation] I propose the following idea for your consideration not to hold up to shame all those who worked out other projects besides the official one, because it is very good that people took up to work out proposals—in case their proposals are sensible they will naturally be useful for our social cause, that of renewal of our life, and passions wouldn't have been raging from the rostrum if the Presidium of our Supreme Soviet were more initiative and energetic. For example, here in Kiev we tried not to carry out work against unofficial or for official [word indistinct]. On the contrary, we tried to collect all ideas. The democratization of our life insistently requires to involve all categories of the working people, especially in the sphere of material production, into the process of political government. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Speaking at the session people's deputy of the USSR Valeriy Grishchuk, professor of Kiev State University, said:

[Begin Grishchuk recording in Ukrainian, fading into English translation] The Ukrainian deputies' club considers it necessary to advise the Supreme Soviet of the

Ukrainian SSR with the proposal not to neglect the main principles which reflects the opinion of the majority of the Ukraine's population. The principles the law-makers must adhere to while adopting their law on the elections are as follows: First, one man one vote; elections in the public organizations should be cancelled. Second, direct elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic. Third, elections should be carried out on the alternative basis. The fourth principle: District election committees should not control deputies running for deputies' mandate. And finally the fifth principle: Direct elections of chairmen of the soviets at all levels. [end recording]

[Correspondent] (Ivan Grushchenko), people's deputy from Kiev, who is member of the committee of legislative proposals, said the following:

[Begin (Grushchenko) recording in Ukrainian, fading into English translation] I took part in working out the draft laws on the amendments to the Constitution and the law on elections. We worked closely with the authors of the alternative draft laws, so I think they have no grounds to complain that their reasonable proposals were neglected. I think that the final draft law which we submit to the session seems to be more democratic and this draft law represents the will of the people. So, cooperating in this way we can make reasonable decisions which would benefit the electorate. I would like to emphasize that the present discussion of the draft laws is just the first step along the way of working out the principally new law of our Republic as a sovereign state. This step should be confident and reflect Marxist-Leninist convictions, deep beliefs in the ideals of socialism. [End recording] [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Of interest was the speech at today's session of Volodymyr Zaychuk, Minister of Justice:

[Begin Zaychuk recording in Ukrainian, fading into English translation] I would like to dwell on the following question: that is, the right to place before the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in the Supreme Soviet of the country this question of abolishing laws adopted by the act if they infringe on the sovereign rights of the Republic—stopping the actions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Union ministries and departments, on the territory of the Ukraine—in case they contradict the Constitution of the Republic [sentence as heard]. Right now we are working on the question of clearly defining the competence of the Soviet Union and the Republics and this question is being rightly advanced. [End recording] [passage omitted: Mykhaylo Maliy, team leader of shipbuilders in Nikolayev and others also spoke at the session]

[Correspondent] Tomorrow the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine will continue its work. We invite you to join us then.

### Hears Shevchenko Report

*LD2510191289 Moscow TASS in English 1834 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Kiev October 25 TASS—By TASS correspondent Mikhail Melnik:

Bills on changes and amendments to the republican constitution, on the election of people's deputies to the republican legislature and local councils, as well as a bill on languages in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist republic will be considered and debated by a regular Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session that opened in Kiev, capital of Ukraine, today.

The session opened with a report by the chairperson of the Presidium of the Republican Supreme Soviet Valentina Shevchenko.

She reported that more than 15 million people had taken part in the discussion of the bills. More than 260,000 proposals and remarks were submitted to the Supreme Soviet by local authorities, work collectives, deputies to local councils and individual citizens.

Nine alternative bills on amendments to the constitution and the election legislation, and four alternative bills on languages have been drafted.

Many suggestions were taken into account in drafting the bill submitted by the Presidium to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet for consideration.

Thus, the election of deputies from public organizations was excluded from the bill as suggested by many contributors.

All elections will in future be contested by a minimum of two candidates.

The right to nominate candidates will be granted to collectives of no fewer than 200 people.

Deputies noted in debate that the number and nature of proposals and remarks on the bills attested to the population's profound interest in election reform, democratic organization of the local and supreme bodies of state authority in the republic and radical restructuring of the work of the soviets.

The session will continue its work on Thursday.

## Belorussian Supreme Soviet Proceedings Discussed

*LD2510140389*

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0430 GMT on 25 October broadcasts a report announcing today's forthcoming sessions of the Belorussian and Ukrainian Supreme Soviets, with an outline of their agendas. The announcer speaks to a correspondent in Minsk on the matters to be discussed at the session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet—in particular, the state program for eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electronic Power Station in the period 1990-1995. The correspondent notes that the number of villages to be subject to resettlement has given rise to a number of arguments. He says the previous draft program, discussed at a previous Supreme Soviet session, has attracted a number of amendments and additions from deputies, and the new draft has been published, along with a map of the republic's radiation situation.

Going on to the details of the program that has now been drawn up by the republican government, the correspondent says: "This is an extensive package of measures, which, taken together, are to secure an equal opportunity for people to lead a normal life. The volume of forthcoming work has also been determined. It is essential to resettle more than 100,000 people, and to build several hundred settlements and nearly 40,000 individual houses. Much provision has been made for those people who are to stay in the afflicted regions."

He goes on to interview V.G. Yevtukh, first deputy chairman of the Bellorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers and chairman of the republican commission for eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, who is to deliver the report at the Supreme Soviet session. Yevtukh says that it is intended to implement a whole package of measures for those who will continue to live on the territory, which has been subject to pollution. The package of measures includes medical services and health treatment, supplementary material, and financial benefits which people should receive for the restrictions they will be forced to suffer while residing on this territory. Yevtukh says there is a certain risk involved and this risk has to be paid for. He notes one must consider matters of obtailning clean agricultural output, of respecialization, agrotechnical matters, matters of land improvement, and matters relating to the organization of trade. Particular attention is being paid to matters of scientific backup. A whole complex of scientific research operations must be conducted to prepare for future work.

Yevtukh says that by refining the program which followed the 11th Belorussian Supreme Soviet Session, the package of measures connected with securing the health of people has been substantially expanded. He says the funds that will be needed to implement the program is estimated at R1.7 billion. He believes that all expenses connected with the elimination of the disaster, should be borne by the Union budget. He says that taking funds from the new republican budget, which is converting to self-financing in January 1990, means putting people in a different situation. That is, the republic is simply unable to bear such costs."

### Chernobyl Plan Approved

*LD2510214789 Moscow TASS in English 2115 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Minsk October 25 TASS—By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kryzhanovskiy:

A programme of action to combat consequences of the Chernobyl power plant disaster was approved on by the Belorussian parliament session that opened on Wednesday [25 October] in the city of Minsk, capital of this western Soviet republic.

The programme implementation requires an outlay of 17 billion rubles. The republic's annual budget, in contrast, amounts to no more than 10 billion rubles.

The programme approved in Minsk will now be forwarded to the USSR Supreme Soviet to be promulgated into federal law binding on the federal ministries and departments responsible for the implementation.

An area equalling 20 per cent of Belorussia's total territory was contaminated by radioactive fall-out three years ago. Decontamination and land-amelioration efforts proved insufficient.

An estimated 100,000 people are awaiting resettlement. 40,000 new houses need to be built for the purpose.

"This is the second time that the programme in question has been submitted for consideration at a parliament session," the republic's First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Yevtukh told TASS.

"The previous session demanded further elaboration of the draft. The new variant takes account of nearly 2,000 proposals and remarks by republican residents. Suggestions came also from supreme soviet commissions, deputies and participants in numerous meetings".

The Supreme Soviet session will also consider bills on amendments to the Belorussian Constitution and the election of deputies to republican legislature and local councils of people's deputies.

### Republic Supreme Soviets Sessions Continue 26 Oct

*LD2610100189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 26 Oct 89*

[Text] The Supreme Soviet sessions of three union republics, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR], the Ukraine, and Belorussia, will continue their work today. The deputies are discussing the draft laws on amendments and additions to the constitutions of the republics, on the election of people's deputies and local soviets. Beside this, deputies of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet are to examine the work of transferring the autnomous reepublics, krays, oblasts, and the Russian federation to the principles of self-management and self-financing. The law on languages and the matter of the legal back-up for the reform of representative bodies of state power have also been tabled for examination at the session in Kiev. On the first day of work for the Supreme Soviet of Belorussia the program for eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster was discussed. This is already the second version and it takes into consideration the comments and suggestions of the Supreme Soviet commissions, and public organizations and labor collectives.

## Belorussian People's Front Meets on Chernobyl

*90UN0037A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 6 Oct 89 p 2*

[Article by S. Naumchik
: "For the Sake of Posterity"]

[Text] ...They were walking along the main boulevard. It was not a funeral procession but over the column hung funereal banners with the names of little cities and villages affected by dangerous doses of radiation. In front they carried a bell and its measured ringing drowned out both the screech of automobile brakes and the noise of thousands of shoes.

Last Saturday the administration of the Belorussian People's Front at the request of residents of the affected regions of Gomel and Mogilev scheduled a procession entitled the "Chernobyl Highway" and a rally in front of the Government House.

The door to the Government House was closed. But do not think that its inhabitants were sitting back in their warm apartments—they were working. And not just anywhere but on the farms sponsored by their establishments. For it was on that day (what a coincidence!) that another occasion was scheduled: the republic Saturday for augmenting the fund for the Chernobyl disaster. "Landing parties of shock workers" came to the regions affected by the radiation, which was emotionally reported in the newspapers the next day. True, they forgot to explain where the potatoes infected with radionuclides were to go...

The concept "35 bars for 70 years" was subjected to the harshest criticism at the rally. It was called inhuman. But the position of the BSSR [Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences—to send the people away from anywhere where it was impossible to obtain clean food products was met with a hum of approval. This concept was also supported by Academician Ye. Velikhov who spoke at the meeting. He even expressed confidence that between representatives of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and the Belorussian scientists the latter would soon emerge victorious.

But let us hear the participants in the rally.

"Our rayon is adjacent to the 30-kilometer zone," says Khoynik resident Roza Sitkova. "And our leaders have been lying to us for 3 years. And now they have deserted this land damned by God and Chernobyl. And they have left us with 'dirty' food products, poor medical services, and the tears of mothers with incurably ill children."

"Now they explain to us: We have had no experience in such situations," recalled Lyudmila Storozh from Narovlya. "They assure us that the program includes healthful living conditions and at the same time in the rayon hospitals they intend to open up rooms for observing pregnant women in order to diagnose birth defects. But we do not want to be mothers for such 'observations' and demand to be resettled to other regions not in 1992 but immediately. And with legal guarantees of our finding decent living conditions in the new place and compensation for the damage to our health."

Participants in the rally sent a demand to the USSR Supreme Soviet to devote one of its meetings to a discussion of the Chernobyl situation. This issue was also proposed for the agenda for the 2d Congress of People's Deputies. It was also suggested that the necessary funds for relocating people be allotted from the budget of the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power. Practically all the speeches contained the idea that the Chernobyl problem is a political problem. Among the demands was to hold liable those who hid the information about the real scale of the emergency and displayed criminal inaction.

And closer to evening they managed to speak with a member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party, the first deputy chairman of the BSSR Council of Ministers, Vladimir Gavrilovich Yevtukh. Vladimir Gavrilovich's opinion about the events of this day were even more interesting since he is in charge of the republic government commission for eliminating the consequences of the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

"And today's procession and rally can do a lot to help the republic government implement the program we are taking to Moscow," said Vladimir Gavrilovich.

"Why then did the authorities not permit the rally?"

"They did not prohibit it. And as far as I know they simply considered it inexpedient..."

The rally was conducted by the People's Front. Not only members of the BNF [Belorussian People's Front] but also those who know about it from hearsay, not only academicians but also workers, not only writers but also peasants, not only "informal group members" but also people's deputies came to the main square in Minsk...

## Sokolov Addresses Minsk Forum 29 Sep

*PM2010090189 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 30 Sep 89 pp 1-2*

[BELTA report: "Perestroyka: Workers' Council"]

[Excerpts] The progress of economic reform, the growth of political and social tension in society, its stratification according to group interests, the decline in the living standard, problems of price formation, the state of labor and public discipline, the aggravation of interethnic relations—these subjects were discussed vigorously and heatedly at a conference of representatives of the republic's labor collectives which ended in Minsk 29 September.

The delegates analyzed the reasons for the difficulties in the country's national economy, suggested ways of overcoming negative phenomena, and called for the more effective use of the progressive experience of the best collectives. The tone was set by the report delivered on instructions from the conference organizational committee by USSR People's Deputy V.I. Goncharik, chairman of the Belorussian trade unions council. [passage omitted]

Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, delivered a speech at the conference. [published in summary form—SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA note]

**Ye.Ye. Sokolov's Speech**

I am glad, Ye.Ye. Sokolov noted, that the representatives of the republic's working class, loyal to their duty, are continuing to stand firmly on the positions of socialism, the positions of Lenin's party. And I am even gladder that both communist workers and nonparty workers stand on these positions.

It is the working man with his loyalty to revolutionary traditions who is the main motive force of today's transformations. The working class has won its vanguard role thanks to its high awareness and degree of organization and loyalty to the ideals of October. And today, when the consolidation of all healthy forces is particularly necessary, as is their concentration on creative work, Lenin's words about how only the working class can help all working people to unite, to rally and hold out to the end, to strengthen communist society to the end, and to build it to the end are topical.

You can put it this way: No policy will produce results unless it is supported by the working class. The Belorussian Communist Party assesses highly the efforts of the republic's working class and all those who have invested and continue to invest their strength, souls, and hearts in the development of the republic's economy and culture. I came to the conference primarily to hear your ideas and your assessment of the current moment. At the same time I consider it my duty to share some thoughts with you.

What is perestroyka? Many different definitions are known but I want to highlight the most important. That is the reorganization of our political, economic, and spiritual life with a view to implementing the basic principle of socialism: from each according to his ability, to each according to his labor. In other words, the main idea of perestroyka is to do everything for the working man to feel needed in society and to be able to reveal his potential to the full.

The blunders and shortcomings of perestroyka mentioned from this rostrum can be explained not least by the fact that all kinds of talkers, street extremists, and timeservers are succeeding to some degree in driving workers and collective farm [kolkhoz] members, doctors and teachers from the political arena. And this has not happened because there are fewer lucid minds among them. Working people still avoid active political work and through habit rely on their "uncle." But there is no "uncle" any more, there is diversity of opinions, there is a rope pulled by the strongest, often not by muscular strength but by the sound of his voice. They must enter politics. Enter consciously, aware that they cannot allow decisions which would infringe on the fundamental values of socialism and the interests of working people.

Such attempts are being made constantly. Malicious enemies and demagogues of all stripes, using the material and spiritual shortage created not without their aid are directing the poisoned arrows of slander and enmity against socialism.

Why is all this being done? Why are some people seeking to burn out of the people's memory all that has been good, heroic, and great in our history? And that such things did exist there is no doubt. We must not gloss over the past but nor must we smear it only in black paint. That is immoral, because you cannot form love of man, kindness, and respect on the basis of a one-sided interpretation of history. Even the ancients noted that if you harden your thoughts you turn your heart into stone.

What do the overt and conceal opponents of socialism propose? The revival of private ownership relations—allegedly to put our affairs to rights. But the experience of world history and of our own history convincingly shows that private capital will bring us not only the most merciless exploitation, stratification, and impoverishment of millions but also national servitude and spiritual degradation.

Essentially a keen political struggle is under way, a struggle for power. Those who attack socialism and the party have one ultimate goal: instilling in people the idea that our road is uncertain and turning them toward capitalism.

I visited "Gomselmash" recently. In our talk one of the workers cited the following idea: "You frequently hear it said that the the extremists' aim is to seize power. But is that the whole truth? Why do they keep quiet about the main thing—about why they need power? After all it is visible even to the naked eye that they need power to turn us from socialism and to stratify society."

This was perhaps said sharply, but with a worker's directness and honesty.

Our attitude toward all informal associations is unambiguous: If you want to help perestroyka with specific deeds—let's cooperate. But when everything comes down to meetings, to taking working people away from their business, when the aim is to develop distrust in specialists, leaders, and party organizers and to create an atmosphere of friability or if you like of chaos and anarchy, the working class has no right to fail to notice this, has no right to be indifferent to such actions, whoever they may come from.

I want to stress that the republic's Communists, working class, peasants, and working intelligentsia have enough strength to defend socialist values and ideals and the people who are advancing perestroyka by their labor. We shall be loyal to the choice made by October.

I should particularly like to mention the role and place of the party in society. You know that the defamation of communists, representatives of the working class, peasantry, intelligentsia, and leaders in the center and locally has recently become widespread.

Why is this being done? To drive a wedge between the party and the people, between the communists and the party committees. To compromise the principled workers devoted to the cause of socialism and to lead to anarchy and lack of control over the economy, science, and culture. To put it briefly, that is political extremism.

What nurtures it? Speculation on difficulties—the imbalance of the consumer market, interethnic conflicts, distortions in the cooperative movement, and morbid phenomena in public awareness connected with the renewal of socialism.

Who is nurturing it? The same critics who, as parasites on glasnost and democracy, are organizing meetings and gatherings and doing everything to advertize themselves as leaders, fighters and martyrs, champions of "the people's welfare." And in order to be on display and to win glory as people of the utmost principle and justice, they spearhead their attacks at the people's heart—the party.

Matters are reaching the point of absurdity. If, for instance, one of you sitting in this hall were to transfer to party work tomorrow, he might immediately be categorized as an ossified bureaucrat, partycrat, or even Stalinist. And it is of no importance that he is an honest, supremely respectable man and that his energy, knowledge, and experience are useful to perestroyka.

Nonetheless I am convinced that the attacks on the party, socialism, and soviet power contain more impotence than strength. Our people have preserved their lofty moral qualities which enable them to determine unerringly who is who and to give their assessment of him.

Who has displayed high political awareness and great civil courage, condemning the personality cult and the activity and actions of "the leader of all times and peoples?" The party! Who has rejected the administrative-edict methods of leadership which had become a delaying factor in society's development? The party! Who has given an uncompromising assessment of the "carousing" period which gave rise to social apathy in thousands and thousands of people, to the desire for an easy life, to corruption and bribery? The party! Who began perestroyka and who drew millions and millions of working people into this process? The party!

And, in summing up this idea, let's ask ourselves some more questions. Did the party, having recognized its errors and weaknesses and leading society along the path of renewal, not submit itself to trial by the people? Is that not a sign of its strength, of its faith in the people and in the fact that it is a part of the people?

The overwhelming majority of the republic's communists, like the overwhelming majority of nonparty people, understand well that the danger to perestroyka does not come from those who are called bureaucrats or partycrats but from those who would like to dismantle our federation and push us onto the capitalist path, to the betrayal of the cause of socialism.

From the events of the current year and in particular the election campaign the republican party organization has emerged, first, enriched by new experience of performing organizational and political work; second with a more precise understanding of the fact that the further raising of the party's authority lies in the resurrection of the bolshevik tradition of living communication with people, on the path of the improvement of practical matters in all spheres of life.

Acting creatively, vigorously, purposefully, in the interests of the people, consolidating the working people's forces, confirming by deeds its right to the vanguard role—that is the main task which the Belorussian Communist Party sees before it. All our thoughts and wishes are open to nationwide discussion and to the submission of any proposals which can help to improve the situation and to further develop the republic's economy and culture.

People here have rightly mentioned the social tension in various spheres, Ye.Ye. Sokolov continued. But is perestroyka to blame? Or are we reaping the fruit of what we have come to over past years? Rather the latter, although there are also errors in the period of perestroyka.

Nonetheless there is not and should not be a feeling that there is no way out of the situation. There are many confirmations of this but I shall merely remind you of the nature and features of the plan for 1990 discussed at the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. During its elaboration the government applied new approaches and boldly set about breaking the proportions which had taken shape. In particular the growth of group "B" output will exceed the growth of group "A" output 13 times over. This year the figure is 1.5 times. A break with the traditions of the past is also planned for a number of other determining positions of the plan for next year.

Perhaps some of you are waiting for Comrade Sokolov to announce when the store shelves will be filled with good-quality, varied goods, when the lines for apartments will disappear, when the air in our cities and the water in our reservoirs will be clean and fresh? If I had done that you would have accused me of frivolity. And you would have been absolutely right to do so. I shall say just one thing: Specific programs of action have been elaborated and are being implemented for all urgent problems in the republic. [passage omitted]

We fully share your concern in connection with distortions in the cooperative movement. Various rogues, dishonest people, and speculators have attached themselves to this movement and their aim is to profit from existing difficulties and shortages and to launder the funds obtained by dubious methods. A number of cooperatives are buying goods in stores and reselling them at speculative prices.

I agree with you that we must leave only those cooperatives which the working people of a particular region need. [passage omitted]

The rayons which suffered as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station require our closest attention. Despite the fact that quite a lot has been done in this zone, the situation there remains extremely tense. The state program examined this July by the Belorussian Supreme Soviet session provides for a whole package of measures of an organizational, scientific, economic, and sociopolitical nature. For this over R16 billion will be required. Our proposals have been examined with full understanding and the kindest attitude by Comrades Gorbachev and Ryzhkov.

Of course, the people of Gomel and Mogilev oblasts cannot fulfill in the next few years such an enormous volume of work on the construction of housing and production and cultural establishments and the installation of roads, electric power lines, and gas pipelines. That is why many labor collectives will have to build up their aid to those in trouble.

The republic's transition to the principles of self management and self financing will undoubtedly help accelerate the solution of the entire package of accumulated socioeconomic problems. Preparation for this has been under way in our republic for a long time now with the broad participation of the public. You are already familiar with the concepts for perestroyka in the management of the republic's economy. Incidentally, they have gained support in the country's government and at the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum. [passage omitted]

Ye.Ye. Sokolov then dwelled on the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee September (1989) Plenum. The plenum, he stressed, approved the program of actions for the renewal of the nationalities policy and the renewal of the Soviet federation in the interests of all peoples and nations and has led society to a new level of understanding of the tasks of perestroyka. The Central Committee members expressed themselves resolutely in favor of the consolidation of the republics' sovereignty and the expansion of the rights of all national formations and the injection of real content into Soviet federalism.

As you know, there have never been any conflicts in Belorussia on interethnic soil. At the same time that does not mean that the solution of interethnic problems will happen of its own accord. That is why we must defend and protect like the apple of our eye the feeling of friendship, trust, and respect between the representatives of different peoples inhabiting Belorussia. Because that is one of the most reliable, the most tested accelerators of our changes.

Of course, everyone wants these changes to come as rapidly as possible. But there is only one path toward that—effective, highly productive labor, organization, and discipline. This task cannot be resolved without the labor collectives' firm and resolute stance. That is a key element. Without a profound consideration of this element any slogan, however attractive, will remain no more than a slogan. Because real perestroyka in the labor collectives of enterprises and organizations is measured not by the number of sittings and meetings, not by resolutions and manifestos, but by the production of new high-quality output which enriches our society materially.

You have obviously noted that a central question at Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's with a group of workers and kolkhoz members belonging to the party's central elected organs was the question of discipline, organization, and order. The idea was heard clearly, at full strength: Without discipline at every work place, on every sector of activity, perestroyka is doomed to fail. Whoever undermines discipline and pushes people toward laxity is encroaching on the transformations taking place in the country.

In this connection I must mention strikes. Unless we understand collectively and individually, unless the entire people of Soviet Belorussia understand that this path leads to an impasse, to impoverishment, to the collapse of the economy, then we will do the fatherland a disservice. The republic's national economy has already incurred substantial losses because of strikes in various regions of the country. And that account is still not closed. Today we cannot say with certainty that we will have enough coal, for instance, in the winter. The formation in people of a sense of personal responsibility for everything which happens in the collective, the rayon, the city, or society as a whole is being advanced to the foreground of all party work.

We are now entering into a complex political campaign connected with the election of people's deputies to the Belorussian Supreme Soviet and the local soviets. The republic's working class must join in this work with a firm awareness that no one from outside will present them with readymade mandates for the people's elected representatives. They must be struggled for, struggled for with a knowledge of the matter, a knowledge of the role which the working man has always had.

Each of us should clearly realize that the seats in the organs of state power should be taken by the best representatives of the people, including the working class, who will be able firmly to defend the working people's interests and steer a line toward society's recovery and the pooling of its best forces on a socialist basis.

Of course, during the election campaign democratic processes will deepen and expand. But we must all remember that democracy outside the law is anarchy. If, as is frequently done, we speak only of rights and freedoms and forget duties, then we are striking primarily against those selfsame rights and freedoms of citizens. [passage omitted]

## Moldavian Presidium Discusses Draft Laws

*LD2510163189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] There has been a sitting of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium in Kishinev at which a decree was adopted on convoking the 14th Session of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th Convocation. The course of the discussion of the Moldavian SSR's draft bills—on changes and amendments to the Constitution, the basic law of the republic, on the election of people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR, and on elections of deputies to local soviets—was subjected to a thorough analysis. The public of the republic is participating actively in the discussion of these drafts. They are regarded as an important step in the law-making process, in the development of democracy, and in the resolution of urgent tasks connected with the reform of the political system and the creation of a socialist law-governed state.

The Presidium recommended the executive committees of rayon, city, village, and rural soviets of people's deputies in the republic to step up their work on analyzing the proposals and remarks introduced by public discussion of these important draft laws.

At the sitting of the Presidium a working group was formed for the preparation of draft laws on citizenship of the Moldavian SSR and on gauranteeing the rights of national groups inhabiting the republic, as well as on the sovereignty of the Moldavian SSR. A commission for the study of questions of the state and national symbols of the kray was set up. Meanwhile, last Sunday, the tricolor flag—the symbol of the spontaneously ratified Popular Front—once again waved gaily over the many-thousand strong crowd of demonstrators on the city's main avenue. The request of the movement's representatives for sanctioning the holding the rally on Victory Square was rejected by the city authorities, who considered it more appropriate to hold the rally in the Zeleniy theatre or at the republic's stadium. By their march from Victory Square to the liberation monument, the Popular Front representatives expressed their dissatisfaction at this decision. The main demand of the demonstrators is to have the Popular Front recognised as an official political organization.

Shortly before that meeting was held the inaugural congress of the Union of Working People of Moldavia. Representatives of over 120 enterprises and organizations took part in it. The congress adopted a declaration on the main guidelines of the organization's socioeconomic activity and its charter, and the question of the organization's having its own publication was examined.

The proposals on changes in the draft laws of the Moldavian SSR on elections were discussed.

## Baltics Sign Economic Independence Communique

*LD2510101489 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 23 Oct 89*

[Text] As we have informed you already, a meeting of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian government delegations was held in Riga on Thursday [19 October]. They discussed problems related to economic self-dependence. The three republics' premiers have signed a joint communique. It's pointed out there that the transition to cost-accounting and self-management is taking place in complicated conditions. This is determined by the novelty of the task and by the fact that the economic reform underway in the Soviet Union is superficial and inconsistent.

Besides, the leadership of some central departments is passive and not cooperative in promoting the republics' economic self-dependence. Great difficulties are encountered in the republics' budget-making, specifying the new economic relations with the Union and the other republics and in establishing international economic contacts.

The communique says that it would be expedient to inform the Soviet Union's President, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Prime Minister, Nikolay Ryzhkov, about the work done in the Baltic republics and the difficulties encountered. The delegations agreed upon the coordination of the three republics' actions in passing over to economic self-dependence. They also concluded that it was expedient to work out the general principles and structure of economic cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union and the Union republics. Next year's economic cooperation agreement between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is to be worked out and signed in December.

The communique recommends to probe the possibilities to exchange missions among the three republics, which would be helpful in expanding relations between the three republics.

## Lithuanian Party Chief Previews Upcoming Congress

*LD2510123389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Interview with Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee, by correspondent (Elyana Kulyatita); time and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [(Kuklyatita)] Why has it become essential to convene a extraordinary congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania as early as this year?

[Brazauskas] The party is the last thing to have the right to be late, because the party sets the example, the party was the initiator, and it is the party which must restructure itself first of all, and march forward, and not give people any excuse to say: Perestroyka is demanded for everyone, but for some reason the party is late with its own perestroyka. So at our 21st Communist Party of Lithuania Plenum, a definitive decision was made on the date to convene the congress, its agenda the norms and methods of the election of delegates to the congress. Now we have to prepare for the congress.

[(Kuklyatita)] A few words about the draft program and the status of the Communist Party of Lithuania.

[Brazauskas] Well, it is both easy and difficult now to speak of the program and status, because these documents are now in such a state that they still require a lot of discussion and improvement. The position is all the more complicated in that there are alternative proposals to the status and program. A council has been set up in the republic to determine the status of the Communist Party of Lithuania: It is made up of competent persons who are preparing materials in parallel—although some of them are members of the official commission of the Communist Party Central Committee for preparing these policy documents. They have, nevertheless, prepared these draft documents in parallel.

Now the main task is to sit down at one long, or round table and find a common language on specific clauses of principle in the drafts of these documents, and if it is easier with the program, it is harder with the status. These are matters of principle here. First of all, the level of autonomy of the Communist Party of the republic. That's one thing. Second, the links between the republican Communist Party with the CPSU—this is a very important element in the draft status. And there are other questions: They included discipline in the party organizations and membership of one or another party organization.

It will certainly not at all be an easy congress. At the plenum we set up a committee for organizing the congress. We have organized receptions at the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee. We already have a lot of proposals. So we are facing some complex work in the 2 months which will end with the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania.

[(Kuklyatita)] Many people understand sovereignty in different ways. What sense do you give to that word, and, in this connection, to the autonomy of the Communist Party of Lithuania?

[Brazauskas] Well, of course, this is a subject for a very lengthy conversation. But I realize that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a unique state, and I would now like to be absolutely agreed that it is a federal state, although [words indistinct] of our official documents and constitution this term is not mentioned or used. But in my opinion, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a wider idea, in my understanding: It has a state system and, therefore, each republic, union republic, has its rights as a sovereign state defined in the constitution. This principle should be confirmed in our actual life. We believe that the sovereignty of a republic must be based first on economic autonomy. At the moment we still enjoy, so to say, the blessings created in our state, but when it coms to taking responsibility for some omissions or mistakes, we blame it on the center. We say: You know, the center holds 90 percent of the economy, let it take responsibility. But I look at this issue differently. We need to be the managers locally; we need to achieve results locally. And if these results are good, let the people praise, us, and if they are bad, we should take responsibility for them.

I think that this is the essence of the principles we have preached. Of course, I don't in any way understand this as some sort of separatist attitude. We understand how we are integrated in the all-union economic complex; we understand from where we get the raw material, from where we get te ready-made goods, means of transport, and so on and so forth, although we have quite a high economic potential. But, in fact, we are very dependent on the whole economy of the country, and this certainly determines this sovereignty.

And as for the Communist Party, we have said: A parallel movement both giving the federation a new content, and also the time is coming to evaluate and somehow establish the autonomy of the Communist Party as the basic political party in the republic. [sentence as heard] The political situation has many component parts, but one of them is certainly the activism of the communists, a very active ife, very many proposals. This also applies to political life. Second, there are other political forces which also have their opinion and which they express. We, as the Communist Party of Lithuania—and here I am expressing the opinions and principles of the plenum—we as the Communist Party of Lithuania must renew ourselves. We find our place in society. We must have and work out our program for political activity, economic activity. Therefore, we have formulated an agenda which will address specific, first steps to stabilize the economic situation, public life, and other very pressing matters that are very important to us.

## Facets of Lithuanian Scene Cause 'Perplexity'

*PM1110100989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Oct 89 First Edition p 2*

[Special correspondent Captain 3d Rank A. Orlov article: "Where Does the Road Lead? Reflections on Gedimino Avenue in Vilnius"]

[Text] Vilnius-Moscow—Until quite recently, this avenue in Vilnius carried Lenin's name. Now it has a different name—Gedimino Avenue. Red Army Avenue also had its name changed almost simultaneously—now it is Savanoryu Avenue. Several other streets have also had their names changed. So what, names are being changed not just in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. Many of these changes are seen as signs of the restoration of historical justice. But is it always a question of justice? Why is it that at times you feel a stab in your heart and you sense—like now—a burning perplexity and bitterness?..

Gedimino Avenue, which begins at the new and ultramodern building of the republic's Supreme Soviet, is undergoing reconstruction. Large-scale road repairs are under way here, along the avenue. From early morning Vilnius residents going about their business can see white paving stones being laid to replace the old road surface. One stone next to the other, simply and tightly. And this is somehow symbolic. You automatically feel like slowing down, approaching the workmen, and asking: Where does the road lead?

Actually, the question does not refer wholly to the road surface.

It almost goes without saying that everyone's ideal—in Lithuania, the Baltic republics, or the Soviet Union in general—is to arrive at a society where there is no room for grievances, injustice, and mistrust in one another. Social and national equality—this is the slogan emblazoned on the banners of perestroyka. And the slightest deviation from it is a step away from its genuine goals. These reflections and this bitterness might not have arisen on Gedimino Avenue had it not been for the fact that, every now and then, the political weather in the Baltic region suddenly erodes some of the goals.

I am referring primarily to draft laws which have been under discussion in the republic for several months now: on economic autonomy, on citizenship, on amendments to the republic's constitution. I have heard it said on many occasions: We are currently living on a diet of newspapers and television. And every news report is perceived as directly affecting the family and home. The latest event followed by the republic was the last session of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. A period of almost 2 weeks, including a short recess, was devoted to ensuring that the people's deputies, while upholding their voters' interests, arrived at a common denominator: How should the republic move toward autonomy, what sort of citizenship law it should adopt, how it should treat various events in the past?

Alas, those chosen by the people still failed to arrive at any joint and considered view on these questions. The session decided to also postpone one of the fundamental draft laws, whose adoption is associated with too many developments in the republic. The draft law on citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR will be further discussed in the press.

It cannot be denied that this was the correct decision. But the response to it was diverse. Ranging from a certain disheartenment among some people, mainly the most impulsive supporters of "Sajudis," to a sigh of relief heaved by others, the majority of whom are allies of the "Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power in Lithuania." Why the relief? As one session deputy told me: "We have fought for and won a real opportunity to rid the future law of certain blatant blunders."

What does this mean? Let us leaf through the draft Law on Citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR. Article 15. "Conditions for granting citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR. A citizen of another state or a stateless person, on application by him, can be granted citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR provided he consents to take an oath of allegiance to the republic and meets the following conditions: 1) He knows the Lithuanian language; 2) He has been a permanent resident on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR over the last 10 years; 3) He has fulltime employment or a legal source of livelihood on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR; 4) He knows the fundamental principles of the Lithuanian SSR Constitution..."

The last two points are no cause for concern, as it were. As for the 10-year residence qualification... Passions have been boiling around it, and this is only to be expected. Indeed, what prompted this actual period of time? Is it just because the draft law's initiators—"Sajudis" aktiv members—were inclined toward it? The session's attention was drawn to the illegality of the residence qualification, and it would have been strange if the outcome had been any different. Common sense itself prompts the question: Even if the residence qualification were to be reduced to half or even one-third, would this make the prospective law any fairer? People's perplexity is understandable: This is the first time in Soviet society that entire groups of the population, primarily servicemen and students who have arrived from other republics, are being deprived of civic rights. And not just voting rights, but also the right to housing, a residence permit, and—in the event of a change of vocation—even the right to work...

Even the provision about knowledge of the Lithuanian language does not overexcite public opinion to such an extent. And did it ever, in all seriousness? Here is an opinion I heard while visiting "Vilma," one of Lithuania's largest production associations with an international collective. Knowledge of the Lithuanian language, according to representatives of the collective's Russian-speaking members, is certainly necessary for those living in Lithuania. The question is: How ethical and moral is it to introduce it by means of purely arbitrary administrative methods, which we are abandoning even in the economic sphere. All that is needed are simply normal conditions for studying the language. Study circles, schools—there is an obvious shortage of them.

Much in our country nowadays is happening for the first time. What sort of oath is it, what does it involve? Here is the text of Article 17 of the draft Law on Citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR: "Persons being granted citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR must take the following oath: 'I, (name, surname), on being granted citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR, solemnly swear that I shall be loyal to the Lithuanian state, that I shall honor and obey the republic's Constitution and laws, that I shall respect the culture, language, customs, and traditions of the Lithuanian people, and that I shall make my contribution to the prosperity of Lithuania and the defense of its interests.'"

Perplexity? Yes, there is that sort of feeling. Because, if for no other reason, hitherto an oath was taken in the USSR only on joining the army. But some legislator felt the urgent need for such an act. This is his right, of course. Nonetheless, the document could have contained a few words about, say, the Lithuanian SSR's international achievements. In addition, there must be provision for liability in the event of the oath being broken: "If I were to break this solemn oath, I should be liable to punishment by..." What sort of liability should this be? Moral? Criminal? No, the worrying questions are no abstract matters.

I recall how Deputy A. Grishin found himself in the minority at the session, having perceived the oath as a sign of mistrust in hundreds of thousands of honest and industrious people—presumably Russians, Belorussians, and Poles, as well as Lithuanians. "My conscientious labor throughout my life has been my oath to the republic," were the tense words by a man honored by many government awards, with the Order of Lenin the highest among them, "but now I have my doubts: Could I possibly have been harming it with my labor?.." "Thank you kindly," he concluded his speech with bitterness.

"To Listen to and Understand Each Other," "Together and on an Equal Footing," "Toward a New Quality of Interethnic Relations"—these are the headlines you come across in central Lithuanian newspapers today. It seems that some breakthrough in moods has been achieved following the period of caution and alienation. Society has undergone some intangible change following the CPSU Central Committee plenum on the nationalities question and the CPSU Central Committee's earlier statement on the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics. Maybe today is actually the time to move perestroyka onward, without confrontations, "together and on an equal footing." But... Next to these headlines, the newspapers belonging to sundry "parties" and organizations still carry the old headlines—biting, rabble-rousing. Some people are unwilling to see any easing of tension. How else can you explain the recklessness of some quite extreme views? Incidentally, they were also to be heard from the lofty rostrum used by the republic's deputies.

USSR People's Deputy R. Ozolas: "We are creating an independent Lithuanian state. I emphasize: a state. This is often overlooked somehow. A state which can exist in parallel or jointly with the Soviet Union, just as with every normal country in the world—to the extent that it can be considered a normal neighbor..."

USSR People's Deputy G. Kakaras: "We are talking about deformed relations in the Army. Can we define this more precisely? It seems to me that the following definition could be used—this is a manifestation of Stalin's bolshevism which recently reached its apogee in the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union..."

Alas, how can the sides listen to each other today if the tagging of labels prevails over dialogue and a calm mastery of the situation?

And while we are on the subject of precisely defining what is happening in the USSR Armed Forces. This topic remains as acute as ever in the republic today. Especially in connection with the popular slogan: "Lithuanian Youths Must Serve in Lithuania!" It was also discussed at the session of the republic's Supreme Soviet. A letter arrived in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA while this article was being prepared to go to print. It was stamped "Soldiers' Mail." The return address was in Kaunas. It was mailed following the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet's discussion of the question of service by the republic's young people. It was written by Privates D. Kulikov, A. Malishauskas, S. Karzyalis, and A. Safronov.

"Our entire company today listened to the simultaneous translation of a speech broadcast on the radio. It was about the results of a poll taken among several hundred Lithuanian students, yesterday's soldiers. It is hard to describe the heavy feeling that descended upon us. It painted a picture of 'the Army's total disintegration.' Apparently, every second Lithuanian in the Army was dubbed a 'fascist' (this is the first we have heard about it). It was claimed that the belongings of 80 percent of Lithuanians had been pilfered by 'bullies,' and that they were 'having their property seized, just like the kulaks at the time of the revolutionary committees' (and what have revolutionary committees to do with all this?). One in every three soldiers of the reserve had seen between one and seven soldiers in his unit who had gone out of their minds (on hearing this, we ourselves almost 'went cuckoo'—due to our amazement). The speaker went on to cite the following opinions expressed by those polled. Officers' main concern is to cover up 'bullying' (and yet it seems to us that their concern is the exact opposite—to expose it as much as possible). The Army is apparently a paradise for those who had turned criminal back 'before they went into uniform' (and there we were, believing that the Army and paradise are two incompatible 'organizations'). To put it briefly, we learned a lot. The only point was, to put it mildly, that everything was overdone. The snapshot of the Army had been left in the developing tank too long and had come out blacker."

I approached the team of road workmen. We started chatting. Russians make up the core of the team. Even though for some reason they couldn't care less about each other's nationality. What was their main worry? Many things. First and foremost, of course, interethnic relations. It would seem high time to stop dividing people in the republic into "indigenous" and "newcomers," into visitors and hosts. Autonomy for the republic? There is a need for it, of course, how can you manage without it. The only point is, it should not be detrimental to the republic. Separation from the USSR? Who in their right mind can seriously talk about that! Citizenship? So who will be vested with the power to determine who deserves to be a citizen of Lithuania and who does not? And finally—the oath? One of my interlocutors stared at his hands and smiled: "That's politics, up at the top... We're down here..."

As the conversation was coming to an end, one of the workers said:

"Time will put everything in its place..."

It would be nice to believe that it will. Time teaches us. And the present in particular. But could it be that, in the quest for answers to questions perturbing us all, it would not go amiss to pay a visit here, to Gedimino Avenue? Pause briefly and look at the workmen laying the new road surface calmly, without haste, without superfluous chitchat. Could it be that they, the builders, ought to be asked: Where does the road lead?..

## Estonia Abolishes Council of Minister Departments

*PM2510145389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 1*

[Own correspondent L. Levitskiy dispatch: "Council of Ministers Without Departments"]

[Text] Tallinn—The reorganization of the Estonian Council of Ministers apparatus has begun. Sectoral departments are being abolished. A new institute —of government advisers—is being set up.

Many Council of Ministers workers have received brief letters. They contained expressions of thanks for their work and a warning that as of the new year their post will no longer exist. That is, they should find a new place of work.

"In the switch to republic economic accountability both enterprises and sectors are sharply increasing their rights, independence, and responsibility as well. So the Council of Ministers sectoral departments are losing their relevance," T. Yarve, Council of Ministers administrator of affairs, says. "In order to 'rule' efficiently and correctly, we need cells to generate ideas, connecting today's daily concerns with long-term directions. Instead of sectoral departments a new institution is being set up—of government advisers. There will be 12 of them. So far the first six have been appointed: for juridical and social questions, economic reform, finance, construction, transportation, and communications. Their task is to be consultants in the preparation of government programs and decisions, and to assess ministries' proposals."

## Azerbaijan Party Backs Moscow Plan for NKAO

*PM2610091189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Oct 89 Second Edition p 4*

[AZERINFORM-TASS report: "Party Aktiv Meeting"]

[Text] Baku, 23 Oct—A meeting was held today in the Azerbaijani capital between the republic party aktiv and representatives of the public and of the creative intelligentsia. It discussed the outcome of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium 20 October session, which examined information about the results of the work of the deputies' commission on the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO].

An important result of the discussion at the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium session was that it drew up proposals for a political settlement of the problem.

The implementation of these proposals, the speakers at the meeting stressed, will promote the improvement of interethnic relations in the region and the restoration of economic stability, and will normalize the situation as a whole in the NKAO. The main thing today is to search for paths to national conciliation and development of the age-old traditions of good-neighborliness between the Armenian and Azerbaijani inhabitants of the oblast, and to overcome differences of opinion. This is not an easy path, but it is essential that we embark on it and take steps toward each other in the name of present and future generations. This is required in the interests of perestroyka and the normalization of the situation in the region.

A.Kh. Vezirov, first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee, addressed the aktiv.

## NKAO Deputies Reject Supreme Soviet Draft

*NC2610115489 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1715 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] In a statement to an ARMENPRES correspondent, Vagan Garriyelyan, USSR people's deputy and first secretary of Mardakertskiy party rayon committee, said: We want only a political solution; the only way out of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] crisis is through a political solution. The stance adopted by the Armenian deputies from the NKAO at the 20 October meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was a principled one emanating from the interests of our people and the prevailing situation in the oblast. Naturally, a pro forma draft resolution calling for the replacement of the Special Administration Committee by a temporary extraordinary committee with the participation of a representative of Azerbaijan could not satisfy us even if it provided for the restoration of the party oblast committee and oblast soviet. The creation of such a committee, even if it is given an extraordinary mandate and is subordinate to Moscow, is unacceptable.

Gabriyelyan added: From the very start it was not clear to us what was meant by a self-governing territory, what status it would enjoy, and how it was to differ from an autonomous oblast. During the Presidium meeting the question of why local authorities try to heap everything on the shoulders of the central authorities was raised, since it was claimed that many problems could be resolved locally through a dialogue to be held by representatives of the two republics and the NKAO. We disputed that by pointing out that the interethnic crisis has worsened to such an extent that these relations have already crossed that line beyond which dialogue is no longer possible and intervention on the part of the central government has become [word indistinct]. The first secretary of the Mardakertskiy party rayon committee added that during the meeting he clearly stated that the NKAO could not come under direct rule by Moscow unless it was removed from the structure of Azerbaijan. This will not solve the problem.

The people's deputy's statement was did not spring from any personal whim. In his words: We must take into account the will of the people, particularly when we remember what the last 70 years have shown about what it means to be a self-governing national unit within the structure of the Azerbaijan Republic. Experience has shown the unrealistic nature of such a federal structure. Therefore, a new approach is needed in deciding the status of the national formations. I must state that the draft resolution presented to the commission by Tarazevich is incompatible with the interests of the Armenians of the NKAO and therefore unacceptable. If we accept such a decision, then we would become further entangled in the already knotty interethnic problem. If the reunification of the NKAO with Armenia is impossible at present, then its removal from the Azerbaijan's structure and subjection to the center is the only way out.

The same view was expressed by the other deputies from the NKAO who, reflecting the will of their electorate, considered the draft unacceptable.

Asked about the reports on central television and in the press that proposals for the political solution of the problem formulated during the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium session have been submitted to the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet and to USSR people's deputies from the NKAO, Comrade Gabriyelyan replied: How true are these reports? They are in no way compatible with the facts. (?A proposal was made to draw up a certain draft resolution.) We, the deputies of NKAO, have received no proposals at all. We actively contributed to the meeting at the Presidium and tried to convey our people's pain and agony to those present and firmly upheld our position. Because of our firm stance, the Presidium rejected the draft resolution and demanded the preparation of a new draft.

## Arrival of Damaged Freight in Armenia Reported

*NC2610091689 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] According to statistics released by the People's Control Committee of the Armenian Republic, 22 trains arrived in our republic via Azerbaijan railways on 24 October. Seventeen trains with a total of 896 railcars entered through Norashen, while 5 trains with a total of 260 railcars entered through Idhzevan.

Aboard these trains were 197 tanks of petroleum products, including 77 tanks of benzene, 147 railcars of prefabricated houses, 32 (?railcars) of cement, and 30 railcars of meat, butter, potatoes, and flour.

On the same day, 12 trains with a total of 321 railcars entered from Georgia via Transcaucasian railways. Aboard the trains were 12 railcars of cereals, 32 tanks of petroleum products, 54 railcars of prefabricated houses, and 139 railcars of building materials and cement.

The Yerevan branch of the Transcaucasian railways reported that most of the prefabricated houses, which are urgently needed in the disaster zone, coming through Azerbaijan have been totally vandalized and are uninhabitable. The fuel tanks have been found to be carrying 10 to 20 percent less benzene than they should. Enormous delays in the shipments of foodstuffs mean that potatoes, onions, (?fish), and other foodstuffs are spoiled when they reach their destination.

The situation concerning the unloading of the railcars at republic's stations has not been [word indistinct]. The schedules for unloading of [word indistinct] trains are disrupted.

## Armenian Earthquake Restoration Work Reviewed

*NC2510200589 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0545 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] According to the Armenian Republic's State Statistics Committee statement, and brought to the readers' attention by ARMENPRES, as of 1 October 1989, 167 out of 185 industrial units and enterprises damaged in the earthquake zone are fully or partially functioning. The monthly production increase in the volume of industrial goods has fallen sharply as a result of the blockade.

In January, the volume of industrial production in the fully or partially operating enterprises comprised 26.2 percent of the total production volume for the same period of the previous year in the same areas; and it was 46.1 percent for the period (?January) to August; it fell to 38.7 percent spread over 9 months, from January to September.

For several reasons the overwhelming majority of the enterprises in the disaster area have not reached their pre-earthquake production levels, with the exception of the Maralik lighting and electrical equipment factory, Kirovakan bread combine, and Artavtomatika Scientific Production Unit.

The pace of drawing the population into industrial production is too slow. During the year job placement has slowed down considerably. Now the manufacturing industry in the disaster zone feels the shortage for 25,000-30,000 workers. However, their employment in the manufacturing process depends above all on the progress of work being done for the utilization of production potential.

## Azeri Students Meet Meskhetian Turk Refugees

*NC2510104089 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 24 Oct 89*

[Text] The students of the [name indistinct] school in Baku, which has been named after Rustam-zade, have visted Kirovabad and [name indistinct] in Apsheronskiy Rayon. They met with the Meskhetian Turks and acquainted themselves with the refugees' living conditions. According to a decision adopted by the [name indistinct] collective, multifaceted aid will be extended to all these families. Meanwhile the provisions and [word indistinct] collected for the refugees have been sent to Kirovabad. Five trucks transported R7,000 worth of flour, tea, [word indistinct], and other provisions and clothing, shoes, beds, chinaware, and other commodities for the refugees from Uzbekistan, who are in [name indistinct].

The students will help build houses in rural areas for the families of Meskhetian Turks who have decided to remain in our republic.

## Azerbaijan's Mutalibov Visits Romania

*NC2410183389 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 21 Oct 89*

[Text] Ayaz Mutalibov, chairman of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers, headed a delegation of the republic's government to the Socialist Republic of Romania from 12 to 19 October. The delegation participated in the arrangements for the international exhibition in Bucharest. The Azerbaijan SSR had an individual section in the Soviet pavillion.

During talks with Romanian officials of the ministries, administrations, and establishments, the sides expressed interest in economic and trade cooperation concerning the production of construction materials and other consumer goods. They also expressed an interest in cooperating in fields such as oil engineering and oil and gas production, including the production of chemical and petrochemical products. Furthermore, they agreed that establishing scientific and technical cooperation in resolving problems in improving metal cutting equipment, drilling in deep seas, producing modern equipment for oil exploration, and upgrading oil exploration, extraction, and production work was possible.

The sides exchanged lists containing the commodities they proposed to trade on the basis of a barter agreement. Furthermore, they noted the perspectives of cooperating in the light and food industry fields, and they reached a number of preliminary agreements. During a meeting at the Romanian Ministry of Light Industry, which was attended by Mustafayev, minister of light industry of Azerbaijan SSR, the sides expressed a mutual wish for the establishment of a working group at ministerial level by the two republics—a group which will provide for cooperation in the production of knitted ware and shoes.

An agreement was reached to hold a practical meeting in Romania, which will be attended by experts from Azerbaijan SSR. The [words indistinct] of the joint work that will be carried out in the future will be discussed at this meeting. The Romanian side put forward concrete proposals for cooperation with the Azerbaijan SSR ministry of light industry on economic, scientific, and technical matters. Installations were proposed without conditions for the production of a number of raw materials Azerbaijan SSR provides for Romania in return for raw materials from that republic and for the production of [word indistinct], sanitary products, manufactured wares, and other manufactured commodities.

Meanwhile, a proposal was made (?within the framework of scientific and technical cooperation) to enable Azerbaijan SSR and Romania to participate in joint research work aimed at improving a number of technologies in the light industry field.

During its stay in Romania, the Azerbaijan SSR delegation was received by Nicolae Ceausescu, secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, together with the delegations of the other allied Soviet republics. Meanwhile, party and municipal officials held a meeting in Pitesti, which has fraternal relations with Sumgait in Azerbaijan SSR.

## Inaction Since Fergana Events Deplored

*PM1710103089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Oct 89 Second Edition p 2*

[PRAVDA correspondents V. Artemenko, A. Kaipbergenov: "Sharp Corners of the 'Pearl': Have Lessons Been Learned From the Events in Fergana Oblast?"]

[Text] Until recently one often heard it said in Uzbekistan that the Fergana Valley is the pearl of the republic. As far as natural conditions are concerned, that is true. The land here is generous. But how do the people live? When the tragic events of this year's hot June erupted, the story of the prosperity of this corner of "paradise" promptly burst like a bubble. The question that arose bluntly was: Why was it here, in the most densely populated, multinational region of the country, that the fires of human hatred flared up? Even today, nearly 4 months after the tragic events, this question still worries people and provides much food for thought.

Let us say frankly that the Uzbek people's conscience is clear. It was not through their will that the Fergana events occurred. They have always been noted for their kindness of heart, internationalism, and amicability. The republic's indigenous inhabitants have never displayed hostile sentiments toward other peoples. This is indicated by numerous examples from the past and present.

Something else is equally obvious: Attempts to defend the culprits responsible for the summer's tragedy are futile and intolerable. The people responsible for vandalism and murder, arson and pogroms must and will suffer severe penalties, whatever nation they belong to. Some of the instigators and active participants in the disturbances have already been sentenced to various terms of punishment.

But of course, it is not only a matter of the criminal responsibility of the immediate culprits. Why was the Fergana tragedy possible, what must be done to prevent similar flareups? These are the main questions that require merciless analysis and honest assessments and conclusions. One cannot but be concerned about the position of certain party and soviet workers in the oblast and the republic who seek to demonstrate that the mass disturbances arose suddenly and entirely unexpectedly. Can one agree with that?

"Conflict situations between representatives of the indigenous nationality and the Meskhetian Turks arose long ago in Fergana," G. Kadyrov, chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, explains. "Long before the June events there was fighting on interethnic grounds, with serious consequences, including some deaths. Nationalist and anti-Soviet pamphlets were distributed. Weapons and explosives were stockpiled. Extremists kindled unhealthy sentiments and passions at numerous rallies under the auspices of various kinds of informal associations, exploiting real socioeconomic, demographic, and ecological problems. But what about the local party, soviet, and law enforcement organs? Did they draw timely political conclusions? On the contrary, they did everything to fudge and gloss over the situation, they avoided resolute measures."

And here is the opinion of M. Ibragimov, chairman of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet Presidium and head of the republic Communist Party Central Committee's commission to investigate the causes of the tragic events. "Our commission formed the conclusion that these events were a large-scale action that was worked out beforehand and skillfully planned and executed, an action political in thrust and nationalist in character. The action was aimed at destabilizing the situation both in Fergana Oblast and in other oblasts of the republic."

In short, the storm was brewing for a long time. Not least because of the mistakes of those who were entrusted with power and whose duty it was to resolve promptly the acute problems faced by the "pearl" of the republic. The local leaders had apparently deliberately "cultivated" over the years a negative attitude to themselves, the distrust of the people around them... For instance, Kh. Umarov, who for more than 20 years was head first of the oblast soviet executive committee [oblispolkom], then of the oblast party committee [obkom]. A relative of the former first secretary of the republic Communist Party Central Committee, I. Usmankhodzhayev, he imposed his own, pernicious style of working with cadres. A year ago Umarov himself received the "Insignia of Honor," and he did not forget his wife, who was awarded the order of "Friendship Among Peoples." Seven issues of the oblast newspaper published panegyrics on Usmankhodzhayev's mother-in-law...

Or take this unprecedented fact. Working people in Yazyavanskiy Rayon asked the obkom first secretary to meet with them to help resolve questions of concern to many people. Umarov did not come to the meeting. But he sent a group of militiamen...with dogs.

At the end of last year, immediately after the party conference, we talked with the new obkom first secretary, Sh. Yuldashev. At that time he likened the state of affairs in the oblast to a cart stuck in a muddy track, loaded to the brim with unresolved problems. The secretary spoke hopefully about the action program adopted at the conference, saying that the real work of implementing it must begin literally the next day. Other delegates said the same thing. E. Khudayberdiyev, a team leader from the "Kokand" State Farm [sovkhoz], said bitterly: "We have been talking for years about bringing the city and countryside closer together, but in fact the distance between them is still increasing. There is cotton everywhere: There is nowhere to graze cattle, procure feed, or plant orchards. Yet at one time, that is what our valley was famous for..."

There was much talk of ecological strain at the conference, both from the platform and in the corridors. In some villages you cannot drink the water from the wells—it is poisonous. The Communists were also worried about the growing unemployment, especially among young people.

Due credit must be given: The new leadership undertook a number of serious measures to improve the situation. But the abscess had already swollen to such an extent that no amount of "lotion" could prevent it from bursting. The obkom and the city and rayon party committees were unable to take control of the situation in time, although long before the sad events in the Fergana Valley they had information at their disposal on the growth of negative phenomena in interethnic relations. The tension, especially in the city of Kuvasay, was being whipped up many months before the eruption. It was actively fostered by certain representatives of informal organizations and unofficial religious circles.

All the same, this is no justification for the negligence shown by the party committees, or for their confusion in an emergency.

It is well known that the tragedies were preceded by mass brawling in a beer bar in Kuvasay on 15-16 May. But none of those who "distinguished themselves" in this fighting was punished. In mass clashes on 23-24 May, one person died and dozens were wounded. But these events also went unnoticed. It was the events in this city that the provocateurs exploited by endowing them with the character of interethnic strife.

Unfortunately, the tragic "lesson of Kuvasay," where rumors arising spontaneously and fanned deliberately prepared the ground for mass disturbances, has not yet been learned. If even a small stone falls into a pond, the waves spread. And what if a huge boulder of trouble falls in?! The waves from the Kuvasay eruption "washed away" first the thousands of Meskhetian Turks living in the Fergana Valley, then those in other oblasts of the republic. We do not want to stir up the people's grief again, but it must be seen that to this day rumors are causing uneasiness among representatives of other nonindigenous nationalities. Let us remind you that the whole country was told that the discord between Uzbeks and Turks started at the bazaar, over...a handful of strawberries.

The emergency demonstrated clearly that many party, soviet, and economic workers are isolated from people's needs and concerns and do not know how to take prompt decisions. Problems, which are in plentiful supply in the oblast, are driven inward and sharply exacerbated. For instance, the structure of the national economic complex in this densely populated region was formulated without consideration for demographic features. The oblast is packed with chemical and petrochemical industry enterprises and the ecological situation here is complex. For instance, the Novokokandskiy Chemical Combine was polluting a unique source of underground spring water for 15 years or so. People and the surrounding crops suffered as a result of its harmful emissions. But the first to sound the alarm about this were the informal groups, not the official bodies...

The average per capita income in rural parts of Fergana Oblast is only R60-64. But until recently the oblispolkom was not allocating land for farmstead plots for collective farm [kolkhoz] members and sovkhoz workers, fruit and vegetable gardening associations, or individual housing construction. In the oblast today there are more than 70,000 people of working age who are not employed in social production. Taking into account the dynamics of population growth, by the end of the 13th 5-Year Plan this figure could increase by nearly 150 percent. Is it appropriate in this situation to ban the admission of rural inhabitants to work in the city? Yet that was the resolution adopted at one time by the Fergana City Soviet Executive Committee...

We have already mentioned mistakes in cadre policy. Many important posts were filled on the basis of kinship, friendship, or personal loyalty. In the last 3 years many leadership workers have been relieved of their posts in the oblast. They include city and rayon party committee secretaries, soviet executive committee chairmen, kolkhoz chairmen, and sovkhoz directors. Many of them have been expelled from the CPSU and subjected to criminal proceedings. Virtually no account was taken of the multinational composition of the population. Only two rayon party committees included representatives of the Meskhetian Turks. In recent years there has been a marked decrease in the number of leading party, soviet, and economic workers from small ethnic groups. Their cultural needs remain unsatisfied. Koreans, Crimean Tatars, Jews, and so forth spoke of this at meetings with a sense of injury.

You would have thought that the tragic events would have shaken up the oblast leaders and made them take a realistic look at life. However, even after those June days everything stayed the same. Thus a lengthy interview with the then obkom secretary T. Egamberdiyeva, who was in charge of ideological work here, was published in the oblast newspapers. You would have thought Turgunoy Akhmandzhanovna would have examined the situation critically and given a frank answer to the "burning" questions: Why did the tragedy happen, where were its roots? And what do we find? Instead of a sober analysis and honest admission of errors—bragging and pride. And at a Central Committee bureau session and an obkom plenum, T. Egamberdiyeva again assessed her own work without self-criticism and tried in every way to gloss over the contradictions...

Yet how badly a self-critical, objective analysis of events is needed! Even today the situation in Fergana Oblast remains complex. The curfew is still in force in the oblast center and certain cities. Several Meskhetian Turkish homes, which had been restored after the June fires, have been burned down again. People have not lost the sense of uncertainty and fear of tomorrow. Why is this not causing concern to the oblast leaders? Sluggishness is also evident in the elimination of the consequences of the pogroms.

The events in Fergana Oblast unsettled the entire republic. But many party workers are still sitting it out in their offices. Yet people expect communciation, demand competent explanations, and what to know exactly what has been done to prevent a repetition of past errors.

As PRAVDA has already reported, the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and a Fergana Obkom plenum relieved a number of senior party workers of their posts. Some were penalized. At a recent plenum of the republic Communist Party Central Committee perplexed questions were asked: Why has the activity of Uzbekistan's leadership workers not been properly assessed? Incidentally, when the Fergana events were at their height and soon after, the Central Committee first and second secretaries, R. Nishanov and V. Anishchev, left their posts.

Reflecting on the events in Fergana, Novyy Uzen, and Abkhaziya, one cannot help concluding that interethnic relations remain highly "inflammable," although only recently it appeared that they were safely sewn up with slogans. Is that perhaps why they "blew up"? Recently Uzbekistan has been avoiding ostentation. They are beginning seriously to tackle employment for the population. Under a program approved by the republic government, dozens of new production units are being set up. The first output—a consignment of linen for kindergartens and creches—has been produced by the sewn goods shop that opened on the "Fergana" Kolkhoz. The kolkhoz members themselves fitted out some empty premises at the Tashlak sewn goods factory. Experienced supervisors from the factory have taught 40 young women the new profession...

In the next 18 months an additional 100,000-120,000 jobs are to be created in oblasts with a labor surplus—Andizhan, Namangan, Fergana, and others. The republic is to receive a significant proportion of machine tools, manufacturing equipment, and raw material from the union government on the basis of import purchases and the conversion of defense enterprises. The Novokokandskiy Chemical Combine, which was polluting the environment, has been shut down completely. The Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and the government, with the support of the country's leadership, intend to adhere firmly to the course of reducing cotton sowings—to a level that is socially, economically, and ecologically expedient.

All this will certainly help to stabilize the situation and promote the relaxation of social tension. At the same time the thought persists: Are we witnessing a highly dangerous phenomenon, whereby problems can only be resolved after conflicts?

The urgent problems require from the republic leadership thoughtful steps, wisdom, and resolve. Because "stagnation" in actions, as the Fergana events showed, leads to unpredictable consequences. Are we really going to go on acting according to the proverb, "The peasant does not cross himself until it thunders"? It is time to look ahead and forestall the peals of thunder.

## Uzbek Birlik Youth Group Leaders on Program

*90US0103A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA in Russian 5 Oct 89 p 3*

Report of interview with A. Abdullayev, chairman of the "Union of Free Youth of Uzbekistan" (UFYU), engineer at the Electronics Scientific Research Institute of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences; A. Abdumavlyanov, UFYU coordinating bureau member, instructor of philosophy at the Tashkent Polytechnic Institute; and K. Babadzhanov, journalist, editor of the UFYU newspaper, ERKIN SUZ [FREE WORD] by Ye. Lamikhova, and T. Tashimov, KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA correspondents; "Fighting For Youth Rights"; date, place not specified; the interview was prompted by a letter to the editor, which comprises the first paragraph of text]

[Text] We hear there is a youth organization operating in the republic which considers itself a new political youth union. Is this true?

[signed] B. Minevich, Tashkent.

In order to respond to the reader's question we conducted a search for this "secret" organization, and came upon an informal association called the "Union of Free Youth of Uzbekistan" (UFYU). Our correspondents conducted this interview with the organization's leaders.

[Question] Very little is known about your organization by the broad circle of our youth. Perhaps this is why there are so many rumors about UFYU—of anti-Sovietism, nationalism...

[Answer] We want to refute these right away. The draft program of our organization states in black and white: The Union of Free Youth of Uzbekistan functions within the framework of the USSR Constitution and the General Declaration of the Rights of Man. The accusation of nationalism is also unjust. We are striving to unite the youth of Uzbekistan but nationality has no significance with respect to joining our union. An Uzbek, a Russian, a Crimean Tatar, a Jew, or any other person may be a member of our organization if he shares our views and will work actively in the union.

[Question] What tasks has your organization set for itself?

[Answer] Our chief task is to augment the role of youth, to get the Uzbek government to take our youth into consideration, to work on solving its problems. We want to see youth actually participating in perestroyka. Youth should be represented in any legislative or government commission—whether it is a commission on drafting the Law on Languages, or one on interethnic relations, or one on something else—and should take part on an equal basis in developing state policies.

[Question] It seems to us that youth is adequately represented in the organs of authority...

[Answer] Well it does not seem that way to us. Today, just like during the stagnation era, the rights of youth are declared and that is all. In actuality, youth is the layer of our society with the lowest income and the fewest rights.

[Question] You are functioning within the framework of the "Birlik" [Unity] popular movement. We have heard the view expressed that you are a toy in the hands of Birlik, that you do not have the status of an independent organization. What is the true nature of your relationship with this movement?

[Answer] We are the youth component of Birlik. We support its charter and program completely. At the same time, we are an independent organization and are accountable only to the Constituent Congress of Birlik.

We want to engage youth in the struggle against the cotton monoculture, against the ever increasing use of chemicals in agriculture. The ecological situation in our republic is terrible. Look at the air we breathe, the water we drink! This is why the incidence of sickness among the population is so great and infant mortality so high, especially in the villages.

Can a person who lives in Uzbekistan and loves this land rest comfortably, regardless of his nationality, in view of the havoc which has been wreaked here? We are situated in one of the last locations in the country with respect to meat, vegetable, and fruit consumption. The purchase price of cotton is ridiculously low.

All peoples who have settled in Uzbekistan, all layers of the population are suffering from such policies—but especially our youth, who will be living on this land, raising children and grandchildren, thinking about the future.

[Question] We have an official youth organization—the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League]. Do you favor cooperation with it or confrontation?

[Answer] We would like to work with the Komsomol. And the Komsomol is trying to meet us halfway. But not a single significant issue that we have raised with Komsomol organs has been resolved favorably. Let us cite just one example.

During the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, only one candidate was nominated in the electoral okrug in which the Tashkent college campus is located. We demanded competitive elections be conducted but our view was not taken into consideration. During the elections, we presented 150 of our own observers who would monitor observance of the Law on Elections of USSR People's Deputies. We were refused for no reason.

[Question] In other words, do you believe the Komsomol cannot resolve youth problems?

[Answer] Of course not. The position of the Komsomol in our society is very unclear. Figuratively speaking, the Komsomol is playing the role of "point man" or "buffer" in our political structure, to whose account all the deficiencies and negligence of party and soviet organs in bringing up our youth and solving youth problems are being written off. But neither can we close our eyes to the fact that the Komsomol itself possesses such negative qualities as careerism, empty-headedness, bureaucratism, indecisiveness, remoteness from the masses, and absence of creative effort.

In its present state, the Komsomol has no right to exist. What has happened in the Baltic region confirms this. We would like to see the Komsomol as an independent political force. As long as the Komsomol remains "in reserve" and greets every decision handed down from above with a "hooray," it will be of no benefit.

But our position in this matter does not mean that we are boycotting every decision of the Komsomol. If it does something truly necessary for the people, for our youth—we will support it. Especially since the chairman of our union, Askar Abdullayev, and many other UFYU members are also Komsomol members.

[Question] Many people are afraid that the Union of Free Youth of Uzbekistan is capable of using violence. Is this a possibility?

[Answer] No. We resolutely condemn violence as a means of solving problems. But I think our official organizations should understand that dragging out resolution of the sharpest social and economic contradictions in our region can lead to the most serious consequences.

[Question] What is your attitude concerning the events at the Tashkent Carnival of Friendship which aroused community indignation?

[Answer] The day after these events took place, a UFYU action committee issued an appeal to all youth in the republic condemning what had taken place and calling upon young people to fight for their rights using political methods, not their fists. As you know, our organization called for a rally and demonstration—these took place on 24 September. The order which reigned here shows convincingly that our youth realizes its responsibility and is not following the path of extremism.

[Question] There are people who passionately support the slogan "Uzbekistan for the Uzbeks." Do you agree with this?

[Answer] No. By the way, our movement is international. The chairman of our union is Iranian (Persian) by nationality, and the movement involves the participation of Tajiks, Crimean Tatars, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, etc.

Our region has been international from the earliest times. Respect for people of other nationalities, interest in the customs of other peoples—this is one of the noteworthy features of the Uzbek character. We are fighting not against Russians, but against bureaucracy. And bureaucrats have no nationality. It doesn't matter whether a rank-conscious administrator is Russian or Uzbek—they work in identical fashion against the people, protecting their department and their privileges.

We are also against privileges being shown the "younger brother" of the Russian people—this wounds Uzbek national dignity. We believe the criteria for appointment to any job position should be the same all around—capability and competence.

[Question] What about knowledge of the Uzbek language? Do you consider this optional for appointments to high position?

[Answer] On this we do not agree. Uzbek must be the state language in Uzbekistan. And to Russian must be relegated the role of language of inter-republic communication. We want the Russian-speaking population to understand that the Uzbek people have a rich culture which in no way takes second place to European culture! How can one assimilate this culture without a knowledge of its language? Knowledge of Uzbek facilitates contacts—both everyday and professional. Journalists, doctors, lawyers, leaders on every level must know Uzbek. Remember, we are fighting for cultural originality not just for the Uzbek people, but for every people living in Uzbekistan. We advocate the operation of a Tajik cultural center in Bukhara and Samarkand. Koreans, Crimean Tatars...need their own theater, schools with instruction in their native language. The state should provide free instruction of Uzbek language. The transition should be in stages over a 3-5 year period.

[Question] Your organization is named the "Union of FREE Youth..." What is it that youth should be free of, in your opinion?

[Answer] From dogma and administrative dictates. We want to see our republic as a civilized society, led not by the bellow, not by the will of a certain party or soviet official—but by law.

[Question] Who in your view is holding up this process?

[Answer] Left-over cadre who do not want perestroyka and are afraid of it—and all the same they remain in their positions and try to restrain the growing self-consciousness of the people.

[Question] How many people are in your union?

[Answer] At present we are an informal organization and do not register our members.

[Question] All the same, is it an elite organization or one for the masses?

[Answer] One for the masses. Our social base is comprised not only of students, as is commonly depicted, but of workers and engineers as well. Many who think as we do belong to "Tashselmash" [Tashkent Agricultural Machinery], to the production association of Tashkent Tractor Plant, to the textile combine, to the Aircraft Association imeni Chkalov, to institutes of higher education and districts in Tashkent.

[Question] Up until now, newspapers have not provided an open forum for expressing your views. KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA wants its readership to obtain first-hand information on the Union of Free Youth of Uzbekistan, so that they themselves may render judgment as to what the union is doing and what policies it advocates, so that they can determine how to relate to it.

[Answer] That is what we would like also.

EDITOR'S NOTE. The first constructive dialogue between Union of Free Youth of Uzbekistan leaders and Komsomol personnel took place last Saturday at a meeting with the Uzbekistan Komsomol Central Committee. Discussion centered around the aims and tasks of the unofficial organization, and the possibility of conducting joint Komsomol-UFYU activity. Although the conversation was not devoid of mutual pretentiousness, it must be admitted that a unification of the efforts of all youth organizations is important today as it has never been before. Tension among youth caused by the country's adverse economic situation—reflected primarily in the low-income segments of the population, which include our youth—interethnic distrust, neglect in the social sphere—these are the realities the political trends of youth cannot fail to deal with, regardless of whether these are official or unofficial expressions of our young people's interests. Unfortunately, UFYU leaders sometimes lack balance, in our opinion. And at times they show an aspiration for categorical appraisal and critical judgment. This is dangerous when passions are inflamed as they are to the limit. But we would probably not be mistaken were we to say that continuation of this dialogue is important, not only for the leaders of the Komsomol and UFYU, not only for the active membership of these two organizations, but for the destiny of perestroyka in our region as a whole, as well.

## Birlik People's Movement Charter Published

*90US0077A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA in Russian 30 Sep 89 p 2*

["Charter of the People's Movement to Protect the Nature, Spiritual and Material Wealth of Uzbekistan 'Birlik'"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] What is the "Birlik" movement about? What are its goals and tasks? These are the questions the readers of the youth newspapers KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA and YESH LENINCHI are asking in their letters. We believe that the publication of the charter of this informal association which is now brought to your attention will be helpful in clarifying many things.

1. General Considerations

1.1. The "Birlik" [Solidarity] People's Movement which has formed as a result of patriotic and sociopolitical activity of the people is a voluntary public organization, interethnic in its composition, which operates primarily with a view to protecting the nature, material and spiritual wealth of Uzbekistan, as well as the renewal of all spheres of life of its society.

1.2. The "Birlik" People's Movement carries out its activities within the framework of the Constitutions of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], the Karakalpak ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], the Program and Charter of the movement, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, as well as the final acts of the Vienna meeting of European countries.

1.3. The "Birlik" People's Movement carries out its activities in cooperation with the party, state, government, and public organizations of the republic.

1.4. The "Birlik" People's Movement, pursuant to the principles of glasnost acknowledged by the Constitution, proceeds from democratic methods and resolutely condemns any manifestation of national, racial, and religious discrimination, preaching violence and hatred, chauvinism and nationalism.

2. Main Tasks

2.1. Broad-scale democratization of the state and public life in the republic, getting rid of the flaws of the cult of personality and the period of stagnation, the establishment of complete glasnost in the revolutionary renewal of socialism.

2.2. Complete implementation of the slogan "All power to the Soviets."

2.3. Struggle for establishing the genuine sovereignty of Uzbekistan within the USSR.

2.4. Attaining spiritual and material equality in interethnic relations.

2.5. Ensuring human rights, bringing the documents safeguarding civil rights into compliance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, final acts of the Vienna meeting of European countries, and other international acts on civil and political rights.

2.6. Genuine establishment of the Uzbek language as the official state language of Uzbekistan.

2.7. Unbiased and truthful interpretation of the history of Uzbekistan.

2.8. Increasing the living standard of the people and meeting their spiritual needs.

2.9. Developing the health care sphere and increasing state funding provided by the state for protecting the health of mothers and children.

2.10. Bringing the economy into compliance with productive forces and relations of production taking into account the human and ecological factor.

2.11. Struggle for the comprehensive development of Uzbekistan, for the fair distribution of the entire social product manufactured and extracted in the territory of the republic.

2.12. Struggle for peace, consistent disarmament, and demilitarization of states.

2.13. Democratization of the sphere of education, an increase in state funding for the education of the people.

2.14. Attaining social equality in all spheres of the life of our society.

2.15. Broad-scale curing of the natural environment and, in particular, rescuing the Aral Sea.

2.16. The elimination of cotton as the single crop of the republic.

2.17. Struggle for releasing women and children from strenuous manual labor in the sectors of the national economy, and primarily in agriculture.

2.18. Vigorous participation in combating all forms of violation of public order and crime.

3. Main Forms of Activities of the Movement

3.1. Extensively drafting the masses for participation in the process of perestroyka, in socio-political, economic, and cultural undertakings.

3.2. Generalizing proposals made by the people and bringing them to the attention of state organs.

3.3. Developing draft resolutions, expert studies, and other analytical documents on different issues with a view to sending them to people's deputies and vigorously cooperating with them in their activities as deputies.

3.4. Organizing the discussion of published draft laws, various official documents, and stating the constructive position of the movement on them.

3.5. Bringing problems pointed out in the charter of the movement to the attention of the public, using agitation, propaganda, and other lawful means, such as the collection of signatures under the demands, appeals, and so on.

3.6. Publishing documents and newsletters on the activities of the movement, organizing speeches, discussions, meetings, and exhibitions.

3.7. Creating committees of experts on issues of concern to the broad circles of the public and releasing their conclusions to the public.

3.8. Holding public events such as meetings, mass gatherings, rallies, and demonstrations, celebrations of historical dates, national and all-people's holidays.

3.9. Participating in nominating candidates in elections to the Supreme Soviet and local soviets; participating in the elections vigorously.

3.10. Conducting work aimed at recalling before the end of the term the deputies who do not perform their functions and their duty.

3.11. Cooperating with the soviets of people's deputies, state offices, political and social organizations in accomplishing the tasks set forth in the Program and Charter of the movement.

3.12. Cooperating vigorously with the organs of people's control, and, if necessary, participating in their undertakings.

3.13. Cooperating with all other progressive forces in Uzbekistan, in all union republics, and abroad.

4. Members of the Movement

4.1. Citizens of the Uzbek SSR who have reached the age of 16, who recognize the Program and Charter of the "Birlik" Movement, and desire to take part in accomplishing the objectives and tasks of the movement laid down therein are admitted to the "Birlik" People's Movement.

4.2. Admission of members to the people's movement is performed by its support groups by a majority vote on the recommendation of two members of a given group.

4.3. Members of the "Birlik" People's Movement should show through their behavior and activities that they are in agreement with the goals, tasks, and the main principles of the movement.

4.4. Members of the "Birlik" People's Movement have a right to:

—participate in all events held by the "Birlik" People's Movement;

—hold events within the framework of the Program and the Charter of the movement;

—participate in the election of leading organs, nominate their own and other candidacies, and be elected to the organs of the movement;

—publish their materials in the publications of the movement;

—voice their opinion and discuss the issues on the agenda;

—enjoy the support and protection of the "Birlik" in the event of persecution and infringement of rights for activities within the framework of the present Charter.

4.5. Members of the "Birlik" People's Movement have a duty to:

—defend the purport of the objectives and tasks of the movement under all circumstances;

—participate in preparing and carrying out actions and events of the movement;

—carry out diligently the assignments and decisions of the leading organs of the movement;

—observe internal discipline;

—adhere to the principle of pluralism on all issues discussed within the movement and respect the opinion of others;

—not to speak at party, soviet, and state organs and in public organizations on behalf of the "Birlik" without special authorization by the respective organ of the movement.

4.6. Those joining the "Birlik" Movement fill out a registration form. The initiation fee is 3 rubles (for college and school students, 1 ruble); membership dues are 1 ruble a month (for college and school students, 30 kopecks). Half of the funds collected locally is left at the disposal of support groups, and the remainder is transferred to the fund of the movement. People sympathizing with the goals and tasks of the movement may make voluntary donations. The handicapped and mothers of many children who belong to the movement are exempt from membership dues.

4.7. A member of the "Birlik" has a right to leave the movement voluntarily having notified a representative of the support group of this.

4.8. Members of the movement who have discredited the "Birlik" by their behavior and actions and have flagrantly violated the Charter are expelled from the ranks of the movement by a decision of the support group. A member of the movement who disagrees with the decision of the group may approach a superior organ. Members of the movement who have not paid membership dues for 3 months and have not participated in the work of the movement for no valid reason will be expelled from its ranks.

4.9. Members of the movement are issued a membership card.

5. Organizational Arrangements

5.1. Support groups consisting of no fewer than three persons are the local base of "Birlik." These groups elect their representative and, if need be, his deputy, and create self-government organs. The representative of the group and the self- government organ coordinate the work of the group and handle its funds. They periodically report to the group and may be asked to face an election before the end of the term at the discretion of the group.

5.2. The support group does not set itself against the public; quite the opposite, it establishes contacts with respective official establishments (party, soviet, economic, production, cultural, and so on). It informs a regional organization of the movement about problems, contradictions, and tasks emerging in the labor collectives and at the places of residence of the members of the group.

5.3. A newly formed group must be registered by the oblast or rayon council of the movement. The groups work toward achieving particular goals by coordinating and pooling their efforts.

Groups which completely ignore the charter and program of the movement are expelled from the movement by a decision of the oblast or rayon council.

5.4. The support groups of a rayon, city, or oblast are united in respective regional organizations of the "Birlik" Movement and registered by respective soviets of people's deputies.

5.5. "The Free Union of Youth of Uzbekistan" is a public organization which is considered to be the youth wing of the movement proceeding in its activities from the program and Charter of the "Birlik" People's Movement.

5.6. Public organizations may join the movement in the capacity of a group or subdivision. Their names and forms of activity are not subject to strict regulation but are subordinated to the further invigoration of the "Birlik" Movement within the framework of its program and charter.

5.7. The following are the leading organs of the "Birlik":

a) congress;

b) central council;

c) presidium of the central council;

d) audit commission.

5.8. The congress is the superior organ of the "Birlik" Movement. It is convened once a year. An extraordinary congress may be convened if no fewer than one-third of the members of the central council or no fewer than one-third of the oblast organizations of the movement so demand.

5.9. The congress of the "Birlik" Movement:

—makes decisions on creating or suspending the activities of the movement;

—adopts the program and the charter, and makes amendments in them;

—discusses and resolves the most important issues of the activities of the movement;

—elects the chairman and members of the central council and the audit commission for a term of 1 year;

—hears reports and evaluates the activities of the central council and the audit commission, their chairmen, and of other elected organs of the movement;

—elects the editor and the editorial board of its publications;

—adopts the emblem of the movement and its badge.

5.10. Decisions of the congress are adopted by a simple majority vote in the presence of no fewer than one-half of the delegates elected to the congress with a deciding vote, by an open or secret vote.

5.11. The central council is elected in keeping with the results of voting following the discussion of all candidacies.

The central council plans and leads the work of the movement between congresses, and endorses the cost estimates of outlays for publications and events of the organizations of the movement.

5.12. The numerical composition of the central council is determined by the congress. The central council elects deputy chairmen of the movement and an executive secretary. The chairman of the central council and his deputies cannot be elected for more than five terms in a row.

Meetings of the council are held no fewer than four times a year. Resolutions of the council are adopted by a simple majority vote and are valid if no fewer than one-half of the members of the council have taken part in the voting.

5.13. The central council elects a presidium which coordinates the activities of the movement between the meetings of the council.

5.14. The presidium of the central council is a permanently operating organ which:

—in case of need, convenes a meeting of the council and prepares issues for the discussion;

—organizes the fulfillment of the resolutions of the congress;

—sets up working groups and commissions of experts by drafting corresponding specialists;

—establishes contacts and cooperates with party, soviet, and public organizations;

—on behalf of the movement, issues declarations and appeals with regard to making decisions on the current tasks of the movement;

—approves the expenditures of the movement.

5.15. The chairman of the movement is entitled to represent the "Birlik" Movement in state organs, offices, and public organizations in which he can make statements on behalf of the "Birlik" Movement proceeding from the decisions of the congress and the central council. He signs the decisions adopted by the congress and the council.

5.16. The audit commission monitors the administrative and financial operations of the council of the movement, the status and conditions of the material assets owned by the movement, and reports on the results of its activities to the congress. The audit commission operates on the basis of regulations on the audit commission adopted by the congress. The chairman of the audit commission participates in the work of the central council with a consultative vote.

5.17. At conferences convened annually, regional organizations of the movement elect the chairman of the oblast (city, rayon) council and the following organs:

—oblast (city, rayon) council;

—audit commission of the oblast (city, rayon) council;

The number of members of the oblast (city, rayon) council, its organizational structure, and procedures for its work are determined by the conference. The council elects a deputy chairman of the council, a secretary, and a board of the council at its first organizational meeting.

6. Assets, Funds, and Staff of the Movement

6.1. The budget of the "Birlik" People's Movement is based on donations and transfers by citizens, organizations, enterprises, and offices, initiation fees and membership dues, profits from publishing and propaganda operations within the framework of the charter, as well as the proceeds from concerts, readings, and other events sponsored by the movement. The monetary and financial documents and contracts are signed only by the persons confirmed by the congress or the central council. The movement keeps its funds at the state bank. In keeping with the budget, the finances of the movement are used for the financial support of economic, organizational, and other undertakings.

6.2. The chairman, deputy chairmen of the central council of the movement, executive secretary, presidium and members of the audit commission discharge their responsibilities on a volunteer basis. The movement defrays the costs associated with discharging these responsibilities; in exceptional cases, the central council sets a salary for them.

6.3. The movement has employees who carry out organizational and technical assignments.

6.4. Financial operations of the central council are monitored by the audit commission of the movement; financial operations of the organizations of the movement are monitored correspondingly by the audit commissions of these subdivisions; in the groups, the monitoring is performed by general meetings or audit commissions.

7. Legal Status of the Movement

7.1. The "Birlik" Movement and its regional organizations have the rights of a corporate body.

7.2. The central council of the "Birlik" Movement has a stamp and a seal which reflect its name.

7.3. The "Birlik" Movement has an emblem and a badge.

7.4. The present charter is submitted for registration to the relevant organs of the republic.

The document was signed by members of the presidium of the "Birlik" People's Movement:

[signed] Akhmad Azam, Usman Azim, Zakhir Alam, Safar Bekzhan, Erkin Vakhidov, Bakhadir Dzhalolov, Dadakhon Nuri, Alim Karimov, Takhir Karimov, Sergey Orlov, Mikhammad Solikh, Zhuma Tashmatov, Fakhriddin Khudaykulov.

## Turkmen Ethnographer Praises Russian Role

*90US0051A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 16 Sep 89 p 2*

[Article by Sh. Annaklychev, professor, ethnographer: "To Restore Trust"]

[Text] December 1986. Central television and radio have broadcast a bitter report: in Alma-Ata there has been a demonstration of young people for national reasons. A sense of bitterness among many Soviet people, and also among our friends abroad. Everyone asked himself the question: "Why has this happened and who is to blame?" And they found no answer...

It seems to me that the main reason was that during the years of stagnation in Kazakhstan, and indeed everywhere, work to strengthen the friendship and brotherhood of the peoples was too weak and the principle of social justice was lost and self-conceit flourished. False toasts were proposed in the jubilee days celebrating the history of the USSR or Kazakhstan, while at other times there was a studied silence on questions of internationalism. People's faith was also undermined in those apologies for leaders who through their conduct compromised the very idea of socialism. The sayings "fish go rotten from the head down," "might is right," and "you have to step on people to get ahead" exemplify those years.

The nationalist demonstrations were noted by the press in Moldavia, the Baltic, and other parts of the country. But is it political shortsightedness to lay at the feet of the Russian people all the responsibility for the socioeconomic and political crisis that has arisen in the country? There are people who are trying to blame Moscow for all the clashes.

I think that I am not mistaken in saying as an ethnographer that the Russian people are an open, trusting, simple, direct, kind, sympathetic, courageous and compassionate people who value true friendship, a patriotic people who are able to overcome all difficulties. This is confirmed both by history, and by every honest person who has lived a long life. The Russian people have played an active part in the revolutions that have taken place in our country. During the years of the civil war, in the clashes with the foreign interventionists, in the bloody encounters with the gangs of nationalists, and in the years of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against Hitler's invaders, the Russian people sustained the greatest losses. According to the official figures, losses in Afghanistan totaled 15,000. Unfortunately we do not have information on the nationalities of those who fell. But I think that more than 70 percent of them were representatives of the Russian people.

During the years of Soviet power, thanks to the constant help provided in the economic and social respects by the more developed fraternal peoples, first and foremost the Russians, the Turkmen people have also achieved great successes in social, economic, and cultural development and have merged on an equal basis with the great multinational family. The formerly isolated and separate Turkmen tribes have for the first time in a millennium been united and have created their own state. The dream of the great Makhtumkuli has been realized.

In short, the Russians have played an enormous role in the socioeconomic and political successes of the entire Soviet people, and in strengthening their friendship and brotherhood. To deny this means to dissemble. And so to those who slander them, this is what I would like to say: "Be silent, you impudent people, we must be grateful to the Russian people." If it had not been for such friendship and brotherhood, we would have been unable to achieve the historic victory in the Great Patriotic War, we would not have a Soviet state, and there would be no Turkmenistan today.

Everyone knows that there are no bad peoples, just bad persons. And no one has calculated which people has the most bad persons, and which the least. For the same reason the most diverse opinions exist as to the cause of the outbreaks of interethnic dissension in our country. Speaking candidly, the thought never entered my head that this could happen. Some people are trying to explain it by the perestroyka that has been initiated, by the development of democracy and glasnost. Of course, it would be wrong to look for the causes of the exacerbation of interethnic relations in the revolutionary transformations that are aimed only at improving the life of each Soviet person. I think that I am not mistaken in saying that the roots of this run deep and come from the distant 1920's, when injustice was first permitted in the country's socioeconomic policy, along with deviation from the party's proclaimed national policy, and gross violations of the norms of socialist legality during the period of personality cult, and complacency. This has been largely heated up by the voices of "friends" from afar—the anti-Soviet broadcasts from more than 40 foreign radio stations.

But Western ideologues have understood that they cannot beat the Soviet people and socialism with the help of war. And now their actions are aimed at undermining our state from within: destroying the friendship of the peoples, isolating them, and setting the Russians against the non-Russian peoples. Today each one of us has a special need to know this simple truth and wage an uncompromising struggle against all manifestations of nationalism, and try to strengthen relations between our nations. The draft platform of the CPSU "Party National Policy under Present-Day Conditions" emphasizes that "it is important that internationalism be perceived as a fundamental and inherent requirement, not as something foisted on us from outside, from the side somewhere."

There are no manifestations of nationalism in our multinational republic. This is a fact that evokes justified pride. However, the successes achieved here should not be a cause for complacency. The escapades by hooligans on 1 May in Ashkhabad and on 9 May in Nebit-Dag should put us all on the alert and induce each of us make his contribution to further strengthening international traditions in the Turkmen SSR.

If in feature movies about various historical events that have taken place in our country, for example, the civil war of 1918-1922 or the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, they had more often shown representatives of the various nationalities in the same scenes this would have served only to promote international indoctrination. And if that was the case then, then today it is time to create documentary movies about the life of our fellow countrymen abroad today—in Iran, China, Afghanistan, Turkey, Iraq, Syria and so forth. It is essential for workers in republic cinematography to make more use of their opportunities.

The formalization of international indoctrination has led to the emergence of national inequality. It is essential to correct this, involving the broad masses of the population in the discussion of the renaming of training establishments and schools, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and population points in the republic, following both common and local traditions. The people would probably give their approval if the Institute of Physical Culture is renamed after the first Turkmen chess champion, Tashli Tayliyev, and if the Institute of Fine Arts is renamed after Sakhi Dzhaparov. The Medical Institute can be renamed after candidate of medical sciences and eminent surgeon B. Khanov, who died in the earthquake, or Academician S. Karanov; and the Ashkhabad Pedagogical Institute of Russian Language and Literature after Tatyana (Artykgyul) Tekinskaya...

The orientation of the CPSU toward self-recognition and independence in the republics is not happenstance. During the years of stagnation the true meaning of internationalism was distorted. Its task was understood to be representation by the various nationalities in the highest echelons of power. There was scant interest in the moral and political qualities of the people promoted. One example of this is that for many years one member of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee Bureau was Shmidt, who worked in various posts. It was precisely on his instructions that many talented Turkmens who had dared to put their own sons through the Sunni ritual were dismissed from their work and expelled from the party. However, nothing happened to the Kazakhs, Tatars, Uzbeks, Kurds, Azeri, and other peoples living in the republic who did the same thing...

But of course, this circumstance humiliated and offended the representatives of the indigenous nationality. And if suddenly someone had spoken out against that state of affairs he would immediately have been accused of nationalism, and put into an intolerable position. In those years the repressions came into our life. True, people were not imprisoned or shot or exiled. But some were forced to move to neighboring republics and had to endure everything in silence, and dozens who were unable to sustain the persecution and humiliation did die.

I call on all fellow citizens to be vigilant. It is impossible to allow any return to former times, or allow the bearers of those times to attain power. Therefore, citing the words of that clear party document—the CPSU platform—I appeal once again: "Now, Soviet society, which has embarked on the path of radical reforms, is critically reviewing its own past. The task is while preserving all that is of value to eliminate injustice, impart new energy to the economic, political, and spiritual life of each people in our country, and open up broad vistas for free national development."

The language issue also plays a major role in interethnic relations. Of course, it is a fine thing to know another language in addition to one's mother tongue and to be able to read and speak it. For example, Turkmens living in other parts of the country (in the Stavropol region, the Karakalpak area, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and so forth) speak three languages—their mother tongue, Russian, and the language of the local people.

Unfortunately, however, the Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Jews and others living in the Transcaucasus, the Central Asian republics, and Kazakhstan, cannot in general speak or speak only poorly the the language of the local nationality. There are unique objective and subjective reasons for this. The son of one of my Russian friends, who was born in Ashkhabad, graduated from secondary school. On his school-leaving certificate, he had tops marks in the Turkmen language. But when I suggested to him that he speak with me in Turkmen he said that he did not know the language, and then answered in Turkmen "Men bilemok" [meaning unknown].

It turned out that he only knew those two words. I have visited dozens of Russian schools in Ashkhabad where the teachers told me they are short of personnel to teach schoolchildren the Turkmen language, and that no methodologies have been worked out for teaching simple everyday dealings. It seems to me that teaching of the Turkmen language should begin in kindergarten, from the first grade, using primitive forms—pictures. It is only if this is done, starting today, that we shall be able after 17 years to meet 17-year-old Ukrainians, Russians, Belorussians and representatives of other nationalities who are able to speak Turkmen fluently. But this all requires a serious approach on the part of the pedagogical sciences, the departments of national education, school teachers and parents, and the children themselves. Moreover, we must have a clear knowledge of how many rubles such a program will cost. And if in the future we approach this question as we have up to now then nothing good will come of it. No law can have any effect in life unless it is realistically supported. The effective teaching of Turkmen must be carried on in the vocational and technical schools, tekhnikums and VUZ's. And the main thing is that what was said above should also apply fully to the sphere of Russian language studies in the republic.

For the representatives of other nationalities who do not know Turkmen but are already working it is necessary to organize circles at work places for the study of language, using enterprise assets and state funding. For example, the method in Moldavia, where representatives of other nationalities are taught to speak the language of the local nationality, deserves particular attention. Only after we have developed this shall we in the Turkmen SSR have the right to make claims against the Russian-speaking population.

We must necessarily take into consideration its interests and opinion in resolving issues within our republic statehood, as envisaged in the CPSU platform.

## PRAVDA on Gorbachev Address to Journalists

*PM2510084189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Oct 89 Second Edition pp 1-2*

[Unattributed report: "Conducting an Open Dialogue With People. M.S. Gorbachev at PRAVDA Editorial Office"]

[Text] As has already been reported, M.S. Gorbachev met with the PRAVDA editorial collegium, department editors, and members of the newspaper's party committee 23 October.

Opening the meeting, M.S. Gorbachev said:

Dear PRAVDA workers, I greet you and am pleased to meet you. Please don't remind me that this meeting should have happened earlier. I understand that myself. And, incidentally, I have wanted to have this meeting for a long time. So now the occasion has presented itself.

The first thing that I want to do is to introduce you to the chief editor whom the party Central Committee has ratified—Comrade Ivan Timofeyevich Frolov. I have no need to set out his career for you or tell you what he has done. I think that you are fully informed on that score. There is just one thing that I would like to say. In making this decision, we proceeded on the basis that the replacement for Comrade Viktor Grigoryevich Afanasyev, who has given PRAVDA a considerable slice of his life, should be someone who would be accepted and understood by PRAVDA workers. This is very important. I will say bluntly that we are pinning great hopes on Comrade Frolov and on our joint work with him. Our entire society should get its second wind as a result of perestroyka and take to the high road of socialist renewal. And PRAVDA has resources and potential which should be utilized more fully. We have a great interest—this will be discussed somewhat later—in ensuring that PRAVDA augments its work, Comrades. I will tell you in a party-minded, frank, and direct way. It is necessary. It is needed by the party and the people, and it is needed by our immense revolutionary cause—perestroyka. That is why I want to wish Comrade Frolov and all of you fruitful joint activity and success in your work.

I have long known Comrade Frolov and have worked directly with him for the last 2 ½ years. I have a good opinion of his party and human qualities: He has everything needed to head the collective of PRAVDA workers.

I want to reiterate what I said at the Politburo session to Viktor Grigoryevich Afanasyev. We expressed our gratitude to him on behalf of the party Central Committee for his prolonged and fruitful activity at PRAVDA, and wished him successes in his scientific work. We think that there too he, as a Central Committee member and academician, will make his contribution to that sphere of science, on which we make great demands. We have no doubts about his party-mindedness, his political qualities, or his devotion to our cause.

M.S. Gorbachev asked how PRAVDA workers and the editorial office party committee had reacted to the Central Committee decision. Party Committee Secretary A.V. Chernyak, senior PRAVDA worker Yu.A. Zhukov, and other participants in the conversation explained that it has been met with understanding in the collective as a natural process of cadre renewal. The question arises: Is not the replacement of the chief editor connected with the reaction to some recent articles? In the opinion of PRAVDA workers there is an acute political struggle under way in society, and there are forces which are striving in their own personal interests to exploit the slightest opportunity to cast aspersions on the party leadership and the party press.

M.S. Gorbachev: A straight question deserves a straight answer. No. Viktor Grigoryevich and I discussed the question of his departure several months ago, therefore the question had come to a head and the decision had been considered beforehand. Of course, we can make some criticism of PRAVDA and the other mass media. But I am sure and must say quite straightforwardly that PRAVDA has firmly upheld the party position. The process of change in the work of the PRAVDA collective is proceeding, and, I think, proceeding in the right direction. The newspaper, as the Central Committee's organ and a most important means of propagandizing the positions of the Central Committee and of perestroyka, is seeking new forms capable of resolving these tasks. We can only welcome this. I think that there is still a great deal to be done in this respect. The discussion now is not about what disruptions or shortcomings have occurred in the past. After all, journalism is a living thing.

And any work, if it is creative, probably contains both successes and shortcomings. The line is important and the principled position is important. And in this sense PRAVDA takes firm party positions, the positions of perestroyka. I think that the newspaper has done a huge amount of work to prepare public opinion to accept the innovative, revolutionary ideas of perestroyka and the new directions in the party's activity.

After all, what we are putting into perestroyka is indeed a revolutionary undertaking in terms of its ideas. A revolution within a revolution—we say that. And we thereby want to stress that, first, today's perestroyka is a continuation of the cause of October and a reaffirmation under new historical conditions of the choice made in 1917 under the leadership of Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. And, on the other hand, the depth of the changes taking place today and the renewal of our socialist society are revolutionary in nature. These changes concern, for instance, ownership relations. They are aimed at overcoming people's alienation from the means of production and the products of their labor, and—this is the main thing—at making them real masters in the economy. It is essentially a question of transferring economic power to the working people by way of radical economic reform. That is the first point. Second, we want to bring to a conclusion the resolution of the task set by the Bolsheviks—the task of overcoming the alienation of people and working people from power. We launched the political reform to that end. How is this process developing? We all still have things to think about in this area. But we have undoubtedly chosen the right direction in this area too: the transfer of power to the soviets and, through this, the implementation of the idea of people's power. Through democratization, the resurgence of the soviets, and the new interpretation of their role in the current situation we want to make people the main players in perestroyka and society. We should also say that we perhaps face the most complex task—the moral and spiritual regeneration and improvement of society.

All these are changes on the largest scale. And the fact that since April 1985 PRAVDA has been actively involved in party fashion in propagandizing and explaining the ideas of perestroyka is of great practical political importance. PRAVDA has set the tone for all the mass media. Like the Central Committee, it is in the vanguard. And that is why we are so strict today in judging the activity of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the party as a whole. And, of course, communists strictly and exactingly judge the way in which our main party newspaper, the Central Committee organ, carries out its role.

Communists working in the Central Committee and in other party bodies do certainly sometimes feel a certain discomfort from the fact that people now express their opinions openly and freely about everything that happens in society and about the stance of party members, particularly those who discharge important functions in the party. I think that you sense this too. You receive letters, some of which also reach me, which relate to the the Central Committee and to PRAVDA. I think that this is a perfectly normal process. I regard the fact that a process whereby those at the top and the bottom are coming closer together is under way, that we now get feedback, as a major gain of the present time. This enables us in both our policy-making and practical work to take account of the mood and processes taking place in society and, naturally, to transform them in our decisions and the activity of PRAVDA and the other mass media.

I think that we are now getting rid of the complex that we should lecture everyone, issue instructions, and utter truths as if the political or ideological process or organization of work stopped there, so to speak. For the first time perhaps in many decades we are seeing perestroyka and the renewal of socialism as a natural process of the masses' creativity. And this, after all, comrades, is Leninist thinking, the Leninist approach.

I should like to express a few wishes to PRAVDA workers on behalf of the Central Committee and myself.

You know the stage at which we—the party, party cadres, and the party press—are operating. The very important stage of society's interpreting what was happening around us in the world, in which we found ourselves in the mid-eighties, is now behind. That analysis was very important. Without that fearless, rigorous analysis there would, I would say, have been no policy of perestroyka for our society or new thinking for the foreign policy which we have offered the world, since the state of the party and the country had to be understood and interpreted.

I will not say that we immediately reached this understanding. This explains the many blunders and miscalculations which occurred. But, nevertheless, in the main, by and large, this analysis brought us to the policy of perestroyka, particularly as the process of analysis was itself a democratic process. And this had an immediate impact on the mood of society and produced a certain response to and trust in the party. At that stage the party was very strongly aware of working people's support. Its authority increased.

That was a period of scientific enquiry and hope and, I would say, of rally-type meetings and tussles. It was an interesting period. I do not know how the present period can be described, and that is probably no longer an issue. Now that the concept of perestroyka has confronted the real society and affected people's real interests, now that society has been gotten moving, we sense that this is a particularly important stage. The way we allocate our time and resolve tasks at this stage will have a major bearing on the future.

At the meeting with leaders of the mass media on 13 October I spoke about how I was at the house of Leonid Maksimovich Leonov this summer when he was celebrating his 90th birthday. We had a brief but interesting conversation. I was even surprised at the extent of his detailed knowledge of everything the country is experiencing. And this was, moreover, no simple collection of information, it had all been thought through by a wise man of a philosophical cast of mind. Leonid Maksimovich voiced an interesting thought in talking about our times and the search we are conducting about how to solve the tasks of perestroyka and attain the targets we have set for our society. The most difficult thing now, he said, is that, on the one hand, what you do now will determine what our society will be like in 100, 150, 200, and perhaps even 300 years time. But to search for and find new forms of life and master them is very difficult in a society where masses of problems have piled up which disturb people, disrupt the normal process of their lives, and cause sadness and alarm. And these problems must be solved, they cannot be avoided, perestroyka cannot hope for success if we do not take care to ensure that our people feel the results of perestroyka right now. And not just from the standpoint of of democracy and glasnost but of confidence, the way people feel in themselves, and real improvement of their lives. But in tackling theses issues we should not forget either about the main direction we chose when embarking on the path of perestroyka.

Now, as I have already remarked, we are really getting down to questions of radical economic reform, including the fundamental question of reforming ownership relations, which should radically alter the economic base.

In the words of Vladimir Ilich Lenin, we are thus in point of fact effecting a radical change in our view of socialism—through reforming ownership relations and revealing the potential of socialist public ownership. This is a difficult process. And look at how very interesting and at the same time contradictory the process associated with implementing the political reform has proved to be. We can see that we have chosen the right direction, but the process is proceeding in a contradictory and ambiguous way, and this disturbs society. And we appreciate that in tackling fundamental problems of revolutionary dimensions we should concern ourselves with removing the burden of the current difficulties so acutely felt in society. That is the main task now.

We understand and appreciate what the people are feeling, as we do the critical attitude to the worsening socioeconomic situation and atmosphere in society. We have to solve these problems and remove the tension, and this needs to be done without delay, within a matter of months, within the next year or 18 months. Additionally so because attempts are already being made to exploit the acute situation from both right and left.

And you know, it is one thing when people seek to frighten us by saying that we have gone too quickly along the path of perestroyka. Or, conversely, people criticize us for going too slowly and say we must speed up and set off at virtually a gallop. One can put up with that and respond to it calmly. But it is now time to give an appropriate assessment of these statements. Why? Because attempts are being made to spread chaos in society, to confuse people, and sow distrust in our works and plans from the right and the left, from extreme right and extreme left positions—from extreme positions, in short. Countering these attempts is today, I think, one of the most important tasks facing the party and our party press. The mass media, particularly the party press, should bring home to people the point of what is happening in society, to prevent anyone from succumbing to the temptation to respond to these irresponsible and very dangerous slogans.

I have already had occasion to speak on this score, and I want to reiterate that there is a danger here, comrades. PRAVDA workers should bear this in mind and conduct an open dialogue with working people. People need to know that we are are committed to perestroyka, that perestroyka is in people's interests, and that we in the party Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet, and the government are today making the most vigorous efforts to eliminate the acute socioeconomic situation in the country.

When I talk to you thus, I hope that you appreciate that not everything depends on the upper echelons (let us use this term, which takes in all the center). But much does. We need to create the political, economic, and legal prerequistes that will normalize the situation in the market and financial sphere. That is the most important work today. However, much has to be tackled in the actual labor collectives to fill the market with goods. Goods are not produced in offices but in enterprises. And it is naturally difficult therefore to hope for the success of the cause if some people fail to grasp this. We have to create everything together, with our own hands.

I came here from a meeting with a large group of our leading economists and important economic managers. This topic was central there. I think that by concerting the scientific and creative efforts of our society we will reach the correct solution to improving the financial situation and the position in the consumer market and deepening and continuing economic reform. I do not regard myself as a credulous person; however, when I analyze the current reality and the contradictory and tense situation of today, I look ahead with optimism. And this, incidentally, was a view also heard in the experts' speeches: We can stop the further development of negative processes and improve and restore the situation. But that requires energetic efforts. I have already said that we will perhaps have to take unpopular measures. But what does that mean? If these measures are needed to take the situation in hand and change it for the better, then ultimately they can scarcely be said to be unpopular. They are, after all, needed by the people. They are for the people! And I would very much ask PRAVDA workers to concentrate now on constructive work. We have already told one another that the situation is acute, the position tough and difficult; but we can also see, let us note, that there are opportunities for getting out of it. These opportunities must be seized by all the mass media, and it is PRAVDA which should give the lead in this work.

Some people cannot get beyond the stage of rallies. In the newspapers and journals and on television fears are still being whipped up, and not much is written about the fact that much is already being done well. Not only labor collectives, but entire regions are working successfully and obtaining interesting results. Only today Comrade Samsonov, director of the First Moscow Clocks and Watches Plant, spoke at the Supreme Soviet session. He quoted interesting statistics. In virtually the same production space they have almost doubled the production of clocks and watches, and 80 percent of this is export output. Profits have increased, which has enabled them considerably to increase wages.

Or another example. In 32 oblasts of the Russian Federation the situation is changing for the better. The market is being filled with goods, and that is in regions where the situation was very strained. This must be written about. People must see it. See these processes. Many new people have joined the leadership of enterprises, labor collectives, rayons, cities, and scientific institutions. People who associate themselves with perestroyka and regard it as their own future. And this must be publicized. The English have a saying: "It is better to light a single candle than to spend all your life cursing the darkness." I would make that the epigraph for the work of all the mass media, not only PRAVDA. People are already lighting these candles, and one cannot fail to see it.

What did we launch perestroyka for? In order to change the existing situation. And how can you change it, without altering anything? So it is necessary to write about these changes. But also to continue to write about those who obstruct the changes, bar the path, and put spokes in the wheels. Perestroyka is a dialectical process. I am not inviting you to depart from the critical approach. No, it is necessary to interpret what has been done critically. That is very important for us. But everything must be permeated by a sense of the main goal—constructive, creative work, the idea of consolidating society and pooling efforts in all avenues. That is important now because we are facing the adoption of major decisions whose implementation will lead to major changes and bear great, good fruit for our country. I think there is a sense of this throughout society.

Why does the topic of labor, patriotism, and deeds for the Fatherland seem muffled in the mass media? After all, people are making history, they live, they make their contributions to the common cause of perestroyka, they contribute their hearts, souls, minds. How can one not write about this, how can one not talk about it? Our hero is the worker of transformations. He has changed now. He is not a mild, obliging man. He is rather an inconvenient man in terms of his demands and approaches, but this is precisely the protagonist of perestroyka. And this protagonist of perestroyka, this man must be spoken of out loud.

We are facing major political campaigns. Each of them will have far-reaching consequences. The 28th party congress lies ahead. We must think about many things as we prepare for the congress. We must think about perestroyka, the stage we have reached, what we have gained. We must analyze mistakes and miscalculations and outline the immediate tasks of the party, which fulfills the role of political vanguard. And, it seems to me, we have reason to observe that the whole of our society is in favor of the party's being strong, renewing itself as quickly as possible, and mastering its new role at the present stage of perestroyka. The precongress period must decide many things and answer many questions.

We expect to prepare a program document in the spring, which will be the precongress platform of the party Central Committee and a basis for partywide discussion. This document will then be adopted as the party's program document at the congress.

Now that we are involved in discussing urgent measures to normalize the financial market, discussing next year's plan, and discussing laws associated with the reform of economic relations in all spheres of the national economy, we realize that there is a degree of misunderstanding that hampers the formulation of united approaches which would ensure the successful resolution of the tasks of perestroyka and the attainment of its goals. What is the problem here? I think it is not only a question of the fact that a quest is in progress, that these are difficult questions that require debate and the juxtaposition of views in order to formulate approaches that could form the basis of a policy of practical actions.

That is not the problem. I think there were different starting points for these debates. And that is why the process is proving difficult. After all, alongside the concept of perestroyka as a policy aimed at the renewal of socialism, democratization, glasnost, the elevation of man, and the humanization of society, ideas are also being suggested that invite us virtually to go back 70 years. As if those 70 years had not existed, as if the lives of whole generations had never been, as if nothing had happened in our society. Yet a great deal has been done, even by the strictest criteria. An enormous breakthrough has been accomplished to reach the achievements of modern human civilization, despite everything tragic and dramatic and all the deformations that complicated and delayed the realization of socialist ideals. All these things happened. But nonetheless there is reason to observe that our historical path is a unique achievement of our times.

Therefore, if one fails to take note of this, one can fall into serious errors and suggest theoretical concepts that might throw up the wrong shoots.

In the precongress period we need a broad debate that will offer the opportunity to arrive at a major program document giving society sure prospects for the immediate future.

And I have said nothing of the fact that in approaching the congress we must thoroughly consider every aspect relating to the CPSU's activity. In a society under renewal we need a renewed party that operates in the light, in the context of the changes taking place within the framework of perestroyka and the democratization of society, a party that would fulfill successfully the role of political vanguard in this atmosphere.

We must approach in a new way the report and election campaign, the election of delegates, and the formation of elected party organs, and discuss thoroughly the ideas associated with changing the Party Statutes.

All these questions are in fact already being broadly discussed. PRAVDA is one of the newspapers that actively helps develop these processes.

The forthcoming elections and formation of organs of power in the republics and the elections of local soviets are equally important. This is a major political campaign through which we want to complete the handover of power to the soviets. Look what battles are developing in society, what passions are seething, even in the early stages of this process. Today's discussion at the Supreme Soviet showed this once again, because there was a discussion there of the changes that must be made to the Constitution and to Article 13, concerning the electoral system. We had to organize a debate and instruct the committees to study these questions further and then submit them once again to the Supreme Soviet for final discussion.

Society is showing great interest in the forthcoming elections to republican and local organs of power. I will not go into the details of this question now, but I would like to put to you an invitation for PRAVDA to become actively involved in preparations for them. I think this too is an important topic for PRAVDA. In general, your main topic is the preparations for the party congress and the political reform. All this is very important for the country's life and for perestroyka to get moving and gather speed.

We are talking about the role of the press. This is directly connected with the subject of the responsibility of the press. I recently had occasion to talk about this at a meeting at the party Central Committee with leaders of the mass media. I do not want to repeat myself. I hope Viktor Grigoryevich was able to convey the essence of the discussion to the PRAVDA people.

V.G. Afanasyev: The editorial office had a long discussion of that meeting.

M.S. Gorbachev: Yes, it is necessary to surmount the negative elements that have appeared in the mass media recently. The Central Committee is very interested in ensuring that the role of the mass media continues to be active, constructive, and creative. I think the whole of society has an interest in this being so. It is not a question of any need for us, at the Central Committee, to change our approaches radically in any way. Because our position is based on the interests of perestroyka, the interests of the people. It is necessary for the mass media to continue to participate in this actively. But now that we have reached the stage of realization of the concept of perestroyka, now that society needs the right guidance, I would like to stress once again that our press should not sow confusion in people's minds. It should help to find the right decisions, approaches, answers, on how to ensure the success of perestroyka.

That is the main thing now. And that means that all editorial collectives must rid themselves of personal bias. I do not mean that the creative man should lose his identity. He must have an identity. Otherwise there can be no active, interesting press. Every journalist realizes his own potential and puts his heart into his articles. That is how it is. But all the same, the main purpose, the highest purpose of the journalist's labor, the journalist's creativity is to uphold our socialist values, advance the ideas of perestroyka, and assert positive, progressive trends. And resolutely to surmount everything that is negative.

It is true that parting with the past and with everything that only recently made up our life is no easy task. It is not easy for you and me, it is not easy in any labor collective, it is not easy for any family or any individual. The process of surmounting the stereotypes of the past must be publicized realistically, as it happens in life. And this must be done with clean hands and pure intentions. And, most importantly, with feeling for our cause, for the country's future, for people. When you have that, comrades, everything else falls into place. And there is no need for meetings and false starts. All that is needed is the exchange of opinions to spur on people's thoughts and endeavors—that is natural, that is needed in any creative collective: a certain milieu, a certain atmosphere.

But I would like to stress once again—a newspaper, any newspaper, even one that is oriented toward a small group of readers, must not be turned into someone's patrimony. The press is a social matter. And it should serve society. And if today society is following a path of perestroyka and renewal, that means that our press must serve this end.

The chief criterion here is the criterion of glasnost and democracy. This fully retains its force. In embarking on any task one must be aware of how it works for the people's interests, for socialism. Recently some people have been trying to do away with the second part of that formula—how it works for socialism. But the whole formula is interconnected. Before its people, before the whole world, the party has stated firmly and clearly, out loud: We will remain committed to our choice, we will implement perestroyka and the renewal of our society on the basis of socialist values. And this is our cause, our sovereign cause. We are not imposing our perestroyka on anyone, but we will pursue it as we understand it. And this has met with the people's support. People are watching very carefully what is happening in the country and how far it accords with the socialist ideals that people retain in their souls, their hearts, their consciousness, despite all their trials. Both the party and the press must bear this in mind. We cannot change our nature, our purpose. Neither the party, nor its party press, nor our cadres working in all spheres—the economy, the social sphere, the spiritual sphere. And therefore the defense of the principles of perestroyka is a very important topic for the party press.

At the meeting at the Central Committee I said to the editors: Name a newspaper or journal, and I will tell you what the position is in any article, in any issue. On questions of domestic and foreign policy and on questions of cultural life. Instead of a multiplicity of voices, instead of glasnost, we have a single voice, without glasnost.

PRAVDA should pursue the party line, the party position, and uphold it in dialogue with representatives of other social movements, including all who are interested in participating in this debate. Some people are slipping into objectivist positions. I think the time has come for our cadres—party cadres, economic cadres, and our journalists—to take a firm stand. Incidentally, society expects this too. People are saying frankly: We want to know clearly the position of every member of the country's leadership on the main, vitally important, crucial questions of perestroyka.

In general, dear PRAVDA people, I will end how I began: It is necessary to work harder. I think in this respect we at the party Central Committee can count on the understanding of our colleagues. That was not a slip of the tongue, we consider you our colleagues, close colleagues in the partywide cause. I wish the chief editor, the editorial collegium, and all the collective successful activity, which is so necessary to the party and so necessary to our society.

I know that you are hardened people, as we are, so I will not thank you for your patience.

Voice from the floor: This is still part of our working day.

M.S. Gorbachev: Part of your working day, as well as of ours. That was all I had to say, and I would be pleased if you were to take the floor and say something to me. Please.

A.V. Chernyak, Editorial Collegium member and party committee secretary: Mikhail Sergeyevich, you outlined the range of tasks PRAVDA has to solve in order to boost work at this stage of perestroyka. We accept this as guideline for action. And we will do everything to raise the newspaper's work to a new level. But we also need help from the Central Committee. We conducted a kind of readers' referendum titled "PRAVDA-90." The most interesting proposals will be implemented. But there also some which we cannot implement on our own. For example, the proposal to have PRAVDA provide more detailed coverage of the party Central Committee's work, launch a rubric "In the CPSU Central Committee," give more detailed information about the work of Central Committee departments, describe new appointments.... All this will promote the development of glasnost, it will promote the strengthening of the party's ties with the masses.

Our subscribers often complain because PRAVDA reaches them 2 and maybe even 3 days after publication. Why does this happen? The editorial office receives a lot of official material. It often arrives late, without any consideration for the newspaper's production schedule. It is rigid, as a matter of fact. PRAVDA comes out in two editions. The first at 1800 hours, the second at 2300 hours. Satellites, aircraft, trains, and over 50 printing houses in different parts of the country are tied to this schedule.

Just 1 hour's delay by the newspaper costs communications enterprises more than R100,000.

V.G. Afanasyev: And that applies only to Russia.

A.V. Chernyak: Then, as I already said, schedule disruptions mean that it does not reach people on the day of publication. Hence the request to give the editorial office the right to publish in the next day's issue any material received by the editorial office after the cutoff deadline.

It is an open secret that the mass media's effectiveness has declined recently. Nowadays the "Following Up Our Publications" rubric is to be seen very rarely in newspapers, including PRAVDA. Work is now done according to the principle: Journalists scribble, readers skim through, and everything in life remains unchanged, just as it was. PRAVDA is struggling for effectiveness in any material it publishes. An example of this is provided by two items about the buildup of goods at Moscow's railroad stations. But even so, our efforts are not enough by themselves. Here we need more active support by party committees at all levels, and especially support by the CPSU Central Committee. CPSU Central Committee resolutions adopted in the past following PRAVDA's publications generated a very good response among people. We would like to see this practice continued.

A few words about the printing base. Ours is really, really weak. People complain that the newspaper is poorly printed and the quality of photographs is bad. In this electronic age, we are still using old grandpa's methods in publishing PRAVDA.

Finally, I would like to mention economic accountability for the press. PRAVDA is earning respectable profits, but we do not have a fund for the collective's social development, we do not have even an editorial office fund to pay bonuses to the best workers. This comes out of savings on authors' fees, or otherwise literally every single kopek has to be wrested from the publishing house.

Finally, I would like to say once more that the party committee will do everything to ensure that PRAVDA rises to the tasks assigned to it by life and by the party.

M.S. Gorbachev: Fine. We will back PRAVDA to the utmost.

L.N. Spiridonov, PRAVDA's first deputy chief editor: PRAVDA's staff thank you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, for coming to visit us. We know that this is the first time ever in PRAVDA's history that the general secretary of the party Central Committee has visited the editorial office and met the collective.

M.S. Gorbachev: So I wasted my time on self-criticism. And I felt really uncomfortable because all these years, tense and really important years for the country, I had not met PRAVDA's staff face to face, even though I meet PRAVDA staff members all the time in my work.

L.N. Spiridonov: And if these meetings were to become a tradition, as it were, despite your incredible workload, this would be enormously beneficial not only for PRAVDA but also for all party journalists.

We realize the enormous political importance of this conversation. Let me take advantage of the occasion to emphasize that the PRAVDA staff collective is a mature collective, a combat collective, it has always been and will always be a reliable mainstay of the Central Committee and the general secretary in the struggle for perestroyka's success.

With your permission, I would like to raise two issues which I personally find very worrying.

First. Relations between many newspaper editorial offices and local party committees are very strained at present. You have obviously sensed this from speeches by some party committee first secretaries at the latest Central Committee plenums. Speakers criticized the press, and their irritation was quite noticeable in this criticism. But we are also familiar with the other aspect of this problem—through reading the local press, through meetings with newspaper editors, and through reports from our own correspondents.

Something must be done here. Bearing in mind the tasks which you formulated here, bearing in mind the specific nature of the exceptionally complex period associated with the elections and the forthcoming preparation for the scheduled congress, it may be necessary to convene an all-union conference of kray, oblast, and republic newspaper editors and frankly discuss with them all the pressing questions. Tell the editors what the party Central Committee thinks of their work, listen to what they have to say. Maybe this conference ought to be held jointly with party committee secretaries for ideology in order to achieve greater mutual understanding.

Second. Relations between the party Central Committee and PRAVDA. We do not enjoy any special treatment. It seems to me, however, that these relations could and should be even closer and more businesslike.

What do I mean? It is necessary to make better use of PRAVDA's tremendous information and analysis potential. We receive and process a great deal of useful information reaching us through the most diverse channels. There is no doubt that the Central Committee—and you have repeatedly emphasized this in your speeches—is perfectly well informed of what is happening in the country. It is quite likely, however, that some specific aspects of our information could be useful to the Central Committee leadership.

M.S. Gorbachev: I agree. I believe that this information channel is exceptionally important.

L.N. Spiridonov: To continue. It would seem useful to me if Central Committee officials were to consult PRAVDA's staff when preparing certain resolutions of fundamental importance. Our comrades' experience could help in the deeper elaboration of various problems.

Finally, one more question. We are often given instructions which, mindful of party discipline, we perform, but without any profound faith in their good timing. They fail to win the approval of editorial collegium members when they notified of them. Maybe the editorial collegium's opinion ought to be heeded at times in such cases, or at least maybe there should be an additional discussion about the expediency of the decision that has been made.

M.S. Gorbachev: At any rate it can be discussed.

L.N. Spiridonov: The editorial collegium asks you both as general secretary of the Central Committee and as chairman of the Central Committee Commission on the

History of the CPSU to start publishing in PRAVDA the "Essays in the History of the CPSU" prepared by the commission.

M.S. Gorbachev: As a draft, as it were?

L.N. Spiridonov: Yes. As a draft, as it were. This would immediately bring all the discussion of the history of the CPSU into a normal framework. It would help to create an appropriate ideological and political atmosphere during the period of preparation for the next party congress. I think this would also be useful for PRAVDA's readers. It is very important not to waste time.

That is the main thing I wanted to say. I want to emphasize once more that the Central Committee and the general secretary of the Central Committee can rely totally on the PRAVDA collective.

M.Ya. Korolev, deputy chief editor of PRAVDA: Today it is not always safe for a principled party journalist to appear in our "political prairies": He may come under fire from the most unexpected direction, or even from several directions. "Informals" are bound to organize a picket of the editorial office, there will be a protest demonstration there against the offending article, and sometimes even a people's deputy will threaten to have the journalist thrown out of the particular republic. Sometimes all this takes the form of quite well coordinated campaigns.

We are not overdramatizing these difficulties, we have gotten used to them and have adapted to the situation. However, I don't want to get used to seeing even colleagues from party publications often blasting each other. While without fail respecting different approaches and opinions regarding journalist collectives and the CPSU Central Committee, I think we must be concerned to ensure that party publications more often support each other and act together on fundamental problems. Mutual attacks apropos of something or apropos of nothing may result in appreciable losses for the party press as a whole.

And another point. The attention of millions of people is riveted to the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet sessions. During the television and radio relays people see the deputies' serious work, the comparison and struggle of opinions and approaches, and sometimes seething passions. This is real politics reflected in faces and actions. Compare it with the so-called "party protocol reports" published day in, day out in our newspaper and others: reports delivered at conferences, reports on trips round the country by leading figures, and other information about the day-to-day life of party organizations. They are bland, are generally all very much along the same lines, and usually do not contain even a hint that during these conferences the participants expressed opinions that did not coincide in every particular, proposed alternative options, and engaged in polemics with each other. Does this heighten interest in the daily work of party committees? Does it attest to the intellectual richness of party routine? Does it attract attention to the party? The answer is clear. Together with party workers, party journalists ought to assimilate new forms and methods of analysis and coverage of everyday party practice, take readers into the laboratory of party work, and show that work in its dynamism and spirituality.

Yu.A. Zhukov: We get a huge number of letters expressing alarm and discontent at the fact that a whole series of important decisions are not carried through to completion, and in particular, I have in mind the following very recent situation. You held a conference of representatives of the press and voiced criticism of a number of publications. And what has been the reaction? Have the necessary conclusions been drawn? For some reason there seems to be no sign of that. Meanwhile the whole world immediately hears of this from the radio and other sources. Certain comrades issue various deafening statements. Readers express their perplexity in this connection.

And another issue. A huge quantity of semilegal literature is being published. Since my two articles on this issue in PRAVDA I get bundles of letters every day. Here is one, for instance: "Having bought for R2.65 a heap of lies and filth about the Soviet Union, which it now transpires can be spat upon from all sides, I am sending it to you at PRAVDA."

M.S. Gorbachev: I have already said that we must defend our values, our choice, which, despite everything, remains the main reference point for our people. And you are aware of how attentive working people are toward what is taking place within the framework of perestroyka and of how they constantly check to see whether this is taking us away from the road on which we embarked in October 1917.

A.A. Ilin, PRAVDA editor for the party life department: I would like to make the following point. You mentioned preparation for the congress among the most important topics. This will determine the content of our work in the immediate future, for a whole year. In this connection I have the following wish. When you were in Kiev during the organizational plenum, we instructed our Ukrainian correspondents to interview you for the paper, and PRAVDA correspondent Mikhail Odinets managed to fulfill the assignment. We think we should not rely on chance, PRAVDA should always have this opportunity.

M.S. Gorbachev: You can proceed on that basis. How about this: If a question has arisen today, make a telephone call, via Comrade Medvedev, and mostly via your chief editor. I think we are still making poor use of our PRAVDA—I myself and all the other members of the leadership.

A.A. Ilin: I would like the Politburo members and Central Committee secretaries who are going to travel to plenums during the report and election campaign to keep in touch with PRAVDA correspondents and to provide help with analysis and assessments. To seek out PRAVDA correspondents, perhaps, instead of us merely having to fight our way through to reach you.

M.S. Gorbachev: I think, Comrades, it is now something of a cliche when we members of the leadership appear in PRAVDA only on major issues, in connection with major speeches. We should respond to everyday life. PRAVDA will gain from this. It should be possible in the newspaper to learn and publish the viewpoint of a member of the leadership and, where necessary, of the general secretary regarding a specific issue. I think this question has been correctly raised, Comrades.

A.A. Ilin: Especially as we receive many letters saying: Please pass this on to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Readers feel that this is elementary for us: We just up and hand it over. Today's meeting will probably give them fresh illusions. So I would like these working relations between the editorial office and the party leadership to be consolidated.

M.S. Gorbachev: Correct. And even, perhaps, Vadim Andreyevich, we in the Central Committee ought to have a press center through which information would constantly flow. What do you think? Even if we don't hit on the ideal option straight away, this would be very important.

A.A. Ilin: Could we then go even further? In view of the fact that the important question of the party and power is now being raised in readers' letters, in discussions, and in journalism. It seems to me that this theme is most fundamental. Especially ahead of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, where it will clearly be broached again. Couldn't you, say, give an interview to a PRAVDA correspondent or editor?

M.S. Gorbachev: At any rate, we accept the topic.

A.T. Karpychev, deputy chief editor: You said that the party Central Committee is not using its central organ vigorously enough. It is actually not only a question of the fact that Politburo members and Central Committee secretaries rarely appear in our paper. It is a question of the fact that readers are accustomed—and this is a good quality of readers'—to trust PRAVDA and to perceive through the prism of PRAVDA the Central Committee's viewpoint. For instance, I remember a roundup of letters about poverty. Some people were displeased by it, but it was a cross-section of public opinion. And readers were grateful that PRAVDA, that is, the Central Committee, had raised this urgent question. That was the reaction. So such questions should be raised in PRAVDA so that the Central Committee's concern for the ordinary working person is evident. Of course, you cannot relieve the acuteness of the problems that exist in society merely with paper, specific results are needed, but you can reassure people and show that the Central Committee is thinking about this.

Second. You said: Work as colleagues. We do indeed work as colleagues, but as colleagues separated by a certain distance. Many Central Committee secretaries and department heads simply do not know even the deputy chief editors and members of the editorial collegium sitting here. We have no close contact. To work as colleagues, precisely as colleagues—that is what life demands. The newspaper is a Central Committee organ. Of course, you're a very busy man, but Central Committee secretaries could get us together, consult with members of the editorial collegium, and resolve some specific questions. There would be a mutual exchange of information.

M.S. Gorbachev: Absolutely correct. Especially as both party work and, so to speak, the journalistic version of party work are a process that needs ideas, needs a quest and always something fresh, it's simply impossible without this.

A.T. Karpychev: More trust should be shown in the editorial collegium. It contains conscientious, industrious people who are devoted to the party, and we are prepared to defend perestroyka. But sometimes we are simply pressured. No, not by Politburo members or you personally, I know of no such examples, but there are insistent demands that we publish something. But this is not always timely. The opinion of the PRAVDA editorial collegium ought to be taken into account, simply taken into account.

M.S. Gorbachev: I think account should be taken on both sides. You know, there is something I had forgotten to say to you. PRAVDA must always tell the truth. Comrades, that is the number one question. And if there has been a misunderstanding or a mistake somewhere, it must immediately be corrected, so the truth always triumphs. Public apologies will only work to the benefit of PRAVDA's prestige. Do you know why? A great many fantasies are circulated via the press in our country. Someone hears something from someone somewhere, doesn't check it out, and immediately passes it on to millions of readers via the press. That is ridiculous. So I am calling on you to ensure that PRAVDA is always truthful. That is very important. It is not sensation-mongering that should determine the nature of the publication.

M.M. Monakhova, member of the PRAVDA party committee and staffer of the journal RABOCHE-KRESTYANSKIY KORRESPONDENT: Perhaps, Mikhail Sergeyevich, you recall Anatoliy Panteleyevich Shevchenko, the worker from the Far East who spoke in the House of Unions Hall of Columns on PRAVDA's 75th anniversary? Do you remember how the audience became animated when he said that he had hunted a tiger in the taiga, but bureaucrats would be even more terrifying than the tiger and even harder to fight... That day the railroad worker had been presented with the M.I. Ulyanova prize for fighting for perestroyka with the printed word as a worker correspondent.

Many people forget today that the Soviet press is not only professional journalists but also voluntary correspondents like Shevchenko. Their social role in society's life and in perestroyka processes is underestimated. Yes, the worker-peasant correspondent movement has been compromised by the fact that a worker's byline has often been used for speculation: What can in no way be approved has been approved in his name. The honest, critically minded section of society has thereby been deterred from taking part in the press. Perestroyka is restoring people's belief that their voice in the press, their word can indeed influence the course of life. This is confirmed by the flood of letters—honest confessions, bitter, emotional—that are read in newspapers with as much interest as the articles of talented journalists. But this flareup of readers' social activeness may remain only a flareup unless it is bolstered by organizational work by editorial offices to recruit the ablest voluntary correspondents for systematic participation in the press.

You, Mikhail Sergeyevich, frequently meet with journalists. And at these meetings I would like you to express your attitude and the attitude of the CPSU Central Committee to the present-day role of the Soviet press' voluntary aktiv in society's life. People like worker correspondent Shevchenko are struggling for perestroyka, but they themselves need the party's keen attention, protection, and support. Incidentally, readers of RABOCHE-KRESTYANSKIY KORRESPONDENT are worried by the fact that there is no mention of worker-peasant correspondents in the Law on the Press that is being prepared.

M.S. Gorbachev: Along with you we are saying, and we are convinced of this, that perestroyka elevates the person, both in the economy, and in the political process—the chief protagonist in everything. So how can it be that this chief protagonist is absent from our press and we do not hear his voice? In our country a group of individuals is monopolizing both individual publications and individual television programs. This is no good. If our press will not offer representatives of the working class, the peasants, and our intelligentsia the opportunity to speak out, I think this is simply intolerable.

M.K. Buzhkevich, parliamentary observer: Journalists covering the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet session do not always feel comfortable there. Why? Yet another draft law or resolution is being discussed, but we don't have the text of it. We frequently get these texts after the discussion of them is over. We do not have enough information about the work of committees and commissions. We have observed that the press center does not get the support of the Supreme Soviet apparatus. Can't Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov or one of the chairmen of the chambers be asked to gather journalists together and to hear them out. Coverage of the Supreme Soviet's work will only improve as a result of this.

V.S. Gubarev, PRAVDA editor for the science department: Mikhail Sergeyevich, can we criticize you a little?

M.S. Gorbachev: Of course.

V.S. Gubarev: You are sitting between two academicians and you haven't said a word about scientific and technical progress. This, of course, is a separate topic, but I think that one problem certainly needs to be mentioned at this meeting. In particular, as chairman of the USSR Union of Journalists Space Commission, I believe that the question of the first spaceflight by a journalist should be decided...

M.S. Gorbachev: The question has already been decided. The first journalist will be ours, and he will go up before the Japanese one.

Now I want to ask Viktor Grigoryevich to take the floor, and then Ivan Timofeyevich, and then say goodbye.

V.G. Afanasyev: I would also like to thank Mikhail Sergeyevich for finding the time to visit us. Of course, it would have been a bit better if he had come 2, 3, or maybe 5 years ago. But in any case this meeting will leave a deep impression...

M.S. Gorbachev: I wouldn't have been able to come 5 years ago. Had that happened, you would have been wondering why I came.

V.G. Afanasyev: I think that these meetings can and must be a regular occurrence. I would simply like to thank you for our work together. I think that we have worked quite well, amicably, and I think that the relations which we have had here in PRAVDA will remain under the new editor. I mean purely human relations. I wish you all the best.

I.T. Frolov: I would like to say that when the Politburo's decision was made, I accepted it with the utmost responsibility, and it is a great honor for me.

Today we have listened to Mikhail Sergeyevich. The thoughts which he expressed are essentially our action program, you have all said so. We need to creatively consider all this, absorb it, formulate specific directions of work, and move ahead. That is the main thing. Thank you.

M.S. Gorbachev: Well, shall we say goodbye then? Once more I express my great satisfaction with this meeting. Let us regard this as not simply a happy coincidence. It will be continued. And what is more, I simply feel the need for this.

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### Mezhdurechensk Miners Hold 'Warning Strike'

*LD2510200689 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] As we have already reported, the miners of Mezhdurechensk, Kemerovo Oblast, held a warning strike on 23 October.

[Begin recording] [N. Chirkov, identified by caption] Without solving the issue of fuel prices, it is impossible to fulfil the main clauses of the protocol about the Kuzbass' transition to regional financial autonomy and the mines' transition to full economic independence. It would not be a mistake to say that the fact that the miners had not been properly informed about the already-adopted decisions is one reason which prompted the miners to strike. I will say right away that the the strike in Mezhdurechensk was held in a well-organized manner. Early in the morning, short rallies were held at enterprises, and then everyone went to work. As the miners had promised, many collectives showed their best performance that day. [passage omitted: figures for performance for that day]

[v. gvozdev, hero of socialist labor, foreman: identified by caption] The first strike was necessary, but I personally think the second strike was not a strike, properly speaking. I have spoken with the men: they worked, many of them worked. The strike was senseless. We expect real changes from perestroyka, to live well, so to speak, so the men have understood that changes can be made not through talk alone but through direct work. [end recording] [video shows miners, coal-extracting operations]

### Strike in Vorkuta Coal Mines Reported

*AU2510195189 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1800 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] New strikes have been reported in the Soviet coal industry. In Vorkuta, Siberia, 6,000 miners have reportedly gone on strike despite a ban by the government. Secret strike ballots are allegedly being held on the expansion of the strikes. The workers demand that the workers' committees which were formed after the strikes in July be recognized, as was promised at that time.

### Leningrad Homes Evacuated After Tunnel Rockfall

*PM2610135189 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Oct 89 Second Edition p 4*

[L. Shchukina article under the "Accidents" rubric: "Relocation After Alarm"]

[Text] Leningrad—Leningrad subway builders have again been tested by the elements. On the night of 21-22 October roughly 150-170 cubic meters of rock fell in shaft No 522 at the face of the connecting passageway between Vladimirskaya subway station, which is currently operational, and Vladimirskaya-2 station, which is under construction. The danger arose of penetration of ground water and of settlement of nearby apartment blocks, whose inhabitants as yet suspected nothing. A crack appeared in Block 8/2 on Bolshaya Moskovskaya Street....

Sodden earth presented the next unpleasant surprise, but the city's emergency service swung efficiently into action, although it was working to a very tight schedule. Yu.A. Maksimov, first deputy chairman of the city soviet executive committee [gorispolkom], who was on duty and received the alarm call, was on the scene of the incident within 30 minutes. A staff was quickly set up to deal with the effects of the accident and relocate the inhabitants of Block 8/2 on Bolshaya Moskovskaya Street.

At 0500 40 trucks pulled up at the damaged building, followed at 0800 by 15 buses. By 1100 the block was completely cleared. Its inhabitants—292 people—were taken to Leningrad hotels. People were fed, reassured, and fixed up with essentials. The Gorispolkom administration in charge of housing registration and allocation was prompt in allocating the new addresses. The militia has organized protection of the abandoned block.

Settlement of Block 8/2, Bolshaya Moskovskaya, has ceased. There has been no movement over night. The Leningrad Subway Construction Administration is continuing to clear up the effects of the accident. As the entrance and exit to Vladmirskaya Station are closed, the amount of overground transport will be increased.

### Interview on Central Asia Antinarcotics Measures

*LD1210142789*

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1140 GMT on 12 October carries a 20-minute program entitled "Operation Poppy-89." Journalist Anatoliy Fedorov opens the program with an interview with a drug addict. This is followed by his interview with a Moscow doctor on the effects drug addiction has on people. Fedorov then speaks to Major General of the Militia (Gennadiy Yefimovich Mariasov), head of the Internal Affairs Administration of the Amur Oblast Executive Committee, about the measures being taken in the oblast to combat the growing of opium. (Mariasov) indicates the lack of equipment for diagnosing drug use, and the absence of effective ways of killing hemp as two of the main problems facing the militia. Fedorov comments that the fight against drugs in Central Asia is particularly difficult bearing in mind the fact that narcotics have been traditionally used here for a long time.

Fedorov then interviews Colonel General of the Militia (Tadzmamedov), first deputy minister of internal affairs of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, about the republic's efforts, together with neighboring regions, to stop the production of opium. He says that attention has been concentrated on locating opium plantations and on finding the distributors and sellers of drugs. He then says: "Over the last 3 years in the republic, we have exposed, arrested and convicted over 400 persons. They are all now doing time." The main area of work is in registering all drug addicts, he notes. He goes on to say: "To date, we have just over 5,000 registered drug addicts, of whom 3,750 have actually been diagnosed as suffering from drug addiction. We have 321 women who use drugs, and 1,184 previously convicted drug addicts."

Fedorov concludes the program with an interview with Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Nikolayevich Sergeyev of the Militia of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry. The latter cites the official figure of approximately 120,000 persons engaged in the nonmedicinal use of narcotics, 50 percent of whom are addicts. He acknowledges, however, that the real number is hard to ascertain and is undoubtedly much greater. He denies that the Soviet Union has a drugs mafia problem, such as in Colombia, saying that organized crime does exist in the drugs sphere. In recent years, he says, about 20 tonnes of narcotic substances have been confiscated annually.

Sergeyev concludes by describing some of the efforts to combat drugs that were discussed at the recent conference in Vienna.

## Militia Manpower Shortage Reported

*PM2410095389 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Oct 89 p 1*

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Dialogue: Ask Questions!": "Is There a Shortage in the Militia too?"; first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] My friend works in the militia. He has told me that an enormous number of unresolved cases is accumulating in the investigation organs. Often no one is working on them—there is a shortage of investigators. Will something be done in connection with this problem or not?! [signed] Yu. Mitrofanov, Kishinev.

This question from our reader lay in the "Dialogue" file for quite a long time. Nonetheless, an answer has been found to it—after a briefing at the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry [MVD].

The MVD workers confirmed that the investigators' load has increased recently. Why? Take just the problems of our country's "hot regions" where interethnic conflicts have flared up. In the past 18 months there have been about 1,000 of them operating there. Nonetheless, in the first 8 months of this year 483,000 criminal cases have been suspended in connection with the fact that the criminals have not been found. The reserves of the USSR MVD will soon enter into the struggle against lawbreakers.

As for the situation throughout the country as a whole, the figures are as follows:

In the first 8 months of this year the MVD investigators had 1,365,158 criminal cases under investigation—52 percent more than for the same time in 1988. For the first two quarters of 1989 22,000 crimes were detected in cases completed by militia investigators. Incidentally, that is 45 percent more than in the corresponding period last year.

Criminal charges were brought against the following:

about 105,000 thieves,
over 30,000 robbers,
nearly 4,000 speculators,
8,000 embezzlers.

It has been decided at government level to enlarge and strengthen the investigation apparatus.

## Ministry of Internal Affairs Troops To Increase

*PM0410182089 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 6*

[Interview with Major General A. Griyenko, chief of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Internal Troops Political Directorate, by S. Taranov: "Number of Internal Troops To Increase"—date, place of interview not stated]

[Text] "Today," Major General A. Griyenko, chief of the USSR MVD Internal Troops Political Directorate, says, "our troops number 36,000, but only half of them are able to serve away from their permanent stations.

"The tragic events in Sumgait, Fergana, Novyy Uzen, Abkhazia, and other explosive regions showed that the forces of law and order are insufficient during mass disturbances. Sometimes we are forced to ship the same units distances of thousands of kilometers, from one 'hot spot' to another.

"Our officers and soldiers are on enforced 'tours of duty' for many months on end. They live away from their families, in camps, or else in very unsuitable premises. Servicemen whose duty it is to protect the entire population regardless of nationality are often themselves the victims of provocations. The burden on the officers and soldiers is beyond all acceptable norms, but it is a practical impossibility to replace them or send them away even for a brief leave: There are no reserves. So a considerable increase in mobile units is a necessary measure arising from today's needs as regards ensuring public order.

"The increase is planned to take place over 2 years and will be carried out through the drafting of new recruits for compulsory military service. No 'drain' of soldiers from the Soviet Army into the internal troops is planned."

[Taranov] By a government decision, new social benefits are also being introduced for officers of the internal troops. What, specifically?

[Griyenko] Officers and petty officers serving away from their permanent stations will be paid 1.5 times the salary for the post and for their military rank, a length of service remission of 1.5 months has been introduced, and there will be payments of tour-of-duty expenses at the rate of R3.5 a day, as well as a single payment (of R200-400) in the event of injury or accident sustained in the fulfillment of duties. Furthermore, after serious injuries, sanatorium treatment is guaranteed. After every 3 months' service, there is 10 days' leave.

[Taranov] What can you say about the troops' techncical equipment? When will effective means of self-defense finally appear?

[Griyenko] The USSR MVD has submitted to the government a draft long-term comprehensive program for equipping the militia and internal troops with equipment, protective clothing, and so forht, including radios, personal computers, and helicopters. Appropriations for these purposes are to be increased by 100-200 percent. But even today we are already receiving new means of protection that were formerly unavailable, or in short supply—for instance, plastic shields to cover the soldier's arms and legs, for protection against stones; flak jackets... In general, the problems are being resolved here. Our requests meet with a response at the producing ministries. Certain defense enterprises also promise to fulfill the MVD's orders for special equipment and ammunition.

Finally, another point that often comes under discussion. Along with the strengthening of the internal troops, the necessary legal base is being formulated for them to function. We also believe that the internal service regulations do not represent the level of legal support that society needs. Gaps in legislation affect the troops themselves too, and provide grounds for arbitrary and sometimes unfair assessments. Perhaps a law on the internal troops should be adopted. This should clearly define our units' rights, duties, and sphere of operation and form the basis for the formulation of legal departmental documents.

### Destructive Exploitation of Yamal Decried

*90UN0054A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 7 Oct 89 p 3*

[Article by Yu. Ivanchuk, editor of the Yamalo-Nenets Okrug newspaper KRASNYY SEVER (Salekhard): "Yamal: In Some Ways Large and in Some Ways Small"]

[Text] An organizing committee has met to prepare for the founding congress of the association of peoples of the north—"Yamal for Posterity!" The association's program was discussed. The committee got stuck on the phrase: "The land and mineral wealth of Yamal should belong to the peoples living there." It was thought: According to the Constitution the land and mineral wealth belong to the state. How can this be?

Recently I had occasion to hear, with a questionable sense of pride, this phrase: "Tyumen financed stagnation." To me this seemed neither paradoxical nor excessively trenchant.

Exploiting the petroleum and gas deposits of the Tyumen north and trading in raw material on the international market, we were not overly concerned about the development of technical equipment and modern technology or the production of consumer goods. We ate imported butter and meat, wore imported shoes and jackets, slept on imported mattresses, and listened to "imported" music. We began to prefer the Latin script to the Cyrillic. Having lost our embarrassment about the fact that what was "ours" had never been as good as what was "theirs," we simply preferred goods with the import stamp: Western shoes over boots, and briefcases over bags. We produced almost nothing of significance but still we led a fairly rich existence. On what? On petrodollars. On a kind of gas rent.

Or to be more precise: For many years the well-being of our state was provided by an almost colonial policy with respect to the indigenous peoples of the North. The policy was the more immoral because the rapacious exploitation of the mineral wealth and land of the Nenetses, Khants, Selkups and other small peoples was accompanied by pharisaical speeches about the "further development" of their economy and culture.

What is the use, for example, of this quotation from the book by V.I. Boyka, doctor of philosophical sciences, "The Socioeconomic Development of the Nationalities of the North": "On 7 February 1980 the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the decree 'On Measures for Further Economic and Social Development of the Regions Inhabited by Nationalities of the North'—a large-scale program which earmarks a plan of action for the decade up to 1990. The distinguishing feature of this program is the combination of an economic and cultural mechanism for the development of the nationalities of the North with the economic and social potential that is actively forming here because of the new stage in the assimilation of Siberia..., the creation of industrial associations, the organic inclusion of national traditional branches in the new production-economic mechanism..., the provision of full employment for the indigenous population in public production."

This book was not published in the "good old days," not in the times of stagnation, but last year, in 1988. The leader of a brigade of builders from the village of Kutopyugan in Yamalo-Nenets Okrug, Kh. Anagurichi, has a somewhat different opinion. He expressed it in the okrug newspaper: "I am ashamed to say that our women chop wood manually in the winter. 'Druzhba-two'—this is what the people call it. If we were to use a real Druzhba gas saw we would do all the work in a couple of minutes and then there would be none left for anyone else to do. But now they do this back-breaking work month after month, receiving R30-40." This is in response to the question of "providing for full employment in public production.

And on the whole the actual life of the indigenous peoples of the North, particularly of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, is somewhat different, to put it mildly. With the invasion of the gas workers, petroleum workers, and highway builders and with the expansion of geological prospecting and extraction drilling here, the ecological, social, interethnic, and other problems have been aggravated considerably.

No matter which sphere of the life of the Nenetses, Khants, and Selkups one looks at, everywhere there is disorder, poverty, and infirmity. During the years of the assimilation of the petroleum and gas 6 million hectares of reindeer grazing land has been taken out of circulation, 28 rivers are no longer industrially significant, and each year the fish catch has decreased by 5,000 tons. An even more depressing picture is found in the social sphere. Among the indigenous population of the okrug, every third person is homeless. The rate of affliction with tuberculosis is 7 times higher than the average for the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and, as is stated in official documents, "there is no tendency to reduction." There is your "large-scale program for further economic and social development" about whose successful implementation, one assumes, we shall be reporting next year. Or perhaps the report will be ahead of schedule?

I have known the Nenets journalist Khabych Yaungad for a long time. We frequently speak about the fate of the little homeland. He cannot speak about this subject calmly; he becomes angry and overwrought. But it seems to me that there is a very large amount of truth in his words: "Palaces have been built in the capitals of the Arab states using petrodollars and the cities have been covered with marble. Envy is not a good feeling. But what is a Nenets supposed to feel when he knows that millions of tons of oil and billions of cubic meters of gas are being taken from the ground of his homeland every year, every month, every day? What are the Khants supposed to think, knowing that with this oil and this gas under different circumstances it would be possible to change the land of the native people to the point of being unrecognizable?"

We suspected that this might happen. And this is why in lead editorials of past years we wrote: "The life of the small peoples of the north has changed beyond recognition during the years of Soviet power!" "Is it really so unrecognizable?"—this is what the national intelligentsia is thinking now.

"Yes, it is unrecognizable!" Yaungad becomes angry again. "Because never before has the proud, independent master of the tundra—the Nenets—been so degraded. The forest was full of animals, the rivers were abundant with fish, the pure moss meadows could feed herds of thousands of reindeer."

I am not idealizing. I know about the property and class stratification of the prerevolutionary society. But how does one justify the notion that the previous stratification (when there were plenty of reindeer, fish, and animals) was much worse than the current stratification when modern cities with electricity, gas, heating, baths, toilets, and other benefits of civilization have sprung up in the Yamal tundra, and next to them on this same tundra the Nenetses live as before in tents lit with kerosene lamps?

Recently it has become so fashionable to blame all of our problems on the government departments that it is not even interesting anymore. Of course in this case they are guilty. In their drive for immediate advantage the powerful Ministry of the Gas Industry, Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry, Ministry of Geology, Ministry of Transport Construction, and others thought least of all about such "trivia" as social justice, the national question, the ecology, and so forth. But I would not attack them so harshly. Why? Such is their nature, their essence. It is naive to demand that a wolf feed on cabbage.

It is another thing to look at who ate this "wolf." For it is no accident that there were such slogans as "Petroleum and gas—at any price!" "The north will write everything off!" And it did. Because it needed this petroleum and gas or, rather, the currency from the petroleum and gas. And large and small "princelings" who could do anything they wanted appeared in the Tyumen north. And why not, if the higher-ups allowed it? And it was quite official. In violation of the Constitution, in violation of land legislation, before scientific expert evaluation, before the approval of technical and economic justification, in keeping with temporary blueprints and plans, sidestepping all norms and rules, beneficial financing was provided and it was permitted to begin work on more and more new facilities of the petroleum and gas complex.

And what is really so confusing, if the local leaders came out with opinions such as that, for example, of the secretary of the Tyumen CPSU Obkom [oblast committee], V. Kitayev, in an interview with a TRUD correspondent: "There (in Yamal) there are no settlements except in the very northern part... The peninsula is practically unsuitable for human habitation." About whom or what should one worry? It is barren there. If an obkom secretary from Tyumen cannot see, then how can they see from Moscow that Yamal is fairly densely populated, that thousands of reindeer herdsmen, hunters, and fishermen live there, that there are villages (and good-sized ones): Novyy Port, Mys Kamennyy, Seyakha, Tambey?

G.S. Titov flew to Yamal recently: some stages of rockets launched from the southern Plisetskiy space testing ground are landing here. A cosmonaut was very confused when a Nenets woman in a tent complained that when such large pieces fall out of the sky they scare the reindeer to death. Obviously the day is not far away when nuclear explosions will also be conducted on Novaya Zemlya farther away from the people. I wish to note, however, that Novaya Zemlya is not very far from Yamal. And Nenets, translated into the Russian language, means person.

In solving many problems the local soviets, unfortunately, are not firm enough and do not adhere strictly enough to principles. But where might they actually learn this? They have not become accustomed to it. So far it has been the people in Moscow who have decided what to construct on Yamal and how to build it. And they are still making these decisions.

The Yamalo-Nenets Okrug Executive Committee was about to try to prohibit the construction of a railroad on

Yamal. But a dispatch was immediately sent to Moscow to the Council of Ministers from the Yamaltransstroy Association: "The construction project has been declared an all-union shock Komsomol project. We have created here a stable, working, multinational, consolidated collective which includes 13,000 people and their families... During the past period we have assimilated about R450 million in capital investments... We ask for permission to extend the priority financing of the construction of the railroad line...."

We have attentively followed the work of the Congress of People's Deputies and later the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The deputies' disturbance with the state of affairs in the country is understandable. As it turned out, there are a great many financial deficits in our economy. And it is impossible to find an extra ruble for many of the most important and simplest programs. One after another, philanthropic accounts are being opened in various banks in the country. But what can be done? In times that are difficult for the homeland we have always counted on the patriotism, conscientiousness, and charity of the citizens.

Against this background how does it look to give many millions in preferential financing for facilities that are being constructed illegally?

I do not know whether or not it is necessary to assimilate the Bovanenkov gas condensate deposit to construct a railroad to Yamal. I do know that scientists have real doubts. For example, Doctor of Geological-Mineralogical Sciences V. Tsarev and Candidate of Technical Sciences R. Povileyko warn in EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA: "According to our calculations, all Yamal gas will be extracted at a loss."

Of this I am deeply convinced: Decisions about such large programs should be made publicly after a thorough discussion of the technical and economic substantiation of the draft and after scientific and social expert evaluation. And the opinions and interests of the indigenous inhabitants must be taken into account. Otherwise the best undertakings can have a completely inadequate effect.

For example, last year the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee considered the state program developed by the government for the introduction of gas into the rural regions of the nonchernozem zone of the RSFSR... It is planned to enlist significant financial and material resources in order to carry out this task and to construct a special main gas line from Yamal to the nonchernozem zone. It is an important and necessary task but it would not hurt to know what the inhabitants of Yamal themselves think about this. And yet even Salekhard, the center of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, does not have gas. Why even mention the other villages?

Nobody will object to the slogan "gas from Yamal to the nonchernozem zone!" But perhaps Yamal should have gas too. The time has come for the state to pay back its debts to the northern peoples. And this does not mean that compensatory construction must be done in the north in exchange for the damaged nature; what is needed is a comprehensive program for material and spiritual restoration of the area.

And another thing. In order to reach a fair solution to the economic, social, ecological, and other large and small problems, the national okrugs must be given real autonomy.

A mechanism for realizing this autonomy is needed. For example, in Yamalo-Nenets Okrug there are proposals to create a bicameral council. This is probably worthy of study. As is the suggestion to remove the okrug from oblast jurisdiction and include it directly with the republic organs.

I do not think there would be so many complaints about the "pioneers" and the well-being of the new cities against the background of the poverty of the old villages would not cause such irritation if the local soviets had more real power.

The time has come to think directly about many principles and norms established in our Constitution. In fact it is difficult to argue with the idea that the land and the mineral wealth should belong to the peoples living on the land.

## Committee Discusses AUCCTU Structure

*904F0010A Moscow TRUD in Russian*
*11 Oct 89 p 1*

[Article by AUCCTU Press Center: "On Congress of Trade Unions of Russia"]

[Text] The first meeting of the organizational committee for holding the Constituent All-Russian Trade Union Congress was held in Moscow.

As is known, the toilers of the largest republic have no leading trade union organ of their own. The AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] actually performs its functions. Meanwhile, almost 55 percent of trade union members of the entire country are in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. It is characteristic that residents of the Russian Federation are authors of three-quarters of the letters to the AUCCTU. It was at the 6th AUCCTU Plenum that a lively discussion took place about the need for structural transformations taking into account the actual requirements of life. The first practical steps have now been taken.

As instructed by the 6th AUCCTU plenum, the AUCCTU Presidium formed an organizational committee which numbers 44 persons: workers, AUCCTU members, chairmen of basic trade union organizations, oblast and kray committees of branch trade unions, chairmen of oblast and kray trade union committees and of central committees of trade unions. They represent 31 industry-wide trade unions and 36 regions of Russia.

At the first meeting, procedural issues were discussed. It was resolved to convene the Constituent All-Russian Trade Union Congress on 21 March 1990 in Moscow, at the Great Kremlin Palace. The representation rate was set at one delegate from 102,000 trade union members which will provide for electing 1,500 delegates. One-half of the delegates will represent inter-union organs—kray, oblast, and autonomous republic trade union councils, and a similar share will represent branch trade unions. In this manner, the representation of all branches and all 77 regions of the RSFSR will be guaranteed.

At the meeting of the organizational committee, much attention was paid to forming the new All-Russian Trade Union Council. As a rule, the leading organs were previously formed directly at the congress. However, at present time it is making serious amendments in these procedures. It turns out that the customary method is not the only one possible. For example, in Kalinin and Kuybyshev Oblasts, it is done this way: Members of the trade union council are delegated directly by lower-level organizations. Naturally, the labor collectives retain the right to recall their representative, and a resolution of the conference is not required for this. This is the right of the delegating organization itself.

As the members of the organizational committee resolved, future members of the Russian Trade Union Council will be delegated along these lines. It will be the function of the congress and its credentials commission to verify their authority, the correctness of election procedures, and acknowledge this authority. Following this, the comrades delegated become members of the Russian Council of Trade Unions.

The organizational committee resolved that the Russian Council of Trade Unions should number 300 members in order for the new trade union organ not to be cumbersome but at the same time be sufficiently flexible and in order to incur less organizational and material expenses for holding various events. These members will also be elected on the principle of parity: 150 persons representing inter-union organs and 150 representing branch trade unions; five persons from each of 31 industries and two persons from each of 77 territories.

It was decided to elect the delegates of territories, as well as the future members of the Russian Council of Trade Unions, at inter-union conferences which are now being held all over the country. Delegates of branches will be elected at republic branch conferences or at expanded plenums of the central committees of trade unions. At the plenums, not only the members of the central committee of a trade union from Russia may vote, but also those invited with a right of a deciding vote. This quorum may elect the delegates of the congress, as well as delegate future members of the Russian Council of Trade Unions.

As far as the presidium (or executive committee) and the audit commission are concerned, this will be resolved by the congress itself.

AUCCTU Deputy Chairman, Chairman of the Organizational Committee I.E. Klochkov said: "We need to tap broad masses of trade union membership, toilers, workers, and trade union activists in order to work out a concept and a program of actions of the Russian Council of Trade Unions. The press, radio, and television may help us greatly in this endeavor."

In conjunction with this, we would like to appeal to the readers of TRUD. We ask you to send your letters with your response and proposals not only to the editorial office but also to the organizational committee for holding the Constituent All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions.

The next meeting of the organizational committee is scheduled for 3 November.

## Restrictions on Copy Machines Examined

*PM1210095589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 6*

[Report by S. Mostovshchikov under the rubric "Biased Report: "Xerox Beyond Suspicions?"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] intends to abandon control over the procedure for acquiring, keeping, and operating duplicating (copying) equipment in the country. Our correspondent has been told that the MVD is preparing documents with the relevant instructions.

...We are strangers here. Alas, we are not the ones being summoned to the threshold of Number 50, Gorkiy Street, in Moscow, by the fine sign reading "Alpha Graphics" which appeared here quite recently. For domestic consumption, under the foreign letters a reassuring explanation has been provided in Russian: "Printing centers of the future." That future does not belong to us.

It belongs to the 30,000 foreigners accredited in Moscow and to the Western businessmen visiting the capital and simply to foreign tourists. In brief, to all those who can pay in currency for the high-quality services of the "Alpha Graphics" printing center and the "Kniga Printshop" joint venture organized by our "Kniga" publishing house with the participation of foreign capital.

Someone accustomed to accepting the awkward caresses of service in our country could be reduced to a state of shock by this center. The smiles of Russian women who know several languages, the fax link with any part of the planet, tabletop printers, sophisticated computers, ultramodern duplicating equipment which Soviet people are accustomed to call by a single term—"xerox"—and no waiting in line. This center is our pride. The country has finally created conditions for businessmen to work normally in the USSR, offering them the services which are customary in the West. It is not the fault of the joint venture that we are strangers at this festival of services.

If we are to speak frankly about the reasons for our backwardness in this matter, the main one is that the official attitude toward duplicating equipment in the country is extremely cautious, to put it mildly. This attitude has been formulated in a well tuned system of restrictions. Let's begin with the fact that the acquisition, installation, and organization of the work of almost any duplicating equipment requires special permission from the internal affairs organs. But even if you succeed in resolving the question positively in all instances, the militia does not leave uncontrolled enterprises or organizations which operate xeroxes (for the sake of simplicity that is what we will call the world's most popular duplicators from the British firm Rank Xerox Ltd). The second department of the Main Administration for the Maintenance of Public Order exists for this in the USSR MVD.

To understand the level of work of this subdivision, which is also called the authorization system department, we must say what it is engaged in, in general, apart from duplicators. Within its competence are primarily questions of controlling the safekeeping of weapons (in schools for instance), poisons, and explosives, and aid in the struggle against poachers. The authorization system has about 1,000 specialists throughout the country—militia inspectors who do this work. But, as V. Vaschenko, chief of the USSR MVD Main Administration for the Maintenance of Public Order, admits, there are not enough of them to "service" about ·60,000 establishments which now have duplicating equipment (that does not include devices belonging to several competent organizations). So they often have to assign control of the operation of xeroxes to ordinary sector inspectors.

The duties of the controller are not too complicated. He must occasionally penetrate beyond ironclad doors and check whether everything is in order. The sector inspectors usually limit themselves to a superficial examination, try the bars on the windows and doors for strength and look to see whether the counters on the machines are working. Experienced specialists check the log of copied texts and documents and check the counter readings against the number of copies noted in the applications "for duplication." They also check the work places of the employees operating the xeroxes to see if there is "something" there. Duplicated texts not indicated in the applications are subject to confiscation. There are many of these cases—they will find horoscopes or the rules for making predictions from coffee grounds or the Kama Sutra or the "ABC of Sex...." That is how they work.

Official arguments in defense of the control system sound convincing: We have to guard against something secret being duplicated, against people starting to produce counterfeit money or passes, or what have you.... But, as the workers of the authorization system themselves admit, control over devices capable of duplicating something was established in our country long before the appearance of high-quality and highly productive copying equipment and was aimed at preventing the duplication of "undesirable" texts. It is not for nothing that from the very first steps of Soviet power there was a register even of typewriters, control over which, incidentally, was removed not that long ago. Now the militia has found itself in a complex situation. Although customs to this day do not allow duplicators into the country without authorization from the MVD, they enter the union by illegal paths. In addition different equipment has also appeared.

"Computers with laser printers make copies in no way worse than high-quality duplicating equipment," V. Vashchenko says. "With the aid of computers, without getting up from your desk you can compose and produce a whole newspaper and in any number of copies. It is impossible to control this process in any way. Indeed is it necessary? The mechanism for controlling duplicating equipment now seems redundant. My opinion is that this equipment should be recategorized as ordinary office machinery.

As yet "xerox" procedures create a mass of difficulties for people. Engineers for who copying an article they need is a real problem, grandmothers with certificates from the des [expansion unknown], the authors of dissertations and essays, and students all suffer—hundreds of thousands of people for whom dealing with duplicators ends up in lines and even semicriminal operations.

Actually, to be fair it must be said that recently printing centers and simply duplicating centers have started to appear which render services for Soviet money. So far there are few of them and the lines there are long and the time taken to fulfill orders is also long. But we are accustomed to this; we could wait in line. But there are already very serious complaints against the work of these establishments. The point is that their activity is regulated by the so-called "instruction on the procedure for printing nonsecret documents" created 15 years ago with the participation of the USSR Council of Ministers Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press.

Here is what A. Dvoyeglazov, acting general director of the "Reprotsentr" printing center which opened 6 months ago at the USSR Exhibition of National Economic Achievements, has to say. His enterprise, organized by the foreign trade publishing house and the "Rank Xerox" firm, renders the same services as the "Alpha Graphics" center, but mostly for rubles.

"This instruction is indisputably an obsolete but skillfully compiled document. On the pretext of defending copyright it drastically restricts the range of texts whose duplication is authorized. What copyright actually is no one in the country knows. All protection comes down to the All-Union Copyright Agency demanding that it be paid money; but how to take it, from whom, and for what is difficult to say. It seems to me it is high time that the instruction be changed and be made in the form of recommendations as is the case, for instance, in the centers of Rank Xerox. The firm recommends to its employees that they do not copy banknotes or documents of a blatantly provocative nature."

"Have people already asked you to duplicate such documents?"

"Yes, they have. But I refused. That is what they would do in the West, but we must not forget that in the West there are xeroxes in stores and anyone who wants to can insert a coin and print what he likes. Not to mention the fact that these devices can simply be bought for personal use. That is complete trust between state and citizens.

"Let us hope that the same trust will be established in our country."

## LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Readership Polled

*89UN0065 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 39, 28 Sep 89 p 14*

[Article by F. Sheregi, candidate of philosophical sciences, and B. Nikiforov, candidate of historical sciences: "Readers on LITERATURNAYA GAZETA"]

[Text] A poll of 2,000 readers was conducted by sociologists in six regions of the country—Moscow, Kemerovo, Sverdlovsk, Saratov, and Donetsk Oblasts and the Kazakh SSR. It is in these regions that there has been an intensive increase in the number of subscribers to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA—by a factor of 2-3.

The social activity of the Soviet people during the years of perestroyka has generated an unprecedented interest in the press. The significant increase in the circulation of many publications, including LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, is clear evidence of this. The editors have decided to take advantage of sociological research to clarify who he is, today's reader, what he finds attractive about the newspaper, what he does not like about it, and what he would like the newspaper to be like in the future. A PORTRAIT OF THE LITERATURNAYA GAZETA READER. It will hardly be a great discovery if, on the basis of data from the research, we report that this is a newspaper for the intelligentsia. Almost 90 percent of its readers have a higher education or are studying in a VUZ [higher educational institution]. Their average age is 35 (41 percent are under 30 years of age). The LITERATURNAYA GAZETA reader is distinguished by a fairly stable interest in the publication, which is shown by the relatively long period of subscribing to the newspaper, 7 years. And this is with a considerable augmentation of readers this year; if the new subscribers were not counted the average length of subscription period would be 10 years.

In addition to a high educational level, the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA reader is distinguished also by a broad interest in crucial events within the country and abroad which, of course, cannot be satisfied by just one publication. Therefore it is not surprising that the reader subscribes to seven other publications each year. The main ones are KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (75 percent of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA readers subscribe to it), PRAVDA (51 percent), IZVESTIYA (44 percent), and republic and oblast newspapers (62 percent). With regard to magazines, the most popular among LITERATURNAYA GAZETA subscribers are OGONEK (53 percent), YUNOST (53 percent), and NOVYY MIR (36 percent).

HOW DOES LITERATURNAYA GAZETA ATTRACT ITS READER? First of all, as most (up to 90 percent) of those questioned indicated—by the high intellectual content of the published materials, their diversity, their timeliness and depth of content, and the professional mastery of the journalists and authors.

These description of the newspaper are the "motive" forces for the subscriptions of the majority of the readers. Behind them lies a deep interest in social problems and a desire to expand their world views and obtain diverse and high-quality information on a broad range of crucial problems. Only an insignificant number of the subscribers (less than 10 percent) is looking to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA for sensational materials. During the course of the investigation we studied the readers' attitudes toward 44 rubrics and subjects that reflect the basic content of the newspaper. As for the preferences that were revealed, they can be reduced to six groups.

The first includes legal articles (72 percent of the subscribers read them regularly) and historical materials and the column "Documents and Destinies" (62 percent).

Second are rubrics and special subjects which are read regularly by 50-57 percent of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA subscribers: "Problems of Democracy," "Glasnost," "National Relations," "Youth in the 80's," "Ecology," "Health Protection," "Morality and the Law," and "The 12 Chairs Club."

Third are "Civil Initiatives and Informal Groups," "Problems of Daily Life," "International Life," and "The Food Program" (they are read by 40 to 49 percent of the subscribers).

Fourth—14 rubrics and subjects are given preference by 30 to 39 percent of the subscribers: "Pulse," "Dialog of the Week," "LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Archives," "The Guest of the Writer," "Movies," "The Theater," "Concepts of Socialism," "The Electoral System," "Man and the Economy," "The Economic Reform," "Pedagogy," "Foreign Culture," and "Reader-Newspaper-Reader" (a page of letters).

Fifth—these rubrics and subjects are preferred by 21-28 percent of the subscribers: "Literary Polemics," "At the Innovation Shelf," "Prose and Poetry," "Literary Panorama," "The Writer and Society," "Problems of the Scientific and Technical Revolution," and "Problems of Cooperation."

Sixth—the range of reading for 14-19 percent of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA readers: "Journals: Month After Month," "Representational Art," "Scientific Environment," and "LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in the Country."

WHAT IS LITERATURNAYA GAZETA LACKING? An analysis of the evaluations shows that there is a shortage of constructive analytical articles on questions of interethnic relations (this was indicated by 54 percent of those questioned), economics (35 percent), and foreign policy (34 percent).

More than two-thirds (73 percent) of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA readers refer to inadequate reflection on its pages of problems of modern youth, and one-third (33 percent) to incomplete materials devoted to "blank spots" in history.

Incidentally, reader interest in articles on Stalin and Stalinism is drying up: It is now less than the interest in articles on figures in domestic science and literature of the past. According to data from the poll, only 16 percent of the subscribers wish to receive more information about Stalin than is given by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. At the same time 51 percent of the subscribers would like to read in the newspaper in-depth articles on the life and creative work of such literary figures of the past as Gumilev, Mandelshtam, Bulgakov, Akhmatova, Yesenin, Tsvetayeva, Pasternak, Grossman, Blok, and Mayakovskiy, and also about our contemporaries—Solzhenitsyn, Yevtushenko, Rasputin, Brodskiy, Astafyev....

An even larger proportion of the readers (53 percent) expressed a desire to delve more deeply into the lives and activity of modern politicians. The names mentioned most frequently included M.S. Gorbachev, N.I. Ryzhkov, Ye.K. Ligachev, A.N. Yakovlev, V.A. Medvedev, and B.N. Yeltsin.

Almost one-third (31 percent) of those questioned want to read in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA about religious figures and the history of religion; every fifth person wants to see articles on foreign history.

Many would like to see more concreteness in the criticism of the activity of the ministries of public health, public education, and finance. And definitely about the party raykoms [rayon committees] in the remote areas "from whence stagnation comes" (writes a culture worker, 24). Subscribers suggest that the newspaper "dare to criticize the country's leadership and elucidate all the forbidden subjects, seek and find the positive in the life of the country, show not only the positive but also the negative consequences of perestroyka, and elucidate not just the problems of Estonians, Armenians, and Uzbeks, but also of the Russians" (party worker, 37); "give more information about the experience of the countries of socialism (Hungary, China, Poland, and others) in solving socioeconomic problems, including negative experience" (military serviceman, 52); "having achieved a regeneration of Central Russia, solve the problem of the abandoned people of the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline], public health, mismanagement, education... and combat the banality in literature and in all art" (teacher, 55); "conduct more sociological polls since behind the pluralism of opinions we frequently do not understand the position of the people" (teacher, 44).

Such desires are quite "legitimate" but a number of readers go further: They express outspoken disagreement with many articles and are critical of the journalists and the newspaper as a whole.

Nonetheless the main result is positive: More than 70 percent of those questioned think that recently the content of the newspaper has improved significantly and only 12 percent think it has deteriorated; 7 percent of the readers see no changes and the rest found it difficult to say anything specific.

WHAT IS THE CRITICISM OF LITERATURNAYA GAZETA? The opinion of some of the readers is expressed in this response: "For a long time LITERATURNAYA GAZETA was almost the only newspaper that was not afraid to pointedly raise a number of social problems for discussion. Unfortunately, now it has begun to relinquish its positions..." (scientific associate, 54). One hears reproaches that the articles in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA are ineffective: "Many sentimental articles are written about people's fates, but the only result is an honorarium" (physician, 53). There are also simply hostile assessments such as: "This newspaper is a model of 'yellow journalism' of the perestroyka period" (engineer, 33). But these are few. The main criticism is still that the newspaper has lost a certain unique character in the sense of criticism and raising crucial problems.

Such evaluations are augmented by aspects in which the readers (up to 80 percent) do not agree with the interpretation or analysis of various phenomena and events. Of course one should also include here cases in which the newspaper, adhering to the concept of pluralism of opinions, deliberately publishes opposing viewpoints on the same problem, inviting the reader to join in a discussion. But among those who were questioned there were not many who confused the newspaper's position with that of the author. And one rarely finds readers disagreeing with LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's assessments of literary works, movies, and performances. Most frequently people are dissatisfied with situations in which the newspaper "stands on the sidelines of crucial aspects of perestroyka" and "tries not to touch upon the most burning issues," as certain readers think.

The LITERATURNAYA GAZETA reader is very sensitive. As though with "extrasensory perception" he can see the places in the published pieces where the editor's pen has crossed, he senses the lack of persuasion of the authors, and notices when the editors give way to "the powers that be."

As we can see, the evaluations and wishes of the readers are unique. It is difficult to take details into account, but one must agree with them when it comes to the main points. And in particular, in my view, attention should be given to the numerous statements about the need for further improvement of the "literary part" of the newspaper, as well as about the expediency of improving the quality of the paper and the use of color.

In spite of the many critical remarks, the absolute majority of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA subscribers are devoted to the newspaper: At the time of the investigation only 7 percent of the subscribers had decided to let their subscriptions lapse next year. And 75 percent still have a high opinion of the newspaper and will continue to read and respect it. The rest can be considered to be wavering. How many of them will remain friends of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in 1990 will be shown by the results of the subscription drive which, as we know, has been extended to 31 October. Those who have not subscribed to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA-89 were not included in the poll, but possibly they will be next year.

## Andreyeva on Proposed Student Organization

*PM1810143389 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 89 p 2*

[Letter from Nina Andreyeva, lecturer at the Leningrad Technological Institute, under the "Pluralism and Opinions" rubric: "Which Road Leads to the Forum?"]

[Text] Given the current course of our life, a young person is bound to lose his bearings and his faith in communist ideals amidst all the garbage we are all fed by the mass media. The idea of holding an All-Union Student Forum and setting up a student organization is being put forward. But have we really already pronounced the last rites over the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol]? Or has the very idea of a communist youth league been so distorted?

The very idea of setting up a youth league is reminiscent to me of parents who have cast their ailing child into the street, preferring to acquire a new one. Order needs to be instilled in the Komsomol—an organization which serves as a communist platform and is a bearer of communist traditions and a long history. What will this student league be like?

Is there any point altogether in putting students into a discrete group, separating them from workers and collective farm members? They have no special advantages or problems, and the intellectual potential of many of them is not too hot. But if the forum does nevertheless come into being, then its first task should be to solve questions concerning the communist, patriotic upbringing of our youth and the restoration of the history of our country, which has been almost destroyed in recent years.

## Shelest Analyzes CSSR 1968 Events

*PM2010094789 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Oct 89 p 2*

[Interview "in a state dacha near Moscow" with Petr Yefimovich Shelest, former member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and former first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, by V. Boyko under the rubric "Lessons of History": "To Err Is Human...": date not given]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Boyko] Let us talk about internationalism and international assistance. Broadcasts by foreign radio stations carried a report that you took an active part in the "Czechoslovak events." You were one of the people who adopted the political decision to send Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. How true is all this?

[Shelest] It is true that I participated in the Dresden, Warsaw, and Cierna-nad-Tisou conferences between the political leadership of our country and Czechoslovakia. But that was a discussion participation. We were investigating what was going on there. I believe that all the questions could have been resolved quite calmly by political methods—if we had not missed the moment. But Brezhnev missed it. He was always meeting with Dubcek and engaging, as Gomulka said, in a policy of kisses. Then it was necessary to send in the Warsaw Pact countries' troops.

[Boyko] What do you think? Was the sending of troops into Czechoslovakia an extreme measure and the only possible one at that time?

[Shelest] I believe that it was a negative decision which depreciated our country's role as a socialist state. Even our friends abroad were in a quandary. Not to mention the fact that there were opponents in our country, too. I remember addressing Kiev University students right after the troops went in. I received very many notes: Why was this done? I had to explain.

[Boyko] Were the students satisfied with your explanations?

[Shelest] You yourself were a student. Is that brotherhood ever satisfied? I endeavored to explain the situation. I now believe that the moment for resolving the problem by political methods was missed. Then this was repeated at the time of the "Afghan problem." We sent them into Czechoslovakia, and nothing happened there, so let's send them into Afghanistan too.

[Boyko] A movement has now emerged in the Ukraine which is called "Rukh," or the [Ukranian] "People's Movement for Perestroyka." What is your attitude to the idea of creating such a movement?

[Shelest] If they have some rational kernel and this movement is directed toward perestroyka, it must be drawn into concrete work. The chaff is eliminated in concrete work. Do you know how a peasant used to winnow grain in the old days? You don't? I will tell you. He has threshed the grain. He spreads a tarpaulin out on the floor. He throws a shovelful of grain into the air. The breeze blows away the chaff and any dirt, while the grain falls back down onto the tarpaulin. So it is with "Rukh." There are many decent people there. Everything that comes from the people must be supported and utilized rationally.

[Boyko] How do you evaluate the reforms of perestroyka?

[Shelest] I will say that we have no other way out. We have gone too far. Only we must find the forms of reforms which the people will accept. But nothing will come of it without discipline and order, with slogans alone.

[Boyko] What is your attitude to the desire of representatives of the radical Ukrainian intelligentsia to resurrect the "blue and yellow" flag as the national flag?

[Shelest] It is not a matter of flags. People must be replete. This is the chief thing now. [Passage omitted]

## Altay Communist Advocates Party Factions

*PM1110132289 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Oct 89 Second Edition p 2*

[Article by I. Shefer, secretary of Altay State University party committee, plus commentary by PRAVDA Party Life Department, under the rubric "Platform for the Primary Organization Secretary": "From 'Total Unanimity' to Debate"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] It is now possible to ensure the party's development in the ideological, political, and organizational spheres only by departing from the old, ossified forms. At the same time the administrative, bureaucratic basis of the principles of party building, which for decades gave the full plenitude of power exclusively to the party committees (or more accurately to the leaders of the committees, from the Central Committee to the rayon committees [raykoms]), led in effect to a situation where many, if not the majority, of them are still headed by people with conservative views. They, in my view, are retarding the development of democratic processes in the party, being afraid to let go of the reins of power. Here one can clearly speak of party bureaucracy.

The success of perestroyka in the party depends largely on the position of those who belong to its upper echelons. But despite the appearance of a new publication, IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS, information on the activity of the Central Committee and its Politburo remains comparatively meager. It is very difficult to judge the practical line of specific members of the Politburo and other party leaders.

What must be changed? First of all, I believe that in the conditions of our political system, a system of organizationally and politically formulated counterweights should be created within the party—a pluralism of opinions and views which, taken together, will ensure the paramount partywide interests over the interests of individual groups, and in particular "full-time" workers who head the hierarchical structures. Total unanimity is always a fiction. Therefore it is necessary not only to give "dissidence" the right of citizenship, but also to construct the entire policy as the product of the struggle of opinions, and not the diktat of functionaries.

To this day we fear the word "faction" like the plague. True, accusations within the party of membership of this or that faction used to lead to the direst consequences. But the situation is different now! Of course, if factions were to spring up now, they would not be the ones that existed before or even after the revolution—the times have changed. Naturally, different organizational forms would most likely be used. But I think a step in this direction is necessary. Why should not the Central Committee now offer all Communists the opportunity to participate in the formulation of the party platform for the next congress, on an alternative basis?

It is also necessary to revise our understanding of the principle of democratic centralism, and to differentiate it. I do not think that in daily life we have yet done away with the norm that existed under Stalin, whereby Communists could criticize only their own organization, not a higher organization.

Another view expressed in the course of our debate concerns the inconsistency of certain steps and measures formulated at Central Committee plenums. For this reason the university's Communists proposed the speeding up of the convocation of the CPSU congress, with a view to renewing the Central Committee. Many Communists argued, however, that even that will not change anything: Once again, they said, the influence of the party's highest levels will prevail in the party, while the grass roots will remain passive. We believe that a new procedure for electing delegates to the congress should be adopted, by means of a partywide referendum: The elections should not be indirect, as hitherto, but direct, on the same principle as the elections of USSR people's deputies.

The next fundamental aspect is the problem of the prestige of political power. Recently (sociological research gives the figures to demonstrate this) it has declined considerably. In these conditions, we believe, resolute steps, also of a political nature, should be taken to boost the people's confidence in the party and government.

Events since the kray committee [kraykom] plenum, where we, the university Communists, were in the minority and where we were even likened to "DS [Democratic Union] supporters," have shown that meanwhile the number of such "plotters" is growing. A plenum of

Tsentralnyy Raykom adopted a decision to hold a referendum on the structure of the Barnaul City Party Organization, and proposed that the kraykom form a group to draw up a draft for new CPSU Statutes from the Altay.

Moreover the kraykom is now starting work to draw up and publish for further open discussion a draft kray party organization platform for the forthcoming elections to local soviets. (Incidentally, I myself have been drafted onto the organizational group under the kraykom bureau.) Furthermore it is now considered entirely normal that alternative, original draft platforms can also be published alongside this one. As you can see, the whole course of events is developing in the direction of (comradely!) debates and the resolution of the party's problems without any minority having to fear that they will promptly be declared to be "DS supporters" or "enemies of the people" in general.

The thesis that every party organization, especially the primary organization, should be concerned only with its "own" internal affairs and not get involved in big politics nowadays sounds bizarre, to say the least. Incidentally, at the kraykom plenum where we were accused of plotting, an account was heard of the work of Pavlovskiy Raykom in boosting the prestige and militancy of primary party organizations in the conditions of perestroyka. We heard about their first secretary, V. Draskov: A young, eager, fearless man. Draskov, in his report, did not cite a single vivid, positive example of growth in a primary organization's militancy (there is, he said, nothing to boast about yet!), and he invited the plenum participants to think collectively about how to restructure work in practice. But there was no practical response. The discussion, although apparently enthusiastic, merely scratched the surface of the urgent problems and became bogged down in details, while upholding the general immutable principle that the party was, is, and will remain the vanguard. In principle, that is true. But what kind of party do we need today, how should its organizations now act, in order to increase and strengthen their prestige and significance in the complex conditions of perestroyka?

I am convinced that everyone should be involved in the search for anwers to these questions. Every party organization and every Communist. Otherwise, it may be too late.

**Party Life Department Commentary**

Yes, the most diverse and sometimes frankly contradictory, mutually exclusive opinions are being voiced in the debate on perestroyka in the party. One may disagree with some of them (for instance, not all the opinions of the author of the above article seem to us to be sufficiently substantiated or cogent), but even patently erroneous statements should be listened to carefully, considered, and analyzed. Sweeping dissidents aside or hurrying to pin labels on them are yesterday's methods. It is important to create conditions everywhere for the fearless, open comparison of views and alternative approaches to urgent problems, while naturally preserving unity on questions of principle and strategic objectives. Judging from the above item, this is recognized in many of the party committees of Altay Kray. The result is: The debate here is becoming increasingly constructive and consolidating. That is the main thing. This is the guarantee of the ideological and organizational rallying of Communists on a platform of perestroyka, on the threshold of the 28th CPSU Congress.

## Anniversary Brings Praise to Moscow Broadcasting

*PM2410152789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 7*

[V. Vladin article under the "Announcement" rubric: "Moscow Radio: Fortunes Over the Years"]

[Text] Moscow Radio first broadcast to foreign listeners on 29 October 1929. "Moscow calling. Proletarians of all countries, unite!" rang out in German and then French and English. The 60th anniversary of Soviet external broadcasting will be marked by a program going out on Central Television's Channel 1 at 2310 hours.

Political observer Vladimir Tsvetov, the program's moderator:

"Nowadays Moscow Radio broadcasts 279 hours of programs in 77 languages daily. Several dozen announcers are simultaneously on air on different wavelengths. The audience numbers 100 million. That we know from our mailbag. Valentina Zlobina from the mail department says in the program that each year around 200,000 letters from more than 160 countries and territories written in 63 foreign languages are received. Recently, since the opening of the Moscow Radio World Service in Russian, there have been many in Russian too.

"Of course Moscow Radio, Voice of America [VOA], the BBC Russian Service, and Deutsche Welle are broadcast alongside one another. Sometimes our call signs will follow a VOA program on the same wavelength. But we have been and we remain different. Even in those dismal times when we were mindlessly engaged in fashioning the 'enemy image,' seeking to depict each other in the most repulsive way, Moscow Radio never allowed any insult to the peoples to be broadcast in its programs. That is why perhaps it enjoys its very high standing.

"Its prestige goes back a long way. It dates from the time when Lenin's dream of being able to address the working people of foreign countries directly, circumventing the barriers imposed by censorship and borders, came to pass. Mate Zalka launched the Hungarian service in 1933; Egon Erwin Kisch was in charge of German broadcasts. Dolores Ibarruri spoke to her compatriots in Spanish from Moscow. Deng Yingchao—wife of Zhao Enlai—was the first to read out 'Moscow Calling' on air in Chinese. Yoshiko Okada, who had won renown as a great actress in Japan, was also a Moscow Radio announcer. While during wartime the voices of Georgi

Dimitrov, Palmiro Togliatti, Wilhelm Pieck, Louis Aragon, and Zofya Dzerzinskaja were heard on the Moscow wavelength. Moscow Radio maintained faith in the victory over fascism.

"Of course, these broadcasts did not escape bombast in the thirties or the period of the fifties through the seventies. Socialism's achievements were described in lofty terms and problems were declared to be solved once and for all. During the Brezhnev period one heard that "The crises and slumps which so acutely affect working people's lives under capitalism have been foreign to the Soviet economy for decades." Moscow Radio has had its ups and its downs. It has lived the life of the country—heroic and tragic, stagnant and energetic. Even in the most desolate, trying times it did not lose its ability to feel the pain of another as its own. Whatever Moscow Radio broadcast, the language was in essence the same—the language of internationalism."